What is his Legacy?
Can he be commemorated as a National Hero? This will be disccussed in an upcoming publication "Renungan Sejarah - Historical Reflections"
1945 - 1998
If he had stepped down in 1990 his legacy would be undisputed : Father
of Development,
a legacy of economic development and nationwide improvement of people's living standards
In an interview with Editor Admiral (Ret,) Sudomo, a member of Suharto's
inner circle,
talked about the death on April 28, 1996 of the president's wife, Ibu Tien Suharto.
It should be clearly stated that rumors in circulation about a violent death are not true. The truth is that
the medical condition of Ibu Tien, a diabetes patient, did not allow her to take long walks.
Before her death she had advised President Suharto to step down , enabling them to enjoy a less stressful life,
free from pressing government issues,
and enjoy a closer family life.
Ibu Tien was very disappointed that President Suharto did not take her advice.
To soothen her feelings she went on a walking trip with her grandchildren to the fruit
orchard Mekarsari outside the centre of Jakarta. Apparently the trip was too tiresome for her and affected
her badly. In the evening she fell ill and did not recover.
Her death was a tragedy for her family and the nation, thus Admiral Sudomo
The late Indonesian president Suharto, seen in this May 1998 photo
with his daughter Siti “Tutut” Hardiyanti Rukmana, was not among the heroes named.
(AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on Tuesday presented posthumous heroism titles to seven Indonesians for their
dedication and service to the nation.
Conspicuously absent from the list, however, were two late presidents: Suharto and Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid.
A presidential decree awarded the heroism titles to Syafruddin Prawiranegara, a former acting president under the
emergency government from 1948 to 1949; and Idham Chalid, a former long-time chairman of the country’s largest
Islamic organization, the Nahdlatul Ulama.
Also honored were Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, a Muslim cleric better known as Buya Hamka; Ki Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro,
considered a pioneer in education in Java; and I Gusti Ketut Puja, the first governor of Bali.
The other recipients were Sunan Pakubuwono X, former head of the Solo Royal House and a key figure in Indonesia’s
independence struggle; and Ignatius Joseph Kasimo Hendrowahyono, a Catholic politician.
The title deeds were given to their families in a ceremony at the State Palace in Jakarta, with all members of
the cabinet present.
Sultan Sulaiman Syariful Alamsyah of the Serdang kingdom in North Sumatra, who died in 1946, was awarded a Bintang
Mahaputra Adi Pradana award, the same award presented to Golkar Party chairman Aburizal Bakrie in August.
Ten late humanitarians and artists received special honors, including Benyamin Sueb, a comedic actor who best
represented the Betawi culture of Jakarta; Javanese culture expert Go Tik Swan; Hindu Ashram leader Gedong Bagus
Oka; and dancer and choreographer Huriah Adam.
Priyo Budi Santoso, deputy speaker of the House of Representatives, welcomed the list of recipients but regretted
that the government did not have the courage to include former presidents Suharto and Gus Dur for the title.
Suharto, although recognized for developing the nation and raising its prosperity, has also been vilified for
his three decades of iron-fisted rule, which was riddled with corruption and human rights violations.
Djoko Suyanto, who heads the National Title Council, said no one had ever nominated Suharto or Gus Dur for the
national heroism titles.
Gus Dur, who promoted many pro-democratic reforms during his rule, was later unseated by the legislature, with
which he had bad ties.
“With figures as extraordinary as Bung Karno [President Sukarno], [Mohammad] Hatta and [General] Soedirman, if
we
really look for their mistakes, there will certainly be some,” Priyo said. “I am of the view that one day, at its
own time, Suharto and Gus Dur will certainly obtain the national hero title.”
Gus Dur’s daughter Zanuba Arifah Chafsoh, better known as Yenny, said the East Java provincial government had
proposed Gus Dur for a national heroism title in 2010.
“Therefore it is strange if there are people saying that there has been no such proposal,” she said.
Yenny’s statement was echoed by Marwan Jafar, head of the House faction of the National Awakening Party (PKB),
which was co-founded by Gus Dur.
“We proposed it together and held a press conference with the minister there, which was covered by various media.
How can they say there has never been a proposal?” Marwan said
The late Indonesian president Suharto,
accompanied by his daughter Siti “Tutut” Hardiyanti Rukmana,
the then minister of social affairs, on May 21, 1998.
Mbak Tutut has released a new book, 'Pak Harto: The Untold Stories.' (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)
There are two sides to every story. At least that’s what Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, who is better known as Mbak
Tutut, aims to show in her new book, “Pak Harto: The Untold Stories,” a memoir of her late father, Suharto.
Published in June to mark what would have been the former president’s 90th birthday, the book is a compilation
of stories told by those in Suharto’s close circles, including former leaders from neighboring countries, such
as Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew and Fidel Ramos of the Philippines.
Many would be inclined to dismiss the rose-tinted view presented by the former strongman’s family and close friends,
remembering the oppressive rule of his New Order regime and its poor human rights record. Suharto’s New Order may
be over, but from a historical and sociological viewpoint, the damage it inflicted may continue to affect people
for generations.
But to read this book is to see the other side of the story — even if it is only the positive side that is presented
by Suharto’s daughter. Despite its self-declared bias, the book is worth reading due to the historical insights
it offers into Indonesia’s longest-serving leader.
The “untold stories” promised in the book’s title are presented by more than 100 sources who offered to share the
details of their impressions and private interactions with the Smiling General. The stories are grouped into eight
chapters, each covering a different angle and period of the former president’s rule.
In the first chapter, “Ksatria Cemerlang” (“Bright Knight”), Suharto is described by fellow heads of government
Mahathir and Lee as a calm and understanding leader who respected his colleagues equally.
Lee recalls his awkward first meeting with Suharto, when Indonesia and Singapore had not yet established a diplomatic
relationship. The longtime prime minister of Singapore praises Suharto as a man of his word and a pragmatic statesman.
The chapter is accompanied by photos of a much younger-looking Suharto, free of wrinkles and decidedly leaner.
The second chapter, “Bahu Membahu Demi Negara” (“Together for the Country”), collects the impressions of members
of the former president’s inner circle, including former ministers Harmoko, Joop Ave and Hayono Isman, who offer
predictably positive accounts of Suharto’s leadership style.
The next chapter, “Kedua Tangan Itu Selalu Terbuka” (“Those Hands Are Always Open”), makes room for Suharto’s political
opponents — but even these appear to be positive stories.
Andi Mapetahang Fatwa, an activist who was jailed by the New Order regime for 18 years, is quoted as saying that
his imprisonment was the collective responsibility of the regime and the nation, and should not be blamed on Suharto
alone.
Taufik Kiemas, speaker of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and husband of former President Megawati Sukarnoputri,
recalls his last meeting with Suharto. He said Suharto’s last message was to defend Pancasila, the state ideology,
and the Republic of Indonesia.
The most interesting part of the book is the historical tidbits provided about Suharto’s participation in the struggle
for independence. Des Alwi Abubakar, a prominent historian who passed away last year, tells a story about how Suharto
saved a fellow spy during the Japanese occupation by dressing him as a girl.
Many of the former president’s favorite sayings are sprinkled throughout the book, most of them showing his strong
connection with Javanese culture.
As a memoir of an influential public figure, “Pak Harto: The Untold Stories” is a well-formulated document. The
story of Suharto’s life is told colorfully, with a wide range of sources, from politicians to celebrities, religious
scholars, teachers, puppet masters and even the former president’s barber.
Instead of commenting on his style of governance, these sources share their stories about what the former president
said, what he ate and about his personal preferences. It is a deeply personal perspective on Suharto.
As the reader nears the final chapters, the question lingers: What is the former president’s true legacy for Indonesia?
Just as Mbak Tutut writes in her preface to the book, only time will tell.
Suharto ruled Indonesia for more than three decades, before being ousted on a wave of popular discontent in
1998.
Under his presidency, investment from the West was encouraged and Indonesia enjoyed rapid economic growth.
