Lessons of the 1965 Indonesian
Coup: Chapter One
The historical background
In October 1965 the international working class suffered one of its greatest defeats and betrayals in the post-World
War II period.
Up to one million workers and peasants were slaughtered in a CIA-organised army coup led by General Suharto which
swept aside the shaky bourgeois regime of President Sukarno, crushed the rising movement of the Indonesian masses,
and established a brutal military dictatorship.
Retired US diplomats and CIA officers, including the former American ambassador to Indonesia and Australia, Marshall
Green, have admitted working with Suharto's butchers to massacre hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants
suspected of supporting the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). They personally provided the names of thousands of
PKI members from the CIA's files for the armed forces death lists.
According to Howard Federspeil, who was an Indonesian expert working at the State Department at the time of the
anti-communist program: "No one cared, so long as they were communists that they were being butchered."
The coup was the culmination of a prolonged operation by the CIA, with the help of agents of the Australian Secret
Intelligence Service, to build up and train the Indonesian armed forces in preparation for a military dictatorship
to suppress the revolutionary strivings of the Indonesian masses.
At the time of the coup, the PKI was the largest Stalinist party in the world, outside China and the Soviet
Union. It had 3.5 million members; its youth movement another 3 million. It controlled the trade union movement
SOBSI which claimed 3.5 million members and the 9 million-strong peasants' movement BTI. Together with the women's
movement, the writers' and artists' organisation and the scholars' movement, the PKI had more than 20 million members
and active supporters.
During the independence struggle against the Dutch in the 1940s and throughout the 1950s and 1960s hundreds of
thousands of class conscious workers joined the PKI, believing that it still represented the revolutionary socialist
traditions of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
Yet by the end of 1965, between 500,000 and a million PKI members and supporters had been slaughtered, and tens
of thousands were detained in concentration camps, without any resistance being offered.
The killings were so widespread that the rivers were clogged with the corpses of workers and peasants. While the
CIA-backed military death squads rounded up all known PKI members and sympathisers and carried out their grisly
work, Time magazine reported:
"The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of corpses has created a serious sanitation problem
in northern Sumatra where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travellers from these areas tell us small
rivers and streams have been literally clogged with bodies. River transportation has become seriously impeded."
How was this historic defeat able to be inflicted? The answer requires an examination of the history of the
struggle of the Indonesian masses, the treachery of the national bourgeoisie led by Sukarno, the counter-revolutionary
role played by the PKI, and the crucial part played by the Pabloite opportunists of the "United Secretariat"
of Ernest Mandel and Joseph Hansen in aiding the treachery of the Stalinists.
The 'Jewel of Asia'
The bloody coup in Indonesia was the outcome of the drive by US imperialism to gain unchallenged control of the
immense natural wealth and strategic resources of the archipelago, often referred to as the "Jewel of Asia".
The importance that United States imperialism attached to Indonesia was emphasised by US President Eisenhower in
1953, when he told a state governors' conference that it was imperative for the US to finance the French colonial
war in Vietnam as the "cheapest way" to keep control of Indonesia.
Eisenhower detailed: "Now let us assume that we lose Indochina. If Indochina goes, several things happen right
away. The Malay peninsula, the last little bit of land hanging on down there, would be scarcely defencible. The
tin and tungsten we so greatly value from that area would cease coming, and all India would be outflanked.
"Burma would be in no position for defence. All of that position around there is very ominous to the United
States, because finally if we lost all that, how would the free world hold the rich empire of Indonesia?
"So you see, somewhere along the line, this must be blocked and it must be blocked now, and that is what
we are trying to do.
"So when the US votes $400 million to help the war (in Indochina), we are not voting a giveaway program. We
are voting for the cheapest way that we can prevent the occurrence of something that would be of a most terrible
significance to the United States of America, our security, our power and ability to get certain things we need
from the riches of the Indonesian territory and from South East Asia.
Indonesia is estimated to be the fifth richest country in the world in terms of natural resources. Besides being
the fifth largest oil producer, it has enormous reserves of tin, bauxite, coal, gold, silver, diamonds, manganese,
phosphates, nickel, copper, rubber, coffee, palm oil, tobacco, sugar, coconuts, spices, timber and cinchona (for
By 1939 the then Dutch East Indies supplied more than half the total US consumption of 15 key raw materials. Control
over this vital region was central to the conflict in the Pacific between the US and Japan during World War II.
In the post-war period the US ruling class was determined not to have the country's riches torn from their grasp
by the Indonesian masses.
Following the defeat of the French in Vietnam in 1954 the US feared that the struggle of the Vietnamese masses
would ignite revolutionary upheavals throughout the South East Asian region, threatening its grip over Indonesia.
In 1965, just prior to the Indonesian coup, Richard Nixon, soon to become US president, called for the saturation
bombing of Vietnam to protect the "immense mineral potential" of Indonesia. Two years later he declared
Indonesia to be the "greatest prize" of South East Asia.
After the coup, the value of Suharto's dictatorship to the interests of US imperialism was underlined in a 1975
US State Department report to Congress which referred to Indonesia as the "most strategically authoritative
geographic location on earth":
"It has the largest population of any country in South East Asia.
"It is the principal supplier of raw materials from the region.
"Japan's continued economic prosperity depends heavily on oil and other raw materials supplied by Indonesia.
"Existing American investments in Indonesia are substantial, and our trading relationship is growing rapidly.
"Indonesia will probably become an increasingly important supplier of US energy needs.
"Indonesia is a member of OPEC, but assumed a moderate stance in its deliberations, and did not participate
in the oil embargo.
"The Indonesian archipelago sits astride strategic waterways and the government of Indonesia is playing a
vital role in the law-of-the-sea negotiations which are vital to our security and commercial interests."
During World War II Sukarno and the national bourgeoisie worked with the occupying Japanese forces in the hope
of achieving a degree of national self-government. In the dying days of the war Sukarno, with the reluctant support
of the Japanese, declared the independent Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945.
The perspective of the national bourgeois leaders was not to lead a proletarian uprising against imperialism but
to establish an administration and strengthen their hand for negotiations with the Dutch, who had no forces in
But the response of the Dutch ruling class was to launch a brutal war to suppress the new regime. They ordered
that Indonesia be kept under Japanese command until British troops could arrive. The British and the Dutch then
used Japanese troops to attack the ferocious resistance of the Indonesian workers, youth and peasants. Thus all
the imperialist powers united against the Indonesian masses.
As armed opposition erupted throughout Indonesia against the Dutch forces, Sukarno, backed by the PKI leadership,
pursued a policy of compromise with the Dutch and signed the Linggadjati Agreement in March 1947. The Dutch nominally
recognised Indonesian control over Java, Madura and Sumatra and agreed to evacuate their troops. But in fact the
Dutch used this as a breathing space to build up their forces and prepare for a new attack of unsurpassed brutality
in July and August 1947.
Throughout this period, hundreds of thousands of workers and peasants joined or supported the PKI because of
their disillusionment with the bourgeois leaders and because they viewed the PKI as a revolutionary party. They
were also greatly inspired by the advances of Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party in its war against Chiang Kai
Shek. In the war against the Dutch, workers and peasants repeatedly seized property and mass unions were formed.
To head off this development, Sukarno's Republican government, led by the then Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin
(a secret member of the PKI), signed the January 1948 Renville Agreement (so called because it was negotiated aboard
the USS Renville in the harbour). This pact gave the Dutch control of half the sugar mills in Java, 75 percent
of Indonesia's rubber, 65 percent of coffee, 95 percent of tea and control of Sumatran oil. Moreover, this US-imposed
settlement provided for the withdrawal of guerrilla forces from Dutch-occupied territory and created the conditions
for the liquidation of the PKI-led "people's armed units" in favour of the bourgeois "Indonesian
National Armed Forces" controlled by Sukarno and his generals.
In 1948 a series of strikes erupted against the Republican government, now headed by right-wing Vice-President
Hatta as Prime Minister, demanding a parliamentary government. These strikes were suppressed by Sukarno who appealed
for "national unity".
At the same time, the exiled PKI leader Musso returned from the Soviet Union and a series of prominent leaders
of the Indonesian Socialist and Labor parties announced that they had been secret PKI members for many years. The
announcement revealed a far wider base of support for the PKI than previously realised by the imperialist powers.
In July 1948 the bourgeois leaders, including Sukarno and Hatta, held a secret meeting with US representatives
at Sarangan where the US demanded, in return for assistance to the government, the launching of a purge of PKI
members in the army and the public service. Hatta, who also held the post of Defence Minister, was given $10 million
to carry out a "red purge".
Two months later, in an attempt to crush the PKI, the Maduin Affair was launched in Java. A number of army officers,
members of the PKI, were murdered and others disappeared, after they opposed plans to demobilise the guerrilla
units of the army that had been at the forefront of the fight against the Dutch.
The killings provoked an uprising at Maduin which was suppressed bloodily by the Sukarno regime. Prime Minister
Hatta proclaimed martial law. Thousands of PKI members were killed, 36,000 were imprisoned and PKI leader Musso
and 11 other prominent leaders were executed.
The US Consul General Livergood cabled his superiors in the US that he had informed Hatta that "the crisis
gives the Republican government the opportunity (to) show its determination (to) suppress communism".
Encouraged by the anti-communist pogrom, the Dutch launched a new military attack in December 1948, arresting Sukarno.
But widespread resistance forced the Dutch to capitulate within six months.
Even then, the 1949 Round Table conference at the Hague imposed a new betrayal on the Indonesian masses, involving
still more concessions by the Indonesian bourgeoisie.
The Sukarno regime agreed to take over the debts of the former colony, and gave guarantees to protect Dutch investments.
The Dutch were to keep control of West Papua and the Indonesian Republic was to continue to cooperate with the
Dutch imperialists within the framework of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The Sukarno government kept all the
colonial laws intact. A new army was formed by incorporating the former Dutch troops of Indonesian nationality
into the "National Armed Forces". In other words, the old colonial state apparatus and laws were retained
beneath the facade of parliamentary government in the new Republic.
The PKI leadership supported the betrayal of the national liberation struggle and determined to confine the
working class and peasantry to "peaceful democratic" forms of struggle. This was a continuation of the
PKI's position throughout World War II when the PKI leadership (as well as the Communist Party of the Netherlands)
had followed Stalin's line of cooperating with the Dutch imperialist government against Japan, and called for an
"independent Indonesia within the Commonwealth of the Dutch Empire". This call remained PKI policy even
during the post-war fighting against the Dutch.
But for the Indonesian masses, the fraud of "national independence" under the continued domination of
Dutch, American and world imperialism became ever more apparent. The natural resources, principal industries, agricultural
estates and financial power remained in the hands of the foreign corporations.
For example, 70 percent of the inter-islands sea traffic was still controlled by the Dutch firm KPM and one of
the big Dutch banks, the Nederlandche Handel Maatschappij, controlled 70 percent of all Indonesian financial transactions.
According to the Indonesian government calculations, in the mid-1950s, Dutch investments in the country were worth
$US1.5 billion. The Sukarno government declared that even if it wanted to nationalise the Dutch possessions it
did not have the money to indemnify the former colonial rulers. And to nationalise without compensation would be
The growing disillusionment of the masses was reflected in the 1955 elections when the number of seats held
by the PKI increased from 17 to 39.
Within two years the mass movement was to erupt in the seizure of Dutch, American and British factories, plantations,
banks, shops and ships.
Stalinists betray the mass movement
In December 1957 the whole fabric of imperialist domination over the Indonesian economy was shaken by a massive
eruption of the working class and peasantry. Factories, plantations, banks and ships were seized and occupied.
Sukarno's bourgeois nationalist regime was only able to survive because the Stalinist Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) leadership sabotaged the mass movement, insisting that the masses hand over the property they had seized
to the US-backed army which was sent in by Sukarno to take control.
A dispatch in the New York Times of December 8, 1957 provided some idea of the scope and intensity of the upsurge:
"The movement of the workers in Jakarta, to the extent we have been able to determine, took place without
the government's sanction, and in opposition to the declarations of Prime Minister Djuanda, of the Army Chief-of-Staff,
General Abdul Haris Nasution, and of other high governmental functionaries, according to whom such measures were
inadmissible and rendered their participants liable to severe penalties...
"The three Dutch banks here, the Netherlands Trading Society, the Escompto and the Netherlands Commercial
Bank, were seized by the delegates. They read a proclamation before their enthusiastic comrades and then before
the Dutch administrators, stating that the seizure was made in the name of the Association of Indonesian Workers
and that the banks would become the property of the Indonesian Republic."
The Dutch newspaper Volksrant reported with alarm on December 11, 1957: "In Jakarta the Communists continue
to hoist red flags on the Dutch enterprises ... Today the main office of Philips in Jakarta and that of the Societe
D'Assurances Nillmij have been 'expropriated' by the Indonesian personnel under the leadership of 'Communist' trade
The movement was not confined to Java. According to the New York Herald-Tribune of December 16: "Workers
of SOBSI, central trade union organisation dominated by the Communists, seized Dutch bakeries and stores in Java
and banks in Borneo." The New York Times of the same day reported that in Palembang, capital of South Sumatra,
"security forces arrested a number of workers belonging to the central trade union organisation controlled
by the Communists for having taken 'arbitrary action' against three Dutch proprietors. Thirty seven red flags hoisted
by the workers before the houses occupied by the Dutch employees were confiscated".
Other bourgeois papers spoke of "a situation of anarchy in Bali" and a fleeing Dutch plantation owner
was quoted as saying that in Atjeh and Deli, on the east coast of Sumatra, the mass actions were directed not only
against the Dutch companies but also against the American and British. Similar reports came from North Sumatra,
the Celebes and other islands.
There were reports too that the uprisings inspired resistance in Australian-occupied Papua New Guinea. At Karema
20 people were wounded when native people fought soldiers after a native nurse reported that she had been insulted.
The rebellion throughout Indonesia erupted in response to a call by Sukarno for a general strike against all Dutch
enterprises. He had previously raised the question of nationalisation of Dutch industry at a mass rally. Sukarno's
aim was to use the threat of nationalisation to pressure the Netherlands to withdraw from West Papua, which it
retained under the 1949 Round Table Conference agreement, so that Indonesia could then take control.
Seeking to balance between the rapacious dictates of Dutch, US and British imperialism, the seething discontent
of the oppressed masses and the growing strength of the US-backed military on which his regime relied, Sukarno
sought to use the pressure of the masses to force the hand of Dutch imperialism.
Workers themselves began to occupy the Dutch companies. Sukarno was totally unprepared for such a response. He
immediately authorised the military to move in to take control of the enterprises which had been seized by the
The Political Bureau of the PKI rushed to Sukarno's assistance, issuing a resolution that urgently appealed to
the people "to quickly resolve the differences of opinion on the methods of struggle against Dutch colonialism
by negotiations, so that in this way unity in the people and between the people, the government and the army may
At the same time the PKI appealed to the workers, "not only to set going the occupied enterprises, but to
make them function in a still more disciplined and better way and to increase production.
"The government must appoint a capable and patriotic direction for these enterprises and the workers must
support this direction with all their strength."
In addition, the PKI insisted that the takeovers must be confined to the Dutch companies, seeking to reassure US
and British imperialism that their interests would not be harmed: "All the actions of the workers, of the
peasants and the organisations of youth are directed against the Dutch capitalists. The other capitalist countries
did not take a hostile attitude in the conflict between Holland and Indonesia in West Irian. That is why no action
will be engaged against the enterprise of the capitalists of other countries."
Recognising the efforts of the PKI to choke the movement of the masses, Tillman Durdin wrote in the New York
Times of December 16: "Members of the National Consultative Council of Communist orientation are known to
have actually pronounced forcibly against the seizures by workers and have called such movements undisciplined
'anarcho-syndicalism'. The Communists defend a program of seizure directed by the government such as it is now
Sukarno himself was ready to flee the country for a "holiday" in India, but the handing over of the Dutch
enterprises to the military, on the instructions of the PKI, rescued his bourgeois regime. The Stalinist leadership
of the PKI not only saved the day for the Sukarno government. They created the conditions for the military generals
and their US backers to prepare for their bloody counter-revolution eight years later.
The perspective fought for by the PKI leadership was the Stalinist "two stage" theory that the struggle
for socialism in Indonesia had to first pass through the stage of so-called "democratic" capitalism.
The revolutionary strivings of the masses for socialist measures had to be suppressed and subordinated to a "united
front" with the national bourgeoisie.
In line with this reactionary perspective, the Stalinist bureaucracies in the Soviet Union and China hailed Sukarno
and his regime throughout this entire period. Krushchev, for example, visited Jakarta and said he would give Sukarno
every assistance in "all eventualities". In fact most of the weapons that were to be used to massacre
the Indonesian masses in 1965 were supplied by the Kremlin.
Military preparations begin
In 1956 the US-backed army had begun preparations for military dictatorship to crush the movement of the masses.
In August the commander of the West Java military region ordered the arrest of Foreign Minister Roeslan Abdulgani
on a charge of corruption. In November the army Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, attempted unsuccessfully
to seize control of Jakarta and overthrow the Sukarno government. The next month there were regional military takeovers
in Central and North Sumatra.
In October 1956 Sukarno moved to strengthen his hand against the masses and to appease the military by calling
for political parties to disband themselves. This call was later extended to an attempt to form a National Council
of all parties, including the PKI, to rule the country. When military commanders in East Indonesia, Kalimantan,
Atjeh, and South Sumatra rejected the plan and took control of their provinces, Sukarno declared a state of emergency.
Finally a new "non-party" cabinet was formed which included two PKI sympathisers.