But the Asian financial crisis in 1997 provoked a wave of unrest among the poor, students and the burgeoning middle
class, which led to his overthrow.
Suharto, who used only one name in common with many of his countrymen, was born in Java in 1921. Accounts of his
early years differ, but his family is known to have been large and poor.
During World War II, Japanese forces occupied Indonesia - then part of the Dutch East Indies empire. The young
Suharto was trained by a Japanese-created militia.
At the war's end in 1945, incumbent president Sukarno declared independence from the Netherlands, sparking a bloody
anti-colonial struggle in which Suharto played a leading role.
The Netherlands finally handed over sovereignty four years later.
Suharto was sworn into the cabinet in 1966
Suharto managed to work his way up the ranks of the armed forces, eventually becoming a senior general.
In 1965, a botched coup attempt eventually propelled him to power.
Exact details are sketchy, but on the morning of 1 October, six senior right-wing generals were captured and murdered.
Suharto himself was not at home at the time, and was not caught up in the sweep.
As one of the few surviving top generals, Suharto played a key role in the political turmoil that followed.
Communist sympathisers were blamed for the killings. In a wave of retribution that swept across Indonesia, hundreds
of thousands of apparent communists and leftists - as well as members of the envied Chinese community - were massacred.
The bloodshed ended the political power wielded by Sukarno, and Suharto was named president in 1967 - a position
that was formalised the following year as a result of legislative elections.
Discipline and order
Suharto was re-elected every five years until his downfall - but his success at the polls was unsurprising as electoral
laws limited the number of parties and stifled opposition.
Although members of the powerful military were banned from political parties, 100 seats were set aside for them
in the electoral college. The system of dwifungsi - dual function - formalised army involvement at every level
of civil government.
Whereas his predecessor had called himself the "father of modern Indonesia", Suharto considered himself
the "father of development", using Indonesia's vast natural resources to create a modern infrastructure.
The army was crucial to Suharto's success
Combining economic liberalism with ruthless discipline, Suharto led his country from poverty to relative prosperity.
But economic growth came at a price.
Suharto's regime was repressive. He ignored demands for political reform, and was regularly accused of corruption
and human rights abuses. After the collapse of the Portuguese overseas empire in 1975, Suharto sent troops to annex East Timor - one of Portugal's former colonies.
As many as 200,000 people - about one-third of East Timor's population - are thought to have been killed or died
of hunger during the occupation. Indonesia eventually agreed to East Timor's independence in 1999.
Bulwark against communism
In later years, Suharto acknowledged that errors had been made. "In transforming our nation," he said,
"we may stumble. We are not trying to hide this fact." As an old-fashioned nationalist, Suharto kept
Indonesia officially neutral in international disputes, as a member of the Non-Aligned
Movement pioneered by Sukarno.
However, Suharto was widely viewed as pro-Western,
and the West viewed him as a bulwark against communism.
His party, Golkar, fostered Pancasila, a state ideology which was an amalgam of beliefs and which provided for
social harmony.
East Timor was a running sore during Suharto's rule
For instance, even though 80% of Indonesians were Muslim, Suharto did not want the country to become an Islamic
state.
Indeed, the Indonesian state officially marked the holy days of several major religions.
But the rigid system put in place by Suharto unravelled quickly amid the catastrophic collapse in the country's
economy in 1997.
During the Asian financial crisis, there was a run on the banks as people rushed to take out rupiahs before the
currency could depreciate even further in value. Shops were stripped of their goods as panic-buying affected the
whole country.
Corruption cases
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was brought in to bail Indonesia out with a series of stringent economic
measures.
But it was too late for Suharto. Indonesia's poor, many of whom had lost their jobs, took to the streets in a frenzy
of rioting and looting, which, together with student protests, eventually forced him from power.
After his downfall, Suharto evaded prosecution on charges of corruption and human rights abuses, despite continuing
demands by protesters.
Rioting in Jakarta, 1998
Suharto's opponents accused him of collecting a fortune during his rule.
The former president and his family were estimated by Time
magazine to have amassed some $15bn (£8bn) during his 32 years in power. Suharto denied the charges and
sued Time for defamation.
An Indonesian court ruled in his favour, saying he should be awarded more than $100m in damages. Time was still
appealing against the ruling as he died.
Prosecutors had also wanted to file criminal charges against Suharto, accusing him of corruption.
But in 2006, after doctors testified that a series of strokes he had suffered had left him brain-damaged and unfit
to face prosecution, these charges were dropped, causing outrage among his critics.
Ultimately, however, the man whom the corruption watchdog Transparency International described as the greatest
kleptocrat of all time and who, for so long, had wielded ultimate power in his country, ended his life a sick,
reclusive figure, seemingly out of touch with the new, democratic, Indonesia.
If Suharto, who has died at the age of 86, had the kind of pumped-up ego we usually associate with powerful
politicians, he never let it show. In fact he rarely betrayed any emotion.
In stark contrast to his fiery and extrovert predecessor Sukarno, Indonesia's first president,
Suharto exuded a sense of calm detachment, his face an enigmatic mask that gave away little.
He kept himself aloof from foreigners and Indonesians alike, almost never granting interviews, only addressing
the public sparingly in set-piece speeches which he delivered in a monotone mumble with all the charisma of a junior
civil servant.
Suharto gave himself the title Father of Development
He left no statues of himself, no parks or roads were named after him, and only on special occasions did you
see his face up on billboards, although in the last years of his rule it did appear on the largest-denomination
banknote.
Indonesians often found it difficult to pin down what they felt about the man who had towered over their lives
for so long.
For most he remained an opaque, distant figure.
They certainly feared him.
He preferred indirect methods to disable his opponents, but was prepared at times to unleash terrifying violence
to defend
his so-called New Order regime.
Slaughter
The bloodshed which accompanied his rise to power, after a mysterious coup attempt in 1965 which he blamed
on Indonesia's then-powerful Communist Party, was on a scale matched only in Cambodia in this region.
Within the space of a few months at least half a million people were slaughtered in anti-communist pogroms that,
at the very least, Suharto and the military tacitly encouraged. The trauma of that period scars Indonesia to this
day, and was a key tool in Suharto's armoury.
The spectre of a communist revival was used time and again, right up to the end of his rule, to discredit dissidents,
even though the party was completely destroyed in the 1960s.
In the wake of those killings, 200,000 people were detained, half of who remained in prison for more than a decade,
most without trial.
They included some of Indonesia's best-known artists and intellectuals.
But it was his ability to manipulate the fear left over from the 1960s which was Suharto's key talent.
He created a network of intelligence agencies whose job it was to sniff out any dissent before it could gain momentum.
Two million people were officially tainted with left wing associations right through to the 1990s - that might
just mean having had a grandparent connected in some way with the old Communist Party.
Such a taint could bar you from a government job, or a place at university.
His intelligence agencies proved adept at provoking incidents that gave them a pretext to crush incipient opposition,
or at persuading opponents to switch sides.
The student movement was crushed in the 1970s, Islamic activists were either co-opted or jailed in a series of
show trials in the 1980s, and independent media outlets were crippled in the mid-1990s.
Economic growth
Suharto had an unrivalled political cunning, an unerring instinct for wrong-footing possible rivals.
But he also carried with him the mindset formed by his small-town upbringing, and believed the mass of the rural
poor
should be disconnected from politics, and focus only on improving their lives.
His preferred title was revealing - Bapak Pembangunan, meaning "father of development".
His approach to ruling the country was as a stern but benevolent father, who enjoyed dispensing folksy advice and
assistance to awe-struck farmers, but would brook no criticism.
It was an approach that delivered impressive stability and development, but at a price. But the oppressive political
climate stifled intellectual development, and smothered attempts to address Indonesia's many ethnic and religious
disputes, which then erupted after Suharto's downfall with great loss of life.
Suharto was also lucky. His accession to power coincided with the escalation of the Vietnam War, when the United
States was desperate for reliable allies in the region and willing to turn a blind eye to his human rights record.