In response to the mass upsurge of December 1957 the operations of United States imperialism were immediately stepped
up. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been active since the 1940s, spending millions to subsidise pro-US
elements within the national bourgeoisie, particularly the Socialist Party (PSI) of Sumiro, a colleague of Hatta,
and its larger Moslem ally, the Masjumi party of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, with whom Hatta had also retained close
Throughout 1957 and 1958 a series of CIA-inspired secessionist and right-wing revolts were orchestrated in the
oil-rich islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi, where the PSI and Masjumi dominated politically.
The first was the Permesta military revolt which began in March 1957 and continued into 1958, ending in a CIA-backed
attempted coup in February 1958.
The United States government provided substantial financial support, military advisers, arms and a small airforce
of B-26 bombers, piloted from bases in Taiwan and the Philippines. US Secretary of State Dulles even publicly expressed
his support for the right-wing rebels.
An aircraft carrier of the US Seventh Fleet was sent to Singapore and for some time it appeared that the US might
directly intervene in Sumatra under the guise of defending Caltex oil personnel and property.
The Indonesian military command finally decided that the rebellion, having failed to win any popular support at
all, had to be ended. The Sukarno leadership survived.
But the role of the army had been enormously strengthened. Over the next six years the US poured huge resources
into it, laying the basis for General Suharto to begin his climb to power after leading the military campaign to
seize control of West Papua in 1962.
Between 1959 and 1965 the US supplied $64 million in military grant-aid to the Indonesian military generals. According
to a report in Suara Pemuda Indonesia: "Before the end of 1960, the US had equipped 43 battalions of the army.
Every year the US trained officers of the right-wing military clique. Between 1956 and 1959 more than 200 high-ranking
officers were trained in the US, while low-ranking officers are trained by the hundreds every year. Once the head
of the Agency for International Development in America said that US aid, of course, was not intended to support
Sukarno and that the US had trained a great number of officers and ordinary people who would form a unit to make
Indonesia a 'free country'."
At the same time, Sukarno instituted his system of "Guided Democracy". In July 1959 the parliament was
dissolved and Sukarno imposed a presidential constitution by decree again with the full support of the PKI. He
further boosted the hand of the military, appointing army generals to leading positions.
The PKI warmly embraced Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" and his supposed consensus or Konsepsi alliance
between nationalism, Islam and communism called "NASAKOM".
In pursuit of their "national united front" with Sukarno and the national bourgeoisie, the PKI leaders
promoted the most deadly illusions in the armed forces.
Only five years before the bloody defeat inflicted upon the Indonesian workers and peasants at the hands of
the military, the PKI line was put most crudely in a statement by the leadership of SOBSI, the PKI-led trade union
federation, on May Day 1960:
"The SOBSI maintains the viewpoint that the armed forces of the Republic are still the true son of the popular
revolution ... and therefore from the officers down to the NCOs and soldiers ... they cannot be drawn into actions
which are treacherous to the Republic. Besides, president Sukarno, who identifies himself with the people, possesses
a strong influence over members of the armed forces and he refuses to be a military dictator."
A new upsurge
In 1962, Indonesia's military annexation of West Papua was fully backed by the PKI leadership, along with
the suppression of the resistance of the West Papuan people to the occupation.
In Indonesia itself, the underlying economic and class tensions, produced by the continued exploitation of the
Indonesian masses by the imperialist corporations and their national bourgeois lackeys, re-emerged.
The period of "Guided Democracy," that is, of the collaboration of the PKI leadership with the national
bourgeoisie in suppressing the independent struggles of the worker and peasant masses, failed to resolve any of
the pressing economic and political questions. Export income declined, foreign reserves fell, inflation continued
to spiral, and bureaucratic and military corruption became endemic.
From 1963 onwards the PKI leadership increasingly sought to avoid the growing clashes between the party's mass
activists and the police and military. PKI leaders stressed the "common interests" of the police and
"the people". PKI leader D.N. Aidit inspired the slogan "For Civil Order Help the Police".
In April, 1964, in an interview with S.M. Ali of the Far Eastern Economic Review Aidit set out for the international
bourgeoisie the Stalinists' perspective of a peaceful and gradual "two stage" transformation to socialism
"When we complete the first stage of our revolution which is now in progress, we can enter into friendly consultation
with other progressive elements in our society, and without an armed struggle lead the country towards socialist
He presented a scenario in which the masses would be confined to placing pressure on the national bourgeoisie:
"The chastening effect of the present stage of the revolution will maintain a kind of revolutionary pressure
on Indonesia's national capitalists.
"There will be no armed struggle unless there is foreign armed intervention on the capitalists' behalf. And
when we successfully complete our present national democratic revolution the chances of any foreign power interfering
with Indonesia's international affairs will become extremely remote."
In August, 1964, Aidit urged all PKI members to rid themselves of "sectarian attitudes" toward the army,
calling on all left-wing artists and writers to make the "soldier masses" the subject of art and literary
In late 1964 and early 1965 hundreds of thousands of peasants took action to seize the land of the big landowners.
Fierce clashes developed with landlords and police. To forestall the revolutionary confrontation which was rapidly
developing, the PKI called on its supporters to prevent violent conflict with the landlords and to improve cooperation
with other elements, including the armed forces.
At a meeting of the PKI central committee Aidit urged the suppression of peasants' actions and denounced party
cadre who, "carried away by their desire to spread the peasant actions, immediately became impatient, indulged
in individual heroism, were insufficiently concerned with developing the consciousness of the peasants and wanting
a definite event, were not careful enough in differentiating and choosing their targets." PKI leaders justified
halting the land takeovers and handing back the land to the landowners by referring to the "impending probable"
formation of a "NASAKOM cabinet".
In early 1965 workers in the oil and rubber industries owned by US corporations began to seize control of them.
The PKI leadership responded by formally joining the government. At the same time, leading generals were brought
into the cabinet.
The PKI ministers not only sat beside the military butchers in Sukarno's cabinet, but they continued to promote
the deadly illusion that the armed forces were part of the "peoples' democratic revolution".
Aidit delivered a lecture to army staff school trainees in which he referred to the "feeling of mutuality
and unity that daily grows strong between all the armed forces of the Indonesian Republic and the various groups
of Indonesian people, including the communists".
In this way, the Stalinists completely disarmed the most class conscious sections of the working class. The elementary
Marxist understanding of the state as the "body of armed men" employed by the ruling class to maintain
its rule was criminally denied.
Aidit rushed to assure the bourgeoisie and the military that the PKI opposed the revolutionary mobilisation of
the masses. "The important thing in Indonesia now is not how to smash the state power as is the case in many
other states, but how to strengthen and consolidate the pro-people's aspect ... and to eliminate the anti-people's
The Sukarno regime moved against the working class by banning all strikes in industry. The PKI leadership raised
no objections because industry was considered to belong to the NASAKOM government.
Just before the coup, the PKI, well aware of preparations for military rule, called for the establishment of a
"fifth force" within the armed forces, consisting of armed workers and peasants. Far from fighting for
the independent mobilisation of the masses against the military threat, the PKI leadership sought to constrain
the deepening mass movement within the bounds of the capitalist state.
They grovelled to the generals, seeking to assure them that the PKI's proposal would lead to the strengthening
of the state. Aidit announced in a report to the PKI central committee that the "NASAKOMisation" of the
armed forces could be achieved and that the fifth force could be established with the cooperation of the armed
forces. Right up to the very end, the PKI leadership suppressed the revolutionary aspirations of the working class.
As late as May 1965, the PKI Politburo sowed the illusion that the military and state apparatus was being modified
to isolate the "anti-people's aspect" of state power:
"The strength of the pro-people's aspect (of state power) is already becoming steadily greater and holds the
initiative and the offensive, while the anti-people's aspect, although moderately strong, is relentlessly pressed
into a tight corner. The PKI is struggling so that the pro-people's aspect will become more powerful and finally
dominate, and the anti-people's aspect will be driven out of the state power."
The Indonesian and international working class paid a bitter and bloody price for this Stalinist perfidy when
Suharto and the generals struck on September 30, 1965.
1965 -- Stalinism's bloody legacy
The Indonesian military coup of October 1-2, 1965 was the outcome of a carefully-orchestrated and long-planned
operation by the CIA and the US-trained and backed commanders of the Indonesian armed forces.
Throughout 1965 class tensions mounted. The year began with peasants seizing the estates of large landowners and
oil and rubber workers occupying US-owned enterprises. President Sukarno had brought the army commanders, led by
General Nasution, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) leadership into his cabinet to suppress the movement.
The PKI leadership halted the takeovers but the mass movement was becoming increasingly difficult to control.
There was growing discontent over the sentencing of 23 peasants to 15 to 20 years in prison for allegedly beating
an army officer to death in the course of resisting military action to suppress land seizures in Sumatra.