It also coincided with the first oil boom, which poured riches into the government's coffers.
This only fuelled the culture of patronage and corruption which was endemic in Suharto's paternalistic style of
government.
It was one of his great blind spots, a corrosive drag on his economic achievements he never seemed to recognise.
He was notably weak in confronting the conflicts of interest surrounding his six children, who became spectacularly
rich during the boom years of the 1980s and 90s.
Suharto himself lived modestly, but he surrounded himself with people who did not, and who flagrantly abused their
access to him to become even richer.
Obscure retirement
Was he a great Asian leader? The many thousands of victims of his brutal purges would surely say no, and
yet most Indonesians probably accepted his rule as largely beneficial right up to his last few years in power.
He enjoyed great respect in the rest of the region as a leader who had led Indonesia away from chaos and confrontation
with its neighbours.
Had he felt able to step down a few years earlier, his reputation in his country would have been assured.
As his New Order began to show its age in the 1990s, there was much fevered speculation over how violent Suharto's
departure would be, whether it would be as bad as Indonesia's only other experience of a power transfer in the
mid-1960s.
Many saw Indonesia as another Yugoslavia, an unwieldy sprawl of islands and ethnic groups that was doomed to fall
apart once Suharto's vice-like hold on power was loosened.
Yet, when finally confronted with overwhelming opposition in May 1998, he did not, as many feared, use the military
to defend his regime, but instead accepted his defeat, and stepped back into obscure retirement.
After a shaky few years, Indonesia has developed into one of Asia's most lively democracies, and is enjoying strong
economic growth again.
One look at nearby Burma, a country with some striking similarities, is enough to know how bad things could have
been in Indonesia under different leadership.
SINGAPORE - Indonesia's long-reigning second president Suharto, who held the office from 1967 to 1998 - who died
in Sunday - will be remembered as one of the more complex and contradictory autocrats of the last century.
Born to a poor peasant family in Central Java in 1921, he ruled Indonesia for more than 30 years from 1965 until
his downfall in 1998, but hardly with an iron fist. There were no legions of jailed dissidents or disappearances
in the night, and there was a considerable improvement in the livelihood and welfare of the average Indonesian.
There is no question that Suharto brought prosperity and development to Indonesia; his principal failing was not
to see the wisdom of gradual political reform or the danger posed by his family's business empire. Suharto's ignominious
resignation in May 1998 as students occupied his rubber stamp parliament and looters burned Jakarta's business
district suggested another people's power revolution. The reality was less idealistic or elegant.
In a later interview, Suharto himself pinpointed the withdrawal of economic support by the United States and the
International Monetary Fund as a trigger for rampant inflation and punishing price hikes - ironically more or less
the same economic circumstances that led to the downfall of his predecessor, Sukarno in 1966.
Once weakened, Suharto became vulnerable to the machinations of Indonesian elite politics; his cabinet abandoned
him and the army quarrelled over who would take over. Ordinary people died in the crossfire and the students were
manipulated and then let down by a selfish elite unwilling to surrender their wealth and privileges. Ten years
on, many of Suharto's associates from the business and political world remain in influential positions and the
power of his patronage lives on in the form of charitable foundations that he established.
Suharto squandered his own legacy.
He should have seen the sense of letting more light into a political system that he controlled with the skill and
determination of a latter-day Javanese sultan. Reserved and somewhat aloof, the always smiling Suharto skillfully
wielded power using a mix of introspection, strategic timing and cleverly managed personal networks.
He made sure that everyone reported directly to him; he even made sure that village-level funds were earmarked
as coming directly from him. As the self-proclaimed "father of development", he never allowed anyone
else to take credit for Indonesia's progress, a style that stunted the country's institutional and bureaucratic
development and left it wholly unprepared for democracy when it finally came after his downfall.
Suharto took pride in his humble rural origins as the son of a village irrigation inspector form a village called
Kemusuk on the outskirts of Jogyakarta. He liked nothing better than to tell farmers what to do - he would become
animated about new techniques for bovine artificial insemination as national television broadcast wide eyed looks
of wonderment on the faces of poor farmers ushered before him to hear these pearls of agronomic wisdom.
He carefully cultivated an image of humility that masked his family's fabulous wealth, wearing the same drab safari
suit and keeping punctual office hours. He shunned the grand stuccoed presidential palace for a dowdy single story
house filled with cheap glass kitsch. He had no weakness for fast cars or women. He rather preferred to go fishing.
All in the family
But he did have a weakness for his family. Suharto's three sons and three daughters were given carte blanche to
build corporate empires, which in turn foreign investors were required to do business with. Using licensing and
monopolistic practices the army had fashioned after Dutch colonial rule to fund its operation, Suharto simply allocated
his family enterprises choice areas of economic growth and then ordered state run banks to lend them money. He
used an arcane foundation law, which once provided a loophole for the independence movement to acquire funds under
Dutch rule, to stash away billions of dollars and forced poorly paid civil servants to make donations.
It is perhaps most telling that when the late Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX of Jogyakarta was told about Suharto's rise
to power in 1966, he responded: "Is he still in the habit of stealing?"
Major General Suharto, then in his mid-forties, crept into power on the back of a failed army-led putsch that has
never been fully explained. It took this former rural credit clerk who joined the army, like so many of his generation
during the Japanese occupation, more than three years to assume full power after the coup, and another decade to
overcome factional rivalry within the military. The army later felt abandoned and weakened under his rule - and
there were several attempts to cross him by senior officers.
Although his regime was not characterized by the blatant state-sanctioned violence of other contemporary autocrats,
Suharto had blood on his hands. He allowed perhaps at least half a million Indonesians to die at the hands of anti-communist
vigilantes in 1966; he jailed many thousands of suspected communists on a remote island the Dutch had used as a
prison - although he later ordered their release. He oversaw the occupation and brutal suppression of East Timor
in 1975 in which up to 200,000 people may have died, and sanctioned a brutal crackdown on organized crime in the
mid-1980s.
All the same, many, perhaps most, Indonesians will choose to remember the good times Suharto ushered in. He was
supported by the middle class in the 1960s who were fed up with Sukarno's bombastic confrontation with the West
and neighboring countries, which was ruining the country.
Suharto delivered economic stability, encouraged foreign investment, prudently spread the wealth and fostered development
that fed and educated people, giving poorer Indonesians the best standard of living they had ever had. By the mid-1980s,
Indonesia was growing at more than 6% a year and had a per-capita income of more than US$500. In the 1990s, Indonesia
was riding high, the darling of the World Bank's East Asian economic miracle.
Although crippled by strokes, Suharto lived on after his fall from power to see the real legacy of his rule, which
was a chaotic scramble to shake off years of paternalistic rule and forge a workable representative democracy.
In the wake of his fall, four presidents have struggled to eliminate rampant corruption in the public sector and
build strong institutions that adhere to the rule of law rather than personal fealty and patronage. If only Suharto
had seen the need for more openness and started the process of change earlier, the country's transition would have
been less costly and less painful.
Complicated legacy
With the passing of Suharto, many will be tempted to declare a close to the authoritarian chapter of Indonesian
history. So long as Suharto lived, there was no hope of closure or compensation for the more egregious excesses
of his three decade rule because of the impunity he enjoyed. Now that he is gone, the danger is that people will
all too easily forget and lull themselves into believing that Indonesia is on an irreversible course to a freedom,
equality and justice.
Sadly, this goal is far from assured. For a political culture that nurtures selfish, corrupt elites and tends to
ignore or trample on popular demands for justice and equality remains very much in place. Democracy as a system
has been in effect for a decade, but democracy as a belief is still rather tenuous. How are we to be assured otherwise
when the sitting vice president describes democracy as a means and not a goal of national development; or when
no one can be held accountable for the mudflow from a rogue gas field owned by an influential family that has displaced
tens of thousands in East Java; or when no one is punished for the murder of a prominent human rights activist.