On the evening of September 30, 1965, a CIA provocation was organised. A group of middle-ranking military officers,
at least one of whom had close personal relations with General Suharto, arrested and executed the army chief of
staff, Lieutenant-General Ahmad Yani, and five other leading generals, and announced the establishment of a Revolutionary
The round up of the generals did not include two key figures. The first was Suharto, then the commander of the
Strategic Reserve Forces (Kostrad), comprised of the military's crack troops. The mutineers led by Lieutenant-Colonel
Untung made no attempt to arrest Suharto nor cut off his headquarters in Jakarta despite being in a position to
do so. The Defence Minister, General Nasution, also escaped. He was supposedly on the plotters' death list but
Untung's so-called coup bid was a charade. Within 24 hours Suharto routed the rebels, virtually without a shot
being fired, and took control of the capital, backed by Nasution.
By the end of the week, Suharto's reconstituted army command eliminated all pockets of resistance, and launched
the greatest anti-communist pogrom in history, orchestrated by the US embassy and the CIA. The White House, Pentagon
and CIA, already fighting an undeclared war in Vietnam, were determined to drown the Indonesian revolution in blood.
US diplomats and CIA officers, led by the US ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green, worked hand in glove with
Suharto's death squads to exterminate every known member and supporter of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).
In preparation for the coup, US officials had spent at least two years compiling death lists which were handed
over to the military with a clear instruction: exterminate them all. Suharto's men were ordered to report back
after each set of killings so the names could be checked off on the CIA's lists.
Some of the American officers involved described what took place. "It really was a big
help to the army," said a former political officer in the US embassy in Jakarta, Robert Martens. "They
probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad.
"There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment."
Martens headed an embassy group of State Department and CIA officers who, from 1962, compiled a detailed who's
who of the leadership of the PKI. They included, he said, names of provincial, city and other local PKI committee
members, and leaders of PKI-backed trade union, women's and youth groups.
The operation was masterminded by former CIA director William Colby, who was then director of the CIA's Far East
Division, and thus responsible for directing US covert strategy in Asia. Colby said the work to identify the PKI
leadership was a forerunner to the CIA's Phoenix Program in Vietnam, which attempted to exterminate supporters
of the National Liberation Front in the late 1960s.
Colby admitted that the work of checking off the death lists was regarded as so important that it was supervised
at the CIA's intelligence directorate in Washington. "We came to the conclusion that with the sort of draconian
way it was carried out, it really set them (the PKI) back for years."
Deputy CIA station chief Joseph Lazarsky described with undisguised relish how Suharto's Jakarta headquarters provided
the US embassy with running reports on the roundup and killing of PKI leaders. "We were getting a good account
in Jakarta of who was being picked up. The army had a 'shooting list' of about 4,000 or 5,000 people.
"They didn't have enough goon squads to zap them all, and some individuals were valuable for interrogation.
The infrastructure was zapped almost immediately. We knew what they were doing. We knew they would keep a few and
save them for the kangaroo courts, but Suharto and his advisers said, if you keep them alive, you have to feed
All this was conducted with the approval of Green who was later appointed US ambassador to Australia, where he
played a leading role in the preparations for the dismissal of the Whitlam government in 1975.
At least one million people were slaughtered in the six month holocaust that followed the coup. This was the estimate
of a team of University of Indonesia graduates commissioned by the army itself to inquire into the extent of the
Instigated and aided by the army, gangs of youth from right-wing Muslim organisations carried out mass killings,
particularly in central and east Java. There were reports that at certain points the Brantas River near Surabaya
was "choked with corpses". Another report from the east Javan hill town of Batu said there were so many
killed within the narrow confines of a police courtyard that the bodies were simply covered over with layers of
On the island of Bali, formerly considered to be a PKI stronghold, at least 35,000 were killed by the beginning
of 1966. There the Tamins, the storm-troopers of Sukarno's PNI (Indonesian National Party) performed the slaughter.
A special correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung told of bodies lying along the roads, or heaped in
pits, and of half-burned villages in which peasants dared not leave the charred shells of their huts.
In other areas suspects were forced to kill their alleged comrades with their own hands to prove their loyalty.
In the major cities anti-Chinese pogroms were conducted. Workers and public servants who went on strike in protest
at the counter-revolutionary wave of terror were sacked.
At least 250,000 workers and peasants were thrown into concentration camps. An estimated 110,000 were still held
as political prisoners at the end of 1969. Executions continue to this day, including several dozen since the early
1980s. Another four prisoners, Johannes Surono Hadiwiyono, Safar Suryanto, Simon Petrus Sulaeman and Norbertus
Rohayan, were executed nearly 25 years after the coup, a clear sign that the Suharto regime still fears the resurgence
of the Indonesian proletariat and poor peasantry.
Stalinist betrayal deepens
While hundreds of thousands of suspected PKI members and supporters were being hunted down and slaughtered, the
PKI leadership and their Stalinist counterparts in the Kremlin, Beijing and the Communist Party of Australia (CPA)
urged PKI cadre and workers and peasants to offer no resistance, giving a green light for the generals to proceed
with their mass executions.
The Stalinists deepened their reactionary line of demanding that the masses subordinate themselves to the national
bourgeoisie and Sukarno, who was maintained by Suharto as a puppet president, and to the armed forces themselves.
On October 1, 1965 both Sukarno and PKI secretary general Aidit responded to the formation of the so-called rebel
Revolutionary Council by moving to the Halim Air Base in Jakarta to seek protection.
On October 6 Sukarno called for "national unity," that is, "unity" between the military and
its victims, and an end to violence. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PKI immediately urged
all members and mass organisations to support the "leader of the Indonesian revolution" and offer no
resistance to the military. Its statement was reprinted in the CPA's paper Tribune:
"Having studied the appeal by the supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Indonesian Republic,
by the leader of the Indonesian revolution, president Sukarno, the political bureau of the central committee of
the Communist Party of Indonesia declares full support for the appeal and appeals to all party committees and party
members and sympathisers, as well as revolutionary mass organisations led by the PKI members to facilitate the
carrying out of this appeal."
Meanwhile, Sukarno, the "leader of the Indonesian revolution," was collaborating with the military
repression in the hope of saving his own neck. He called for a thorough purge of those allegedly involved in the
"September 30 affair," (the alleged coup bid led by Colonel Untung), and permitted PKI leaders to be
arrested and murdered. On October 15 he appointed Suharto as army chief.
Five months later, on March 11, 1966, Sukarno handed Suharto unchallenged decree-making power. He "ordered"
Suharto to "take all steps" to re-establish order and to safeguard Sukarno's "personal safety and
authority". Suharto's first exercise of his new powers was to formally outlaw the PKI. In recognition of the
value of his services, Sukarno was retained as the titular president of the military dictatorship until March 1967.
The PKI leadership continued to demand that the masses bow to the authority of the Sukarno-Suharto regime. Aidit,
who had fled, was captured and executed by the army on November 24, 1965 but his line was maintained by the PKI's
Second Secretary Njoto. In an interview given to a Japanese newspaper correspondent he emphasised:
"The PKI recognises only one head of state, one supreme commander, one great leader of the revolution President
Sukarno... It is President Sukarno united with the forces of the people who will decide the destiny and future
All party members, Njoto continued, should "fully support the directives of President Sukarno and pledge themselves
to implement these without reserve... Our party is making every effort in its power to prevent a civil war."
In other words, while the military butchers and their CIA mentors organised the systematic liquidation of not only
the PKI leadership but the most class conscious sections of the Indonesian masses, the PKI ordered its cadre to
ensure that no-one fought back.
The utter bankruptcy and treachery of the Stalinist "two-stage" theory of insisting that the masses tie
their fate to Sukarno and the national bourgeoisie could not have been spelt out more graphically.
The betrayal of the PKI was endorsed and reinforced by the Stalinist bureaucracies in Moscow and Beijing. The Kremlin
blamed "putschist" and "adventuristic" elements in the PKI for the defeat and called repeatedly
for the "unity" of the Indonesian "revolution" around Sukarno's NASAKOM (Nationalism, Islam
On October 12, 1965 Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Mikoyan and Kosygin sent a special message to Sukarno: "We and
our colleagues learned with great joy that your health has improved ... We have with interest heard about your
radio appeal to the Indonesian people to remain calm and prevent disorders ... This appeal will meet with profound
At a Tricontinental Conference in Havana in February, 1966, the Soviet delegation tried in every way to block a
public condemnation of the counter-revolutionary terror raging against the Indonesian masses. Its stance won praise
from the Suharto regime. The Indonesian parliament passed a resolution on February 11 expressing "full appreciation"
for the "efforts of the delegations of Nepal, Mongolia, the Soviet Union and others at the Solidarity Conference
of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, who successfully neutralised the efforts of the counter-revolutionists
of the so-called September 30 movement, and their protectors and leaders, to intervene in the internal affairs
Thus, the betrayal of the Stalinists was so brazen that the parliamentary lapdogs of the military junta were able
to refer to the CIA's September 30 set-up as an attempted counter-revolution!
The Beijing Stalinists similarly wiped their hands of the fate of the Indonesian masses. They even went ahead in
Jakarta with a World Conference Against Foreign Bases and stood by without protest as their Indonesian comrades
were arrested in the conference hall itself.
The legacy of the 'bloc of four classes'
The Stalinist betrayal in 1965 was the culmination of more than 20 years of treachery in which the PKI, working
on the basis of the Stalinist "two-stage" theory and, in particular, the Maoist ideology of a "bloc
of four classes," tied the working class and peasant masses to the bourgeois nationalist regime of Sukarno.
Aidit spelt out the ideological framework of the bloody defeat of the Indonesian revolution shortly after returning
from 18 months in China in July 1950 and wresting control of the PKI leadership:
"The working class, the peasants, the petty-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie must unite in one national
Aidit slavishly followed the line of the Maoist regime in China which suppressed the independent struggle of the
working class and attempted to establish a "New Democracy", a bourgeois state, in alliance with sections
of the national bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie after the collapse of Chiang Kai Shek's dictatorship.
Parroting Mao, he called for a "people's democracy" and a "united front of all anti-imperialist
and anti-feudal forces in the country. That is to say, the working class, the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie
and the national bourgeoisie."
In keeping with the counter-revolutionary "two-stage" theory of Stalinism, "The task of this alliance
is to bring about not socialist but democratic reforms".
Aidit demanded that the workers and peasant masses support not only the national bourgeoisie but also "all
other patriotic and anti-colonial forces including the left (rather progressive) landlord group".
It was this line, which Aidit hammered out incessantly, which was used to suppress workers' and peasants' struggles,
tie the working class to the Sukarno regime, and create the conditions for the US-backed military to strike.
Time and again, PKI members and supporters were instructed to strangle the class struggle and the revolutionary
strivings of the oppressed masses in order to preserve the "national united front":
"The basic principle we must adhere to in the conduct of the national struggle is to subordinate the class
struggle to the national struggle."
The "two stage" theory of Stalinism insists that in the colonial and semi-colonial countries such as
Indonesia, the oppressed masses must not engage in struggles that threaten the national bourgeoisie nor raise the
program of socialist revolution. The class struggle has to be stifled to prop up the national bourgeoisie and establish
a national capitalist democracy.
The bloody counter-revolutionary consequences of this Stalinist line were first demonstrated in China in 1926-27
when the butcher Chiang Kai Shek inflicted a crushing defeat on the Chinese working class after the Communist Party
had been instructed by the Kremlin leadership to join his bourgeois nationalist Koumintang.
The massacres carried out by Chiang confirmed Leon Trotsky's warnings that the weak and belated bourgeoisies of
the oppressed nations are organically incapable of conducting any consistent struggle against imperialism and feudalism.
That is because, to do so requires the mobilisation of the masses in revolutionary struggle and such a struggle
immediately comes into conflict with the class position of the national bourgeoisie as exploiters of their "own"
working class and peasantry.
As Trotsky explained in his writings on the betrayal of the Chinese Revolution:
To really arouse the workers and peasants against imperialism is possible only by connecting their basic and most
profound life interest with the cause of the country's liberation. A workers' strike small or large an agrarian
rebellion, an uprising of the oppressed sections in city and country against the usurer, against the bureaucracy,
against the local military satraps, all that arouses the multitudes, that welds them together, that educates, steels,
is a real step forward on the road to the revolutionary and social liberation of the Chinese people... But everything
that brings the oppressed and exploited masses of the toilers to their feet inevitably pushes the national bourgeoisie
into an open bloc with the imperialists. The class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the masses of workers and
peasants is not weakened, but, on the contrary, is sharpened by imperialist oppression, to the point of bloody
civil war at every serious conflict." (Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese Revolution, New Park 1969, p.5)
The criminal role played by the PKI in tying the Indonesian masses to Sukarno's national bourgeois regime made
Trotsky's analysis tragically prophetic.
The unresolved tasks of genuine national liberation, land redistribution, democracy and economic development in
Indonesia and all historically-oppressed countries can be achieved only by the working class leading the peasant
masses in the socialist revolution. That is, national self-determination can only arise as a by-product of the
socialist revolution led by the proletariat.
The victory of this struggle is bound up with the development of the world socialist revolution to overthrow imperialism
on a world scale.
This is the kernel of the Marxist theory of Permanent Revolution developed by Leon Trotsky and vindicated by the
victory of the October 1917 Russian Revolution.
Pabloite accomplices of counter-revolution
In the months following the bloody CIA-organised military coup of October 1-2, 1965, every known member and supporter
of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and all working class parties, and hundreds of thousands of other Indonesian
workers and peasants, were massacred or thrown into concentration camps for torture and interrogation.
The systematic extermination and ruthless suppression of working class opposition intensified after March 11, 1966
when Sukarno, the bourgeois nationalist leader retained by the military as President, granted unfettered decree-making
power to the coup leader and army chief, General Suharto.
The betrayal of the tumultuous revolutionary movement of the Indonesian masses by the Stalinist leadership of the
PKI was a profound defeat with enormous implications for the international working class.
The PKI blocked the repeated attempts of the workers and peasants to seize the factories and plantations. It
tied the masses to the bourgeois nationalist regime of Sukarno and ultimately joined the US-backed military leaders,
the future butchers of the masses, in the Sukarno cabinet. After the coup the Stalinists ordered their cadre to
enforce Sukarno's appeal for "unity" with the military and to prevent any resistance to the holocaust
that was being unleashed.
The blow struck to the Indonesian revolution reverberated throughout Asia and around the world. In particular it
encouraged and enabled the massive escalation of the US invasion of Vietnam, it crushed the hopes and revolutionary
striving of the masses in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and it strengthened the hand of the unstable
bourgeois regimes in the Indian sub-continent.
Mandel and Hansen whitewash Stalinist treachery
But the response of the Pabloite revisionists of the "United Secretariat," led by Ernest Mandel and Joseph
Hansen, was to minimise the magnitude of the great Indonesian betrayal, to whitewash the counter-revolutionary
role of the Stalinists, and, above all, to cover up their own responsibility for the bloodbath.
While the Indonesian masses were being slaughtered, Professor Mandel attempted to paint the most reassuring picture
of the future prospects of the Indonesian revolution, in order to dull the consciousness of the international working
"Naturally the struggle has not ended in Indonesia," he wrote from the comfort of his Belgian university
chair in an article published in the Pabloite journal World Outlook on March 11, 1966.
"A part of the Communist cadres have been able to go underground," he went on. "The discontent of
the hungry masses is increasing from day to day; the empty stomachs of the workers and peasants are not filled
through massacres. The revolt will widen against the corrupt regime. Sukarno understands this and will resume his
eternal balancing act; he has just eliminated the most ferocious of the generals from his cabinet. The people will
again have their turn."
This whitewash of the immense betrayal of the Indonesian masses demonstrates the counter-revolutionary consequences
of Pabloite opportunism, which emerged in the Trotskyist movement from the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Led by Michel Pablo, elements such as Mandel adapted to the post-World War II stabilisation of capitalism and
the seeming strengthening of the Stalinist bureaucracies which suppressed the revolutionary upsurge of the international
working class in the immediate post-war period. They abandoned Trotsky's struggle for the construction of the Fourth
International as the world party of socialist revolution and claimed that the Moscow and Beijing-line Stalinist
bureaucracies and parties would be pressured by the masses into playing a progressive role. On this basis, they
set out to liquidate the Fourth International into whatever Stalinist or social democratic formation then dominated
the labour movement in each country, declaring that the road to socialism consisted of centuries of horribly deformed
workers' states of the type established in Eastern Europe and China.
In 1953 this liquidationism was combatted by the formation of the International Committee of the Fourth International
in response to an Open Letter issued by American Socialist Workers Party leader James P. Cannon calling for the
defence of "orthodox Trotskyism". However, by the early 1960s the SWP leaders themselves had increasingly
adapted to the prolonged post-war boom. They hailed the apparent successes of national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois
elements, such as Castro in Cuba, as a substitute for the seizure of power by the working class led by revolutionary
Marxist parties, proclaiming that socialism could be achieved through such "blunted instruments". This
was the perspective on which they reunified with the Pabloites in 1963 to form the United Secretariat.
Central to the Pabloite renunciation of proletarian revolution was the reactionary objectivist method which
presented the struggle for socialism as a quasi-automatic "historical process" achieved through the spontaneous
movement of the masses led by whatever political tendencies were at hand, regardless of their class composition
Thus the Indonesian "people" would prevail regardless of the terrible crisis of leadership produced by
the perfidy of the mass Stalinist party. Sukarno, by now the willing tool of General Suharto, was supposedly muzzling
the most ferocious generals. And, even after its unspeakable betrayal, Mandel referred to the PKI as a "Communist"
Mandel's snow job was ratified by the "United Secretariat" in a statement issued on March 20, 1966. Its
conclusion was that the emergence of General Suharto as the "strong man" of the counter-revolution was
of little consequence, because "It is extremely unlikely that the counter-revolutionists now in power in Jakarta
will be able to stabilise the situation for any length of time."