The tenacious survival of what Indonesians call the "feudal mentality" helps explain the historical cycle
of revolution, liberation, dictatorship, leading eventually back to revolt and liberation which has characterized
the past sixty years. Indonesia's founding president Sukarno led a revolution that
established one of Asia's youngest multi-party democracies at independence in 1949; the 1955 general election is
still considered a benchmark expression of popular will.
But Sukarno's vanity and bombast convinced him that his leadership was sufficient to guide the country, and democracy
withered and died. In 1965 General Suharto seized the reins of power amid protests and student unrest calling for
an end to Sukarno's dictatorship. Two decades later, a new generation of students was calling Suharto the dictator,
and another ten years on in 1998 he was forced from power after students occupied parliament allowing his cabinet
to abandon him and the army to withdraw support.
The period since then has generated hope that the country's political system is firmly on a democratic path. One
optimistic sign has been the ability to vote in and vote out a series of chief executives - four presidents in
a decade compared to just two in the preceding half century. Elections have been held freely and fairly at all
levels and the army has retreated from the political arena.
So why worry about the future? It is virtually a truism in Southeast Asia that elections are not a good measure
of democratic health. Look at Thailand where more than a decade of democratic advancement that most observers confidently
considered a corner turned ended in a military coup. In Indonesia there has never been a tradition of military
coups, but there is a long history of patronage and paternalism that has tended to concentrate wealth in the hands
of a few who squander national resources that could be deployed to benefit the many.
What Indonesia desperately needs to establish is a system of government that cares for all of its citizens and
nurtures a culture of equality. What use is a democracy when many ordinary Indonesians remember that Suharto the
authoritarian delivered welfare and prosperity, yet in Jakarta today - where the city governor is now elected -
low income families suffer higher levels of chronic malnourishment and disease than a decade ago. As the late writer
and social critic Y B Mangunwijaya once sadly observed: "The little man in Indonesia will only be helped by
the power of the outside world because in Indonesian culture there is no tradition of helping the little man."
It would be comforting to believe that the decade Suharto spent in virtual isolation at his Jakarta home after
his fall was justice of sorts for a man who allowed the country to descend into violence and ruin because he could
not bring himself to let a little light into the system. But instead, the ailing Suharto commanded strong loyalty
and respect from the majority of people who now lead the country - many of whom rushed to his bedside each time
he was hospitalized because they owe their wealth and position to his patronage. Why last year he even won a libel
case against Time Magazine over an article alleging that he and his family had illegally amassed billions of dollars
and stashed them overseas.
Instead of fretting over the old dictator's residual power, it would be prudent to focus on the obstacles that
lie ahead. For no matter how freely and fairly the next president is elected, if social justice isn't delivered,
we will surely see new signs of the old political cycle that has burdened Indonesia since independence: protests,
prompting crackdowns, the promulgation of emergency powers in the interest of stability, and eventually dictatorship.
Isn't this just what happened in the 1960s when Sukarno faced popular demands for reform and offered his people
rhetoric instead of rice? The passing of Suharto should not pull the wool over outsiders' eyes and lull Indonesians
into a false sense of security. Let us instead worry about the future and prevent the country's current and future
leaders from assuming they can benefit from Indonesia's abundant riches without sharing the wealth and governing
in the interests of all, rather than a few.
Michael Vatikiotis is the Asia regional director for the Geneva-based Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. He is the
author of Indonesian Politics Under Suharto.
JAKARTA (Reuters) - Former strongman Suharto, who died on Sunday, steered Indonesia through three decades of
rapid economic growth and stability, only to see much of his work unravel in months as the country was plunged
into chaos.
The ex-general was swept out of office on May 21, 1998 amid a savage economic crisis, mass protests and riots in
Jakarta that killed 1,200, while his own legacy was tarnished by charges his family had plundered billions of dollars
through corrupt deals.
The 86-year-old former president was taken to a Jakarta hospital on January 4 with heart, lung and kidney problems.
He suffered from multiple organ failure, doctors said on Sunday.
Ethnic bloodletting, a ruined economy and weak government in the years after Suharto's fall led some Indonesians
to yearn for a return to his tough style of leadership. That view faded as Indonesia embraced democracy and recovered,
and many could never forgive the graft and human rights abuses of the Suharto era.
Critics say Suharto and his family amassed as much as $45 billion in kickbacks or deals where political influence
was a key to who won a contract, charges he denied.
Attempts, some half-hearted, by subsequent governments to prosecute him over corruption charges failed as the courts
accepted that he was too ill to stand trial.
Suharto rejected accusations he had stashed wealth overseas. Last year, the Supreme Court ordered Time magazine
to pay him more than $100 million in damages in a libel suit over a 1999 cover story that said he and his family
had a fortune of around $15 billion. Time has challenged the ruling.
"The fact is I don't even have one cent of savings abroad, don't have accounts at foreign banks, don't have
deposits abroad and don't even have any shares in foreign firms, much less hundreds of billions of dollars,"
Suharto said in a rare interview in late 1998.
Some defenders say Suharto himself was relatively clean, but turned a blind eye to his relatives' abuse of their
connections to him to gain lucrative contracts and increasingly egregious deals that included a national car project
and Bre-X, a non-existent gold mine.
In any case, Indonesia was consistently ranked one of the most corrupt countries in the world under Suharto, and
has had limited success in changing that since his fall.
ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE
Born on June 8, 1921, Suharto came from a humble background. His father was a minor official in the village of
Kemusuk in Central Java.
Suharto joined the Dutch colonial army at 19 as a corporal. During the Japanese 1942-45 occupation, he was an officer
in the Japanese-trained "Indonesian army", and afterwards fought with Indonesian guerrillas against the
Dutch.
He rose to power after he led the military in 1965 against what was officially called an attempted communist coup.
Whether that was true -- and Suharto's role in the events remains controversial -- it was followed by an anti-communist
purge in which as many as 500,000 people were killed.
Suharto effectively seized control from the country's first president, Sukarno, in 1966 and was named president
the next year. Over the next three decades, he won reluctant admiration for political shrewdness as he played rival
groups off against each other and stifled political dissent.
His New Order regime brought multi-ethnic Indonesia, the world's fourth-most populous country, a large measure
of unity, backed by a powerful military that crushed any sign of revolt
As a staunch anti-communist, he had the support of the West, particularly Washington which quietly gave the
green light for Indonesia's brutal invasion of East Timor in 1975. The United Nations never recognized the annexation,
and only after Suharto was ousted did Indonesia agree to Timor's independence.
COLLAPSE
Once one of Asia's tiger economies, Indonesia was among those hardest hit by the region's financial crisis in 1997-98.
Years of economic progress evaporated as the rupiah currency collapsed, scores of firms went bankrupt, and millions
of people were thrown back into poverty.
The crisis sparked unprecedented political dissent. Thousands of students across Indonesia took to the streets
to demand Suharto's resignation. Riots and unrest flared. Jakarta burned.
When Suharto did eventually resign, he handed over to his protege and vice president, B.J. Habibie, and the backlash
began.
Amid allegations of graft, state firms cancelled deals struck with Suharto's relatives, saying they had been forced
into them on unfavorable terms, while Indonesia's crippled banking system took years to recover.
Evidence mounted of human rights atrocities by the army that had backed Suharto's presidency, and ethnic, religious
and separatist violence burst out across the sprawling archipelago, leaving thousands dead.
Suharto's political vehicle, known as Golkar, remained strong even after he stepped down, winning most seats in
parliament in 2004, although it failed to take the presidency later that year.
His own direct and visible influence seemed to fade fairly quickly after he resigned, and he said very little in
public even before his reported health problems.
But Suharto and his family kept close links to key institutions such as the military, while Indonesia's political
and business elite still showed their respect by visiting him, at home and in hospital.
Despite occasional nostalgic pangs for the positive aspects of his rule, however, the public shows little desire
to abandon the post-Suharto democracy that has won praise worldwide.
(Writing by Jerry Norton, Editing by Sara Webb and Sanjeev Miglani)
A new regime has risen, backed by the army but scrupulously constitutional and commanding
vociferous popular support. "Indonesia is a state based on law not on mere power," says its new leader,
a quietly determined Javanese general whose only name is Suharto.
Under Suharto, the nation that last year was a virtual
Peking satellite has become a vigorous foe of Red China.
It has called off its senseless, undeclared war against Malaysia and revived its friendships with other neighbors.
It has halted the economy-wrecking prestige projects that Sukarno so dearly loved. And in an orgy of flashing knives
and coughing guns, it has virtually wiped out the Partai Komunis Indonesia (P.K.I.) —which under Sukarno had
grown to be the third largest Communist Party in the world.
Indonesia's Supreme Court has reversed a two-year-old libel conviction against Time magazine, in a move that is
being seen as a victory for press freedom.
It means the publication no longer has to pay $106m (£70m) in damages to the estate of late President Suharto.
A 1999 cover story alleged his family had amassed a multi-billion dollar fortune during his 32-years in office.
Since the initial trial, a corruption watchdog has estimated that Mr Suharto stole as much as $35bn while in power.
Last year the Indonesian courts ruled that his heirs were liable for some of the embezzled money.
Suharto's Indonesia
A look back at life in the world's fourth largest country
03-August 1966
Suharto talks with President Sukarno. Following endemic violence and social unrest, the charismatic independence
leader was forced to grant Suharto executive powers that would eventually lead to the general succeeding him.
06-1969
U.S. President Richard Nixon meets with President Suharto.
After the visit, the United States increases its military assistance to Indonesia.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s experience economic development and enjoyed close ties with the United States.
09-1998
Indonesian depositors outside a bank in Jakarta. The Asian currency collapse sent tremors through Indonesia's economy
and caused its currency, the Rupiah, to plunge. The crisis prompted a multi-billion dollar IMF bailout and the
closure of several Indonesian banks, as well as allegations that Suharto's ruling Golkar party had diverted recovery
funds into its own coffers.
11-May 19, 1998
Students protest outside Indonesia's parliament building.
At least 500 people were killed in the riots that preceded Suharto's fall.
15-September 2004
Suharto waves to journalists after voting near his home in Central Jarkarta in Indonesia's first free elections.
Ill health, including a series of strokes, kept the former leader out of the spotlight following his 1998 resignation.
After the overthrow, Suharto spent most of his time living at home with
his family in an upscale neighborhood in central Jakarta
even as allegations of ill-gotten wealth percolated through the press. Citing declining health and diminished mental
capacity, Suharto managed to stay out of court despite a 1998 legislative decree ordering an investigation in all
corruption, collusion and nepotism charges involving Suharto. He was constantly in and out of hospitals after suffering
strokes and undergoing kidney dialysis. When it became clear that he would not survive the latest hospitalization,
the new rulers of the archipelago came to pay homage and to pray for his recovery. The Golkar party, which Suharto
founded and retains the largest bloc in parliament, called for all pending graft charges —pending for a decade
now — be dropped. As the ex-strongman lay dying, the health minister instructed
all hospitals to provide their best equipment to Pertamina hospital, where Suharto was being treated. But after
three weeks, he
died of multiple organ failure. He will be buried next to his wife in the central Java city of Solo. It is not
clear what will happen to
the civil suit brought against him by Indonesia's attorney general for allegedly siphoning off more than $1.4 billion
from one of the many foundations set up during his rule.
An era of democracy has now replaced Suharto's despotic rule. And yet, he leaves behind an edifice as sturdy as
that millennium-old temple in Prambanan. The way things are done in Indonesia is the system of patronage he set
up and it remains firmly in place to this day.
WASHINGTON, DC - On the 35th anniversary of the so-called "Act of Free Choice" (AFC) that resulted in
West Papua's annexation by Indonesia, newly declassified documents revealed that the administration of the late
US president Richard Nixon was unwilling to raise any objections to the process despite its assessment that the
move was overwhelmingly opposed by the Papuan people.
The documents, released by the independent Washington-based National Security Archive (NSA) on Friday, show that
Washington's Cold War courtship of General Suharto, who had come to power in a military coup d'etat in 1966 and
ruled Indonesia with an iron fist until his ouster in 1998, was considered a much higher priority than a plebiscite
on independence, "which would be meaningless among the Stone Age cultures of New Guinea", according to
a memo sent by then-national security adviser Henry Kissinger to Nixon on the eve of a meeting with the Indonesian
strongman in Jakarta in June 1969. The presidential trip coincided with the AFC voting by which Indonesia legitimized
its annexation of the territory of West Irian, now known as West Papua - the western half of the South Pacific
island of New Guinea.
The province was annexed from the Dutch in 1969 and renamed Irian Jaya (West Irian) under Suharto. The area was
granted limited autonomy in 2001, and in 2002 the provincial government adopted the name West Papua for the province.
The eastern half of the island comprises the independent nation of Papua New Guinea.
"You should tell [Suharto] that we understand the problems they face in West Irian," wrote Kissinger,
who advised Nixon not to bring up the subject on his own lest Washington be more closely identified with a process
it knew to be flawed.
The newly released documents, which consist of 11 diplomatic cables and memoranda concerning West Papua from February
1968 through the end of the United Nations-sponsored AFC in August 1969, confirm that Washington was most concerned
at the time about Indonesia's support for US policy in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia and saw in Suharto
a key ally, despite Jakarta's official non-alignment policy.
Suharto is described in the Kissinger cable as a "moderate military man ... who, although indecisive by outside
standards, is committed to progress and reform".
The cables related to West Papua, now Indonesia's largest province, are also remarkably similar in tone to another
batch released by the NSA in 2001 on the reaction of Kissinger and former president Gerald Ford to Indonesia's
planned 1975 invasion of East Timor, a Portuguese colony in the Malay Archipelago that had recently declared itself
independent.
When Suharto asked for Ford's "understanding" for the East Timor invasion, according to one secret memorandum
cable, Ford replied, "We will understand and not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the
intentions you have."
Kissinger, who accompanied Ford on his trip to Indonesia in December 1975, prior to the invasion, is reported to
have told Suharto, "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly," assuring him that if the
East Timor invasion went forward, "we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the president returns
home".
Suharto launched the invasion immediately after Ford left Jakarta and annexed the territory the following year.
Over the next several years, as many as one-third of the estimated 750,000 East Timorese died or were killed in
counter-insurgency operations by Indonesian forces.
When Suharto was ousted almost a quarter of a century later, however, East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for independence
in a 1999 referendum, and, despite retaliatory action by the Indonesian military, which destroyed much of the territory's
infrastructure, achieved formal independence last year after a transition period overseen by the United Nations.
Like the East Timorese, West Papuans have maintained a low-level insurgency against Indonesian rule since the territory's
annexation. Unlike East Timor, however, West Papua became a key focus of the regime's transmigration schemes, so
that Javanese living in West Papua currently outnumber the indigenous population.
In addition, the California-sized territory holds important natural resources, particularly gold, other minerals
and timber, which have drawn considerable investment from both Indonesian and Western, including US, companies
that are used to dealing with authorities in Jakarta.
The newly released documents show that Washington was well aware in 1969 that the vast majority of the estimated
800,000 Papuans opposed annexation by Indonesia, largely because of the violence and repression committed by Indonesian
troops that had occupied the former Dutch territory since 1962.
Indeed, the US ambassador in Jakarta at the time, Frank Galbraith, wrote in one memo on July 9, 1969, that "possibly
85-90%" of the population "are in sympathy with the Free Papua cause". He also noted that Indonesian
military operations, which had resulted in the deaths of possibly thousands of civilians, "had stimulated
fears and rumors of intended genocide among the Irianese".
The AFC, which was endorsed unanimously by 1,022 "representatives" of the Papuan population who were
hand-picked by Jakarta, was administered and controlled entirely by Jakarta.