Today, with Suharto's military junta still riding ruthlessly on the back of Indonesia's oppressed millions, it
is crucial to study how the Pabloite opportunists provided the essential political cover for the PKI and the Sukarno
The "United Secretariat" statement sowed the most deadly illusion that even General Suharto's American-trained
killers would be compelled to act in the interests of the Indonesian masses against imperialism as part of Sukarno's
phoney "confrontation" with the newly-formed state of Malaysia: "The army leaders themselves will
not readily give up their nationalist, anti-imperialist verbiage which reflects real conflicts of interest with
British imperialism and the ruling comprador bourgeoisie and semi-feudal landowners of Malaysia."
While the Indonesian masses were left leaderless in the face of Suharto's horrific slaughter, the Pabloites loftily
declared their confidence that somehow the masses would be victorious.
"The masses, though leaderless and deeply shaken, have not lost all fighting potential, particularly in the
countryside. It will prove impossible to get the thousands of squatters to evacuate the imperialist-owned or 'nationalised'
plantations managed by corrupt army officers, or to compel the thousands of plantation and oil workers to revert
to the 'normal' working conditions of colonial times."
Above all, the Pabloites continued to insist that the masses place their trust in the Stalinist leaders of the
PKI, arguing that they could be convinced to play a revolutionary role, even after they had strangled every mass
movement against the Sukarno regime.
"If they succeed in regrouping and in regaining a mass following in some regions of the countryside by
calling on the peasants to immediately take over the land held by the landlords, the plantations and army administration,
they could gain on a progressive scale due to the inability of the Indonesian reaction to solve the country's basic
economic plight and due to the divisions in the ranks of the army which that inability will undoubtedly provoke."
In 1957, and again in 1964-65, the PKI had directed workers and peasants to surrender the factories, banks, oil
installations, plantations and other enterprises they had occupied, saving the day for Sukarno and the Indonesian
bourgeoisie. Now, the Pabloites claimed, they could play a progressive role.
Mandel's article and the "United Secretariat" statement were published, together with an article by a
Pabloite member of the PKI, by the US Socialist Workers Party in a pamphlet called "The Catastrophe in Indonesia"
dated December 1966. It was complete with an introduction by Joseph Hansen, an SWP leader who had played a poisonous
role in the 1963 reunification with the Pabloites. Hansen, subsequently exposed as a Stalinist agent who became
an FBI plant in the SWP, was a central instigator in the SWP's 1963 break from the ICFI. Hansen sought to reassure
the pamphlet's readers that "one of the new features of world politics today" was "the quickness
with which the masses recover from defeats that formerly would have left them prostrate for decades".
The stunning indifference of the Pabloites to the fate of the Indonesian masses was not simply the product of
the callousness and contempt for the working class which characterises their fetid petty-bourgeois milieu but was
also a bid to cover-up the critical factor in the Indonesian betrayal the role played by the Pabloites themselves
and their Indonesian representatives.
It is a measure of the cynicism of the Pabloites and their subservience to the Stalinists and the national bourgeoisie
that none of the articles and statements published in the 1966 pamphlet so much as mentioned the existence of a
section of the "United Secretariat" in Indonesia, let alone explained the part it played in the events
leading up to the coup.
There was just one brief appeal for the legalisation of and release of all members of the PKI, the Partai Murbah
(a social democratic formation) and the Partai Acoma, even though the Acoma party had relations with the Pabloites
at least as early as 1953 and was admitted as a section of the "United Secretariat" in 1960, just as
the American SWP was intensifying its unprincipled reunification manoeuvres with the Pabloites.
This fleeting reference to their own members was a guilty attempt by the Pabloites to hide the part that they and
their Indonesian proteges played in providing the PKI Stalinists with much-needed credibility throughout the 1950s
How Pabloism emerged in Indonesia
The Partai Acoma originated as a breakaway from the PKI in 1948. By falsely claiming to be Trotskyist, it served
to divert and trap working class and peasant opposition to the support of the PKI for the national bourgeois regime
of Sukarno. Led by an MP, Ibnu Parna, its programmatic documents presented the PKI as a "Marxist-Leninist
party like us." As we shall show, this was a fraud in relation to both the PKI and the Partai Acoma.
The need for such a fake "Trotskyist" safety valve was demonstrated by the explosive events of 1948.
The collaboration of the PKI leadership in the post-war administrations headed by Sukarno and their acceptance
of the Indonesian bourgeoisie's rotten agreements with the Dutch colonialists aroused intense working class opposition.
From July 5, 1947 to January 23, 1948 President Sukarno's Republican administration was headed by Amir Sjarifuddin
who was both Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Sjarifuddin was a secret member of the PKI, as was the Deputy
Prime Minister and a Minister of State. In addition, two Ministers of State were open members of the PKI. This
administration signed the Renville Agreement with the Netherlands which maintained Dutch control of the lion's
share of the sugar, rubber, coffee, tea and oil industries, required the withdrawal of guerrilla forces from Dutch-occupied
territory and provided for the liquidation of the PKI-led "people's armed units" into the bourgeois "Indonesian
National Armed Forces" controlled by Sukarno and his generals.
Such was the popular opposition to the acceptance of the US-imposed pact with the Dutch that the government
was brought down and replaced by one headed by right-wing Vice-President Hatta as Prime Minister.
Strikes then erupted, demanding a parliamentary government. The PKI leadership supported the suppression of this
movement by Sukarno who appealed for "national unity". When this betrayal was opposed by a section of
the PKI, the PKI leadership responded savagely, executing the leaders of the opposition faction.
Partai Acoma emerged from this dissenting group. While it opposed the PKI leadership, the Acoma party maintained
that the Indonesian revolution had to be carried out by the PKI as a "Marxist-Leninist party". Subsequently
the Acoma leaders established contact with the "United Secretariat" which encouraged their pro-Stalinist
positions and illusions in Maoism.
It is apparent that the Partai Acoma diverted wide layers of workers and peasants looking for an alternative to
the class collaborationist program of the PKI.
From 1953 to 1955, for example, the Acoma's strength in the 200,000-strong Indonesian Peasants Association (SAKTI)
delayed for two years plans by the PKI leadership to merge SAKTI with two PKI-controlled peasants' organisations,
the RTI and the BTI.
Pabloites prepare betrayal
An article published in February 1958 in the Pabloite journal Quatrieme International provides a graphic indictment
of the role played by Pabloism in opposing the fight for revolutionary Marxist leadership in the working class.
The article, "The Indonesian Revolution on the March," by Sal Santen, a close associate of Pablo, was
written at the height of the revolutionary convulsions of December 1957, when workers and peasants seized control
of Dutch and other imperialist-owned plantations and enterprises.
The article provided a criminal cover for the counter-revolutionary role of the PKI, which ordered the masses to
hand over their conquests to the military in order to shore up the Sukarno administration.
According to Santen: "It must be added that the Communist militants, the basic and average cadres of the PKI
and of the SOBSI, the big Indonesian workers' union organisation, have nothing of the bureaucratic character of
Aidit (Communist Party leader) and Co. They are in front; they are the ones who took over the initiative in occupying
the factories, the plantations, the banks and the ships. There is no doubt that the most conscious of them are
inflamed by the revolutionary audacity of Tan Malakka, by Leon Trotsky's ideas of the permanent revolution."
Acting on this perspective, the Indonesian Pabloites politically disarmed the tens of thousands of workers and
peasants who came forward into struggle only to find their way blocked by the PKI. Just at the point when the decisive
task was to educate the most class conscious elements in the necessity for an uncompromising struggle against the
Stalinist "two-stage" and "bloc of four classes" line of the PKI, and the need for a thorough
arming with the program of Permanent Revolution, the Pabloites worked for the opposite.
Opportunist to the core, they equated Trotsky with Tan Malakka, an early PKI leader who opposed the plans for a
revolt in 1926 and split from the PKI to form his own organisation. They falsified the Marxist theory of Permanent
Revolution, transforming it from a conscious strategy to guide the struggles for the dictatorship of the proletariat
into a spontaneously generated perspective.
The central tenant of Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution is the perfidy of the national bourgeoisie and their
incapacity to lead a real struggle against imperialism. Only the working class can free the masses from national
and class oppression, by carrying the socialist revolution and uniting with their class brothers throughout the
world in a common struggle to overthrow imperialism internationally.
Such a struggle can only be undertaken consciously under the banner of the Fourth International in an uncompromising
struggle against the Stalinist and petty-bourgeois forces, such as the Pabloites, who attempt to disarm the working
class and tie it to its own bourgeoisie.