The Act was carried out pursuant to a US-brokered 1962 agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia that awarded
control of what was then called West New Guinea to Jakarta subject to its agreement to carry out an election on
self-determination, in which all adult Papuans were to be eligible to vote, no later than 1969. Once in control,
however, Jakarta quickly moved to repress the independence movement.
And if Washington ever intended to hold Jakarta to its pledges about the election process, that sentiment dissipated
after Suharto took power in 1966, initiating the killings of an estimated 500,000 suspected communists, and installing
economic reforms designed to promote foreign investment. Indeed, the first company to take advantage of a new foreign
investment law was the US mining company Freeport Sulphur, which won concessions over vast tracts of land in West
Papua. The company, which became Freeport-McMoRan, has been operating the world's biggest open-pit gold mine in
West Papua for some three decades.
Although the UN's observer at the time reported serious violations of the self-determination process - and 15 countries
strenuously contested the AFC's validity - the UN General Assembly "took note" of the AFC's results,
in effect recognizing Indonesia's annexation.
Almost all of the secret US cables assumed, whether explicitly or implicitly, that Jakarta itself would never accept
any outcome other than annexation. One telegram sent early in the six-week AFC period compares the exercise to
"a Greek tragedy, the conclusion preordained. The main protagonist, the [government], cannot and will not
permit any resolution other than the continued inclusion of West Irian in Indonesia.
"Dissident activity," the author predicts, "is likely to increase, but the Indonesian armed forces
will be able to contain and, if necessary, suppress it."
Kissinger himself appeared to understand the fraud, stressing to Nixon that "you should not raise this issue"
because "we should avoid any US identification with that act".
At the same time, US officials were doubtful whether even a free plebiscite would make any sense. One 1968 telegram
from US Admiral Marshall Green in Jakarta stresses that "we are dealing here essentially with Stone Age illiterate
tribal groups" and that "free elections among groups such as this would be more of a farce than any rigged
mechanism Indonesia could devise". At another point Green expresses concern that the UN special representative
for West Irian, Ortiz Sanz, might not be sufficiently aware of these "political realities" and should
be "made aware" of them.
For 30 years, almost everything in Indonesia revolved around one man: Suharto.
As a young general, Suharto -- who like many of his fellow Indonesians used only one name -- was one of the few
military leaders
to escape the attempted coup that in 1965 ousted Sukarno, the left-leaning strongman who was then president for
life.
As a wave of killing swept across the country, Suharto took control, although he left Sukarno in place as a figurehead
before
naming himself president in 1968.
Ruling with a heavy hand, Suharto kept the country together -- no mean feat in a land of 200 million people comprising
300 ethnic groups speaking 250 languages and inhabiting more than 17,000 islands spread over a 3,500-mile archipelago.
The country's economy also grew strongly, as did Suharto's personal fortune and those of his family members, who
became billionaires many times over.
Then came the Asian economic crisis, when the country's currency plummeted. Unrest grew as Suharto seemed unable
to cope with the country's economic situation. After 500 students died in protests, he stepped down on May 21,
1998.
He offered an apology to the nation but managed to avoid prosecution by claiming ill health.
He died in Jakarta on Jan. 27, 2008 at 86. — Jan. 27, 2008
Suharto of Indonesia, whose 32-year dictatorship was one of the most brutal and corrupt of the 20th century, died
Sunday in Jakarta. He was 86.
He had been admitted to a Jakarta hospital on Jan. 4 with heart, lung and kidney problems, and placed on a dialysis
machine and then a ventilator to support his final days of life.
Mr. Suharto was driven from office in 1998 by widespread rioting, economic paralysis and political chaos. His rule
was not without accomplishment; he led Indonesia to stability and nurtured economic growth. But these successes
were ultimately overshadowed by pervasive and large-scale corruption; repressive, militarized rule; and a convulsion
of mass bloodletting when he seized power in the late 1960s that took at least 500,000 lives.
As the leader of one of the world’s most populous countries, Mr. Suharto and his family became notorious for
controlling state enterprises and taking kickbacks for government contracts, for siphoning money from state charities
and for committing gross violations of human rights.
Yet Mr. Suharto remained virtually untouchable to the end, even as his successors in a new democratic system repudiated
his rule. He was never charged with the killings committed under his command, and managed to escape criminal prosecution
for embezzling millions of dollars, possibly billions, by having himself declared mentally incapable to stand trial.
A civil suit against him was pending at his death.
After he was forced from office, he tried to give the appearance of a frail and humiliated former potentate, but
he could be seen jogging and swinging a golf club at his home in the center of Jakarta. His health deteriorated
in his final years, and he became something of a recluse.
In his last days, a parade of the country’s power elite visited the hospital to pay their respects.
Mr. Suharto — who like many Indonesians used only one name — stepped down on May 21, 1998, just two months after
arranging to have himself elected to a seventh five-year term. He departed with an apology to the nation. “I am
sorry for my mistakes,” he said. But his quiet statement came only after the deaths of 500 student protesters,
an event that shocked the people into a consensus that the president must go.
When demonstrators occupied the Parliament building, once-docile legislators finally called on him to resign.
Like his predecessor, Sukarno, Mr. Suharto worked to forge national unity in a fractious country of 200 million
people comprising 300 ethnic groups speaking 250 languages and inhabiting about 6,000 islands spread over a 3,500-mile
archipelago.
Sukarno had also fallen from power in a wave of violence, one that swept the country in 1965 after an attack that
was officially portrayed as an abortive leftist coup. Mr. Suharto, one of the few senior military officers to escape
execution on the first day of that uprising, moved decisively against the insurgents and effectively took control
of the country.
Mr. Suharto dealt gingerly with Sukarno, a founding father of the nation who still had support within the army.
Sukarno was kept as a figurehead while Mr. Suharto, a relatively little known major general, waited three years
to officially succeed him, in 1968.
In the following years, governing through consensus, traditional mysticism, military repression and authoritarian
control, President Suharto restored order to the country and presided over an era of substantial development. Many
Indonesians benefited from his programs, but none more so than members of his family, who became billionaires many
times over. Last year, he topped a new list of world leaders who had stolen from state coffers. The list, by the
United Nations and the World Bank, cited an estimate that he had embezzled $15 billion to $35 billion.
Enigmatic and Magical
Mr. Suharto was an unlikely character to play such a major role in his country’s destiny. He was a private
person, and although he wielded complete power, he spoke in gentle tones, smiled sweetly to friend and foe and
presented himself as a man of humble origins, shy, retiring and enigmatic. Short and thick set, he almost invariably
dressed in a Western business suit or a safari jacket once he gave up his military uniform, and a black songkok,
the flat traditional Indonesian cap.
He rarely took a public stand on any issue. Instead, by waiting to allow a consensus to form, he was usually able
to make events evolve the way he wished. He can be better understood in the context of the old forms of Javanese
kingship in which the ruler was surrounded by courtiers who tried to divine the royal mind.
Although he was a Muslim, Mr. Suharto seemed imbued with Indonesian traditions of animism and mysticism overlaid
with Hindu and Buddhist teachings. In a country given to superstition, where ancient patterns of belief coexist
with more modern ideas, he consulted gurus and dukuns, spiritual advisers and soothsayers who were believed to
be in touch with natural forces.
Whether it was those forces or his timing, good fortune came to him. Just as the United States was becoming
embroiled in Vietnam, he stood as a bulwark against Communism in Asia. The United
States rewarded him with a foreign aid program that eventually amounted to more than $4 billion a year. In
addition, a consortium of Western countries and Japan established an aid program that in 1994 alone totaled almost
$5 billion.
In doing so, the United States, along with much of the rest of the world, showed a willingness to overlook the
corruption, favoritism and violations of human rights, including the disappearance
of opposition politicians, that came to characterize Mr. Suharto’s rule.
Many Indonesians, too, supported him, at least while the economy was buoyant. But the Asian economic turmoil
in 1997 exposed Indonesia’s economy as on the brink of collapse.