In the hands of the Pabloites, the program of Permanent Revolution became a justification for their own adaption
to the national bourgeoisie and the Stalinists. The working class did not need its own revolutionary party to come
to power because the PKI was the instrument through which the Permanent Revolution was being realised, albeit unconsciously.
Thus, Santen, speaking on behalf of Pablo and Mandel, declared:
"In any case it is clear that the whole of Indonesia is moving. The march of the masses has become irreversible
although the process remains contradictory and has already reached the stage of dual power in a good part of Indonesia,
and above all in Java. The occupation of enterprises, of plantations, of the fleet, and the banks by the masses
has only one meaning: It is a question of the classical beginning of the proletarian revolution. The Indonesian
revolution is in the act of breaking the limits of the national revolution under a bourgeois nationalist leadership.
It develops according to the laws of the permanent revolution." (Emphasis in the original)
The Pabloites held out the prospect of a peaceful transition to "worker and peasant power":
"A speedy and almost 'peaceful' victory of the revolution up to worker and peasant power (above all in Java)
was possible, if the PKI, at the first moment pushed by the spirit of the masses, had not done everything to castrate
the action of the masses by subordinating it to the control of the government."
What the Pabloites meant by "worker and peasant power" was completely opposed to the struggle for
the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Pabloites lined up as cheer leaders for the counter-revolutionary Stalinist
"two-stage" perspective of demanding that the proletariat give up the struggle for socialist revolution.
To sanctify their opposition to the independent mobilisation of the working class and to the forging of a revolutionary
proletarian, that is, Trotskyist, party, the Pabloites insisted that the PKI, despite its betrayal of the December
1957 occupations, would be pressured to the left by the masses:
"At the same time, at each aggravation of the situation, the masses have the tendency to push the SOBSI and
PKI further. A great deal will now depend on the boldness, on the revolutionary Marxist understanding of the militants,
of the average Communist cadres. We feel completely solidarised with them, inspired and enthused by their initiatives,
by their boldness which we passionately hope will not stop before the 'taboos' of the Aidits. We salute the Indonesian
Trotskyist cadres who are integrated in the PKI with the correct revolutionary perspective that the radicalisation
of the masses will be realised above all through the PKI and SOBSI."
This was the greatest crime of Pabloism the liquidation of Trotskyist cadre, and those who were attracted to Trotskyism,
into the camp of Stalinism.
Santen added a footnote to emphasise that this treacherous line was advanced in direct opposition to the struggle
waged by the International Committee of the Fourth International since its founding in 1953 to defend Trotskyism
against Pabloite liquidationism. Santen specifically denounced the ICFI's fight for the construction of sections
of the Fourth International to defeat counter-revolutionary Stalinism:
"In contradiction to some sectarian 'orthodox' people, the International does not let itself be fascinated
by the reactionary Stalinist policy, but orients itself, above all, on the dynamism of the situation itself, a
dynamism that pushes the masses, and through the masses the PKI itself into contradiction with the present order
This passage should be burned into the consciousness of every worker as the summation of Pabloism's pro-Stalinist
In direct struggle against the ICFI, the Pabloites consciously pushed fatal illusions in the PKI Stalinists, precisely
at the point where the burning question of the hour was to expose the criminal role of the Stalinists and resolutely
fight for a decisive break by the masses from the PKI to construct a revolutionary Trotskyist leadership.
The protracted and implacable struggle waged against the Pabloite opportunists by the ICFI, which appeared for
many years to be a fight taken up by small isolated forces in the Fourth International, was a life and death question
for millions of Indonesian workers and peasants.
Within weeks of Santen's lines being penned, the rotten fruits of the PKI's betrayal of the December 1957 movement
began to emerge. A counter-revolutionary government was formed in Central Sumatra in February 1958 by coup leader
Colonel Achmed Hussein and headed by Dr Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. This CIA-backed operation, only possible because
of the PKI's disarming of the December 1957 rebellion, was a test run for the bloody coup that was to take place
seven years later.
Fully conscious that this was a dress rehearsal for counter-revolution, the response of the Pabloites was to intensify
their wretched boosting of the PKI. Quatrieme International's editor added a footnote which climaxed with the following
"Since the 'rebels' main aim is to do away with Sukarno's 'guided democracy' in which is included the PKI,
then any compromise will be at the expense of the PKI. In this case, the immediate perspective is that the PKI,
under mass pressure, will be obliged, willy nilly, to execute a major policy about-face as was performed by the
Chinese Communist Party in a similar situation in 1949, and to go past the bourgeois-nationalist stage of the revolution
to the socialist stage of workers' power. Thus, in fact, but again without acknowledgement, operating on the basis
of, and validifying the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution."
Thus the PKI, the hangman of the Indonesian revolution, was depicted as the unwitting instrument of the Permanent
Added to this was the lie that the Chinese Stalinists, the mentors of Aidit and the other PKI leaders, had carried
through the "socialist stage of workers' power" in 1949. In fact, the peasant armies of the Maoists brutally
suppressed the proletarian uprising in 1949, murdered the Trotskyist opposition, and established an extremely deformed
workers' state based on the Stalinist perspective of a partnership with the national bourgeoisie, the urban petty
bourgeoisie and the peasantry. This was indeed the model upon which the PKI leadership based itself.
Not content with glorifying the Stalinists, the editor's special footnote then promoted the prospects of the national
bourgeoisie undertaking a progressive transformation as well. It suggested an alternative scenario premised on
the Sukarno government leading a struggle against the CIA-organised "rebels":
"In the other event, that the Sukarno government takes a stronger line of opposition and resistance to the
'rebels,' a further polarisation of all the bourgeois and semi-feudal counter-revolutionary forces will be seen;
confronting a shadow bourgeois-nationalist government and the masses. This confrontation of the masses against
the new 'slaveholders' rebellion,' against the new 'Kornilov putsch,' will mean a new upsurge of the revolution,
while the experience of this kind of revolutionary action by the masses will leave little chance of a relapse to
the stability of a bourgeois nationalist regime."
The events of October 1965 were to prove the Sukarno regime to be no less accommodating to General Suharto's killers
than the Kerensky government was to General Kornilov's coup bid in 1917. Sukarno displayed the essence of bourgeois
nationalism by ending his political career as a puppet President for Suharto's military junta.
The conclusion of the editor's footnote should be inscribed on the tombstone of Pabloism: "In either case
our optimistic perspective is justified. The Indonesian Revolution is on the march! Its victory as a socialist
revolution is now in generation. (Emphasis in original)
From 1957 to 1965 the Pabloites internationally perpetrated this objectivist cover-up of the grave dangers confronting
the Indonesian revolution.
The work of the Pabloite section in Indonesia was central to the whole Pabloite world perspective. It was discussed
intensively at the so-called Fifth World Congress of the "United Secretariat" in 1957.
"Our Fifth World Congress, in discussing the progress and the road of the world colonial revolution, gave
serious attention to the developments in Indonesia. Recognising the Indonesian situation as pre-revolutionary,
it expected a revolutionary explosion very soon," declared the article by Santen.
The entire Pabloite "United Secretariat" has blood on its hands. They aided and abetted the Stalinist
betrayal of the Indonesian workers and peasants.
Pabloites cover up Stalinist treachery
The crisis of working class leadership was never posed so sharply as in Indonesia between 1963 and 1965. The
fate of the Indonesian workers and peasants depended entirely on overcoming and defeating the counter-revolutionary
line of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which bound the working class hand and foot to the tottering bourgeois
nationalist regime of Sukarno while the US-backed military prepared for a bloody coup.
The PKI Stalinists, led by general secretary Aidit, repeatedly demanded that workers and peasants hand back factories
and plantations which they had seized. They then joined the army generals in taking cabinet posts in the Suharto
government and backed the outlawing of workers' strikes.
The more it became obvious that the generals were preparing for a bloody coup, the more the PKI leaders worked
feverishly to assure the bourgeoisie and the military that the PKI opposed the revolutionary mobilisation of the
Aidit repeatedly declared that the state power in Indonesia did not have to be smashed but could be reformed from
within to "strengthen and consolidate the pro-people's aspect," which included President Sukarno. The
PKI leader gave lectures at army colleges in which he heralded a "feeling of mutuality and unity that daily
grows strong between all the armed forces of the Indonesian Republic and the various groups of Indonesian people,
including the communists".
The PKI leadership could only advance these positions because the Indonesian Pabloites were working equally feverishly
to prevent workers from breaking with the Stalinists. They vehemently opposed the construction of a new revolutionary
The responsibility for the bloody counter-revolutionary consequences of this line can be traced directly to
the 1963 Pabloite Reunification Congress at which the American Socialist Workers Party consummated an unprincipled
break from the International Committee of the Fourth International and joined the Pabloite "United Secretariat"
of Ernest Mandel.