The currency lost 30 percent of its value in 1996, a drought made rice scarce, unemployment rose and the widening
income gap led to rioting and violence. Mr. Suharto turned to the International Monetary Fund, which agreed to
a $43 billion bailout if Indonesia would abide by its terms.
His signing of those terms was seen as a humiliating capitulation, but he equivocated when it came to instituting
them. Many saw his hesitation as an effort to protect the fortunes of his family and friends, money widely believed
to have been stashed in foreign banks.
Mr. Suharto called for belt-tightening. He raised fuel prices, then revoked the order. He promised bank reform
and ended tax breaks, then reversed himself or left wide loopholes.
His failure to come to grips with economic problems brought a wave of student unrest. In May 1998, student rallies
spilled from the campuses into the streets and across the archipelago. Hundreds died in fires and clashes with
security forces.
Apparently unable to grasp the seriousness of the situation, Mr. Suharto left on a trip to Cairo, but was forced
to cut it short in an effort to restore order. The economic crisis was a challenge that he did not seem to know
how to handle.
“This is something he cannot shoot, he cannot put in jail, he cannot close down, like our newspaper,” said Jusuf
Wanandi, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta, an Indonesian policy
institute.
Anti-Communist Purges
In the 1960s, during the turbulent months after his rise to power, few would have predicted that Mr. Suharto, a
peasant turned soldier, would be able to weather crisis after crisis, as he did for 32 years.
The first of those was touched off by long-smoldering resentments between Communists, conservative Muslims and
ethnic Chinese that exploded into one of the bloodiest massacres in modern history.
His precise role in the violence is not clear; he managed to keep his name from being directly attached to it.
What is clear is that in many areas the army, which he controlled, supplied weapons to and whipped up a tense population
to mutilate and murder people suspected of being Communists, many of them of Chinese ancestry. Estimates of the
number of dead have ranged from 500,000 to as many as one million.
Contemporary dispatches reported that the general sent crack troops of the army’s Strategic Reserve Command
to organize the liquidation of the Communists. Hamish McDonald, a journalist with wide experience in Asia, wrote
in his book “Suharto’s Indonesia” that General Suharto later dispatched Col. Sarwo Edhi Wibowo with a force of
commandos “to encourage the anti-Communist civilians to help with the job.” The colonel said, “We gave them two
or three days’ training, then sent them out to kill the Communists.”
Along with presumed Communists, entire families were wiped out and personal scores settled with ethnic Chinese,
longtime residents of the country.
Mr. Suharto had blamed the Indonesian Communist Party for what he described as an abortive coup in 1965, though
the Communists’ exact role in it remains unclear. In that uprising, six senior anti-Communist generals were killed
in one evening, and questions have lingered about why Mr. Suharto was one of the few senior officers not marked
for assassination. In any event, he became the chief beneficiary of the subsequent crackdown as he moved quickly
to consolidate his control.
When Mr. Suharto took over from Sukarno, the country was bankrupt. Inflation was rampant and hunger was commonplace
in a country rich in natural resources.
Mr. Suharto ended Sukarno’s policy of confrontation with Malaysia and became a force for regional stability by
helping to establish the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Indonesia rejoined the United Nations, from which
it had withdrawn in 1965.
With the help of American-trained economists, Indonesia moved from being the
world’s largest rice-importing nation to a rice exporter. During the 1970s, oil was a major export and a significant
source of foreign exchange.
High oil prices allowed considerable economic development, but when Pertamina, the national oil company, was shaken
by
scandal in the late ’70s, the country again neared bankruptcy.
Mr. Suharto brought what became known as the New Order to Indonesia, but at the price of repression. Scholars have
estimated that as many as 750,000 people were arrested in the military crackdown after the killing of the generals,
and that 55,000 to 100,000 people accused of being Communists may have been held without trial for as long as 14
years.
In the early ’80s, 4,000 to 9,000 people were killed by death squads organized by army Special Forces to deal with
petty criminals and some political operatives. And, according to Benedict Richard O’Gorman Anderson, a professor
emeritus of government at Cornell, 200,000 people of a population of 700,000 died in East Timor in the civil war
and famine after Indonesia’s invasion and annexation in 1975.
Professor Anderson called Mr. Suharto a “malign dictator with blood on his hands — over the years anywhere from
half a million
to a million people.”
The repressiveness of the Suharto era broke into the headlines during President Ronald Reagan’s trip to Asia in
1986, a trip meant to highlight the “winds of freedom” in the region. Just before Mr. Reagan’s arrival in Bali,
the government expelled a correspondent for The New York Times and barred two Australian journalists after unfavorable
reports about the great wealth accumulated by the general and his family.
When he came to power, he refused at first to move into the presidential palace, saying he preferred to live in
his own modest house in Jakarta. During his years as president, however, his homes became palatial.
The Family Business
While he occupied himself with affairs of state or relaxed with a round of golf or a day of fishing, his wife,
Siti Hartinah Suharto, known as Madame Tien, handled the family’s business affairs. She became the object of quiet
criticism, with her detractors calling her “Madame Tien Percent,” a reference to what were said to be commissions
she received on business deals.
But Madame Tien, who died in 1996, was restrained compared with the six Suharto children. They used their connections
to amass as much as $35 billion from their business interests, according to an estimate by Transparency International,
a private anticorruption organization. Cartels and monopolies extended the family’s reach to paper, cement, plywood,
cloves, toll roads, power plants, automobiles and banks.
One daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, led a corporate group that collected many of the tolls on new highways.
A son, Bambang Trihatmodjo, became chairman of a conglomerate of some 90 companies with interests in everything
from shipping and insurance to cocoa and timber, hotels, television, automobiles, even condoms. Another son was
connected to the state oil monopoly.
Whatever favors were not given to the Suharto family went to friends. A respected Indonesian scholar was quoted
by The Times as saying: “At least 80 percent of major government projects go in some form to the president’s children
or friends.”
The family has denied that it benefited unfairly from tax breaks and other favors and said government contracts
had been subjected to competitive bidding, a widely disputed assertion.
Suharto was born into a devout Muslim family on June 8, 1921, on the island of Java. One of 11 children, he
grew up in extreme poverty. He attended high school and later worked as a bank clerk, a job he had to give up because
he ripped his only sarong
and could not afford to replace it.
He went through basic military training in 1940, and became an assistant police chief in Yogyakarta, Java. He welcomed
the Japanese, who invaded Indonesia in 1942, as liberators from Dutch colonialism, and joined a local Japanese
military unit. By
the end of World War II, he concluded that the Japanese were no better than the Dutch, and he joined the fight
against them.
When the Dutch tried to reclaim the country after the war, Suharto joined the Indonesian independence movement
under the nationalist leader Achmed Sukarno. He led the troops that expelled Dutch troops from the city of Yogyakarta,
and when Indonesia became independent, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the new Indonesian army.
Suharto rose quickly through the ranks, eventually becoming commander in chief of the army's Strategic Command
in Jakarta. Immediately following the incidents of September 30, 1965, when a group of senior officers were killed
in a coup attempt, Suharto led a counterstrike that ended the rebellion. During this period, President Sukarno
had been hanging on to power by balancing between the Communist Party and the military -- the two most powerful
organizations in the country.
General Suharto took advantage of the opportunity to consolidate power, and began a ruthless military campaign
to wipe out the Communist Party. He oversaw a bloody purge of Communists and suspected Communists between 1965
and 1966 that resulted
in mass murders in villages and towns across the country. The exact number of people killed may never be known,
but estimates range between 500,000 and three million.
THE NEW YORK TIMES, on March 12, 1966, referred to these events as "one of the most savage mass slaughters
of modern political history." The American embassy followed these events closely, and offered both money
and information to help rid the country of Communist influences.
On March 11, 1966, General Suharto took emergency control over the country. Two years later, he was formally elected
President of Indonesia. Suharto was rewarded for his bloody efforts with loans and technical and military assistance
from the West. He allowed the army to play a role in all levels of government, which suppressed all forms of political
and civil dissent. He also removed large numbers of landless farmers from Java, the most populated island in Indonesia,
and settled them in other parts of the country.
Enriched by Western aid and oil revenues during the 1970s, Suharto began an ambitious development program that
built roads, established medical clinics, and brought electricity to small villages. Despite these advances, rampant
corruption and the ruthless suppression of dissent created simmering pockets of discontent around the nation.
The invasion of East Timor in December 1975, shortly after the island gained independence from Portugal, revealed
that the basic character of Suharto's regime had not changed. The Indonesian military, determined to annex East
Timor, tortured and brutalized its population. Amnesty International has estimated the civilian casualties during
the Indonesian occupation were as high as 200,000 people -- more than one quarter of the population
Indonesia, whose 115 million inhabitants make it the world's sixth most populous nation, is a land of immense
resources and seemingly limitless potential. Throughout the 3,000 islands of the sprawling archipelago, however,
all too few people seem to be exploiting this potential. An exception is the leadership of the 350,000-man armed
forces.
Since 1965, when at least 300,000 Communists were massacred in the wake of an abortive coup and President Sukarno
was effectively removed from power, the military has not had a serious political rival. The parties are fragmented,
and Parliament is under the army's thumb. In economic enterprise even more than in politics, the army is making
its mark—and quite a few fortunes. Generals, colonels and majors serve as governors, industrialists and hotel managers.
Occasionally they even serve as soldiers.
Love and Oil. The single most spectacular success story is that of Lieut. General Ibnu Sutowo. He heads Pertamina,
the government-owned oil monopoly, which is currently harvesting a fortune in fees from foreign firms for exploration
of what may prove to be a huge reservoir of undersea oil off Indonesia's coastline. Pertamina goes its own way,
and a very quiet way it is. It does not disclose figures on its operations but hands out lavish financial aid for
army-encouraged projects. It also does very well by its own. On a salary of less than $100 a month, Sutowo recently
threw a $60,000 wedding for his daughter, prompting one Djakarta newspaper to editorialize: "Crude oil smooths
the way for love."
In addition to freewheeling Pertamina, the army is involved in virtually every part of Indonesia's economy—usually
less out of greed than sheer need. Under President Suharto's austerity budget, armed forces units are required
to provide between 25% and 40% of their own support. To raise funds, the army recently announced plans to commercialize
engineering and transport—in effect, hiring itself out as an Indonesian version of Hertz Rent A Car. Some other
examples of military business enterprise:
> Djakarta's latest luxury hotel, the Kartika Plaza, is owned by an army cooperative. As far as the army is
concerned, this is legitimate, although civilians are troubled by the practice.
> Gambling casinos have been established in Djakarta by the district's military governor, who has found that
slot machines and blackjack are sure and legal ways of financing the city and feeding the troops.
> An army unit near Djakarta conserves its monthly ration of gasoline and sells the surplus on the free market.
Clearly, this is illegal.
> In northern Sumatra, military authorities illegally sell export licenses to Chinese merchants—and the licenses
are not cheap.
Long-Run Dangers. Suharto, a military man himself, has repeatedly ordered an end to many of these practices. "All
illegal collections, regardless of purpose, should be stopped," he said late in 1969. "Such collections
may look profitable in the short term, but in the long term they undermine our national economy." Beyond demoralizing
Indonesians who had hoped for a new order, the military's highhanded role has discouraged foreign investors.
By Tom McCawley, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor / January 28, 2008
Jakarta, Indonesia
Indonesia will never see former President Suharto, who died Sunday, face a courtroom and receive the crisp judgment
of the law. Instead, Indonesians must decide how history will judge the complex legacy of the man who ruled them
for 32 years.
Suharto held sway over this multiethnic archipelago through guile, cunning, patronage, and cruelty from 1966 to
1998, leaving mixed emotions among Indonesia's 230 million people and a legacy of virulent anticommunism that had
a major impact on the region and fostered close ties with the US.
"He was 50 percent good and 50 percent bad," says Thee Kian Wie, a historian.
Some point to Suharto's economic achievements, saying he built roads, schools, and health clinics in thousands
of poor villages, and lifted millions out of poverty. "Life was better then, peaceful, easier to make a crust,"
said Sintha Wati, who sells goods alongside a fetid canal in Jakarta.
Others remember a military-backed strongman who enriched his friends and family and left Indonesia in chaos amid
the Asian financial crisis in 1998. "Rice was cheap, streets were peaceful, but people were scared,"
said Bembenk, a young clerk.
Even former victims have talked of forgiving Suharto, whom corruption watchdog Transparency International accuses
of siphoning off $15 billion of state funds. "As a man, I forgive him," said A.M. Fatwa, an Islamic leader
imprisoned under Suharto's government, to reporters, "but not his system of power."
To the West and the United States, Suharto's fierce anticommunism made him a reliable ally. The US had close military
ties to Indonesia in the 1970s and 1980s. The US and Australian governments were aware of Suharto's plans to invade
and occupy East Timor in 1975. The US only broke off ties with Indonesia after a massacre at a cemetery in East
Timor in 1991. Full military ties were restored in 2005.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared a week of mourning for Suharto ahead of a large state funeral. For
weeks, former leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahatir Mohamad of Malaysia have lined up to pay respects.
Criminal charges against Suharto on corruption for embezzling more than $600 million were dropped last year on
the grounds of poor health. On Jan. 8, four days after he was hospitalized, the civil case continued in a court
in central Jakarta. The attorney general charged Suharto with embezzling more than a billion dollars in charity
funds through his foundations. A civil case against his family over alleged involvement may go ahead.
Economists credit Suharto with engineering an economic turnaround in the mid-1960s, which yielded an average of
7 percent economic growth until the mid-1990s. Suharto deployed a team of US-trained economists, the "Berkeley
Mafia," to contain inflation of more than 600 percent
"He had a very no-nonsense approach to crises. He just got on and got the job done," says Mohammad Sadli,
a former energy minister under Suharto. "At least, he did in the beginning."
Poverty fell from 60 percent in 1966 to 15 percent in 1990. Indonesia achieved self-sufficiency in rice production
and achieved near-universal enrollment of primary school children. Life expectancy, say demographers, rose by some
20 percent from 1968 to 1990.
Turning his back on the anti-Westernism of his predecessor Sukarno, Suharto welcomed
Western capital and liberalized investment rules. He built a highly centralized state, focusing power in the hands
of trusted allies, the military, and most of all, himself. He tolerated little dissent, jailing critics, and often
allowed the military a free hand to brutally suppress separatists in provinces such as Aceh, Papua, and East
Timor, which broke away in 1999.
According to Robert Elson, an Australian biographer of Suharto, "He was deeply involved in the creation of
modern Indonesia ... but he was ruthless, and on occasion, murderous."
Suharto's attitudes toward leadership, says Mr. Elson, were formed in a military career that included service under
the colonial Dutch and Japanese armies. Suharto organized militias, did intelligence work, and fought the Dutch
in the war of independence from 1945-49.
His rise to power was opaque, decisive, and bloody. He put down a botched putsch in 1965
by mid-level officers that was blamed on the Beijing-backed Communist Party, which then counted some 3 million
members. It was crushed in reprisal attacks led by Army-assisted civilian militias.
Between 300,000 and 1 million died in what the CIA called "one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century."
Many more were jailed for years without trial and their families tainted by association. Ethnic Chinese also suffered
as ties with Beijing were cut; Chinese-language materials were outlawed.
Suharto then eased aside his predecessor, the left-leaning Sukarno, and declared a "New Order" that demonized
Communism. Within a few years, Indonesia rejoined the UN that Sukarno had exited in anger in 1965 and became a
founding member of the anticommunist Association of Southeast Asian Nations. His reward was corporate investment
and US military aid that became a bedrock of the regime.
Many of Indonesia's powerful figures once owed favors to the man who ruled for so long. Some floated the idea of
putting him on trial and then pardoning him afterward. Few observers are likely to have been surprised that after
10 years, he evaded the courts to the end.