After leading the struggle against Pabloite liquidationism in 1953, the SWP leaders had in the late 1950s increasingly
adapted to the pressure of the protracted post-war boom and the apparent quiescence of the working class. They
abandoned the struggle for proletarian revolution led by a Bolshevik-type party and sought "regroupment"
with petty bourgeois radicals and disaffected Stalinists. In 1963 they joined hands with the Pabloites in claiming
that not only the Stalinist parties, such as the PKI, but also the bourgeois nationalist and petty-bourgeois nationalist
forces in the backward countries, such as Castro in Cuba and Sukarno in Indonesia, could become vehicles for the
establishment of socialism.
The reunification resolution declared that there was no crisis of revolutionary leadership in the oppressed countries:
"In the colonial and semi-colonial countries ... the very weakness of capitalism, the whole peculiar socio-economic
structure produced by imperialism, the permanent misery of the big majority of the population in the absence of
a radical agrarian revolution, the stagnation and even reduction of living standards while industrialisation nevertheless
proceeds relatively rapidly, creates situations in which the failure of one revolutionary wave does not lead automatically
to relative or even temporary social or economic stabilisation. A seemingly inexhaustible succession of mass struggles
continues, such as Bolivia has experienced for 10 years."
In other words, no matter how crushing were the defeats and betrayals inflicted on the masses, they would rise
again. There was no need for a Trotskyist party. The criminal character of this opportunist complacency was soon
to be spelt out in the blood of the Indonesian masses.
The 1963 conference was based on the rejection of the historical necessity of building sections of the Trotskyist
movement in the backward countries. The Pabloite resolution declared: "The weakness of the enemy in the backward
countries has opened the possibility of coming to power even with blunted instruments."
In Indonesia, the "blunted instrument" was to be the PKI.
The great betrayal in Sri Lanka
The Pabloite treachery in Indonesia was intimately bound up with the great betrayal in Sri Lanka in 1964 when the
Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), the Pabloite organisation, joined the bourgeois coalition government of Mrs Bandaranaike,
together with the Stalinist Communist Party of Sri Lanka, in order to behead the mass working class movement against
The LSSP had opposed the formation of the International Committee in 1953 and subsequently played a central
role in preparing the American SWP's reunification with the Pabloites. Its opposition to the struggle against opportunism
in the Fourth International was rooted in its increasingly nationalist orientation and abandonment of Trotskyist
program and principles in order to accommodate with the Stalinists and Bandaranaike's capitalist party, the SLFP,
The Pabloite Reunification Congress of 1963 covered up the LSSP's national opportunism by claiming that "Our
Ceylonese section has progressively corrected the wrong orientation adopted in 1960 of supporting the liberal-bourgeois
government of the SLFP. Since the masses began to go into action, it has not hesitated to place itself at their
head against its electoral allies of yesterday." Just one year later the fake "Trotskyist" credentials
supplied by the Pabloites were used by the LSSP to join the capitalist government.
This betrayal by a party hailed by the Pabloites as the "largest Trotskyist party in the world" had disastrous
implications internationally, first of all in Indonesia. It strengthened the hand of the Stalinist and Maoist parties,
such as the PKI, whose capacity to suppress and disarm the working class would have been shattered had the LSSP
upheld the program of permanent revolution and fought for the overthrow of bourgeois rule in Sri Lanka.
Pabloites boost PKI
After the entry of their Sri Lankan section into the capitalist government in Sri Lanka alongside the Stalinists,
the Pabloites continued to pursue a very similar pro-Stalinist and pro-national bourgeois line in Indonesia.
The Pabloites' pamphlet, The Catastrophe in Indonesia, not only covered up the part played by the Indonesian Pabloite
section, the Partai Acoma, as we exposed in the previous chapter.
Even after the bloody coup in Indonesia, the pamphlet continued to promote the prospect of the national bourgeoisie
and the PKI playing a progressive role.
It included an article by T. Soedarso, described by US Socialist Workers Party leader Joseph Hansen in the pamphlet's
introduction as a "young member of the Indonesian Communist party who succeeded in making his way into exile".
Hansen enthusiastically commended Soedarso's article as "an indication of the determination of an important
sector of the Indonesian Communist Party to learn from what happened and to utilise the lessons in such a way as
to ensure victory when the masses again surge forward, as they surely will".
Soedarso's article treated the counter-revolutionary program of the PKI leadership as a series of "mistakes",
including the "errors" of "seeking to achieve socialism by peaceful means," and of pursuing
a "policy" of a two-stage revolution and a united front with the national bourgeoisie.
Soedarso expressed no fundamental differences with the Stalinists, agreeing, for example, that "The revolutionary
movement could and should support the progressive attitudes or actions of the national bourgeoisie". If ever
proof was needed that the semi-colonial bourgeoisie, personified by Sukarno, was inherently incapable of a "progressive"
program and would line up behind the slaughter of the working class, the Indonesian bloodbath provided it. For
18 months Sukarno served General Suharto's dictatorship as a puppet president, and even after that, from March
1967, he was retained as a token "president without powers".
The Pabloites likewise belittled the significance of the PKI's entry into the Sukarno NASAKOM coalition government
with the military butchers. Soedarso implored the PKI to reverse this "line," as if it were a mere lapse.
Soedarso's virtual apology for this fundamental class treachery was no accident. The cardinal premise of Pabloism
was the reversal of Trotsky's struggle against Stalinism. The evolution of Stalinism into a counter-revolutionary
bureaucracy was established irrevocably in 1933 when the Stalinist Comintern, approved, without a single dissenting
voice, the betrayal of the German Communist Party in handing over the German working class to Hitler without a
shot being fired. From that point on Trotsky insisted that the Third International, following the Second, had passed
definitely into the camp of the bourgeoisie, and that the Fourth International had to built as the world party
of socialist revolution to ensure the continuity of Marxism.
Soedarso's article was a conscious cover-up, organised by Mandel and Hansen, for the reactionary role of Stalinism.
The article deliberately did not use the word Stalinism, but fraudulently referred to the PKI as "Communist".
And then to make his position crystal clear, Soedarso concluded: "The above criticism is not intended to undermine
the role of the PKI nor to arouse distrust in Indonesian Communism."
Thus, a year after the military coup, by which time a million workers and peasants had perished, the Pabloites
were whitewashing the lessons of 1965 and still urging the Indonesian workers and peasants to maintain their faith
in the PKI.
The Pabloite 'lessons' of Indonesia
Soedarso's article was not an isolated instance. In fact the line advanced in the article provided the essential
themes for the statement issued on March 20, 1966 by the Pabloite "United Secretariat". Entitled "The
Lesson of Indonesia," it opposed any break from the PKI and issued no call for the building of a section of
the Fourth International. On the contrary, it declared that the "Indonesian Communists" could "overcome
the results of the present defeat" by assimilating certain lessons.
The first "lesson" was stated as follows: "While it is correct and necessary to support all anti-imperialist
mass movements, and even to critically support all concrete anti-imperialist measures taken by representatives
of the colonial bourgeoisie like Sukarno, for colonial revolution to be victorious it is absolutely essential to
maintain the proletarian organisations strictly independent politically and organisationally from the 'national'
Not only did the Pabloites continue to sow the most dangerous illusions in the "anti-imperialist"
pretensions of the national bourgeoisie, their talk of "independent" proletarian organisations was an
utter fraud. The political independence of the working class could only be forged by building a Trotskyist party
in pitiless and audacious struggle against the Stalinists whom the Pabloites were trying to resuscitate.
The second Pabloite "lesson" claimed that "While it is correct and necessary during the first phases
of the revolution in backward countries to place the main stress on the problems of winning national independence,
unifying the country and solving the agrarian question (i.e., the historical tasks of the bourgeois democratic
revolution which constitute the most burning tasks in the eyes of 80 to 90 percent of the population), it is indispensable
to understand that the solution of these tasks is only possible when the working class, in alliance with the poor
peasantry, has conquered leadership of the revolution, establishes the dictatorship of the proletariat and the
poor peasantry and pushes the revolution through to its socialist phase."
With this opportunist line of "two phases," the Pabloites were trying to breathe new life into the
discredited "two stage" theory of the Stalinists, which demanded that the "socialist phase"
of the revolution be delayed until the completion of the democratic and national revolution. The Pabloite position
was the opposite of Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution which was based on the international character of
the socialist revolution and the revolutionary role of the international proletariat. Trotsky emphasised the essential
lesson of the Russian revolution that, in this epoch, the democratic and national tasks in the backward and oppressed
countries could be achieved only through the proletarian revolution and its extension on the world scale.
The Pabloite call for the "dictatorship of the proletariat and poor peasantry" sought to revive the "Old
Bolshevik" formula of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" discarded by
Lenin in 1917. Lenin adopted Trotsky's unequivocal position that the proletariat is the only consistently revolutionary
class which can lead the peasants and carry through the democratic and socialist tasks of the oppressed nations
as part of the struggle of the working class on a world scale.
The third "lesson" advanced by the Pabloites was: "While it is necessary to win the broadest possible
mass base in the countryside, a revolutionary party capable of applying that policy must be based upon a hardened
proletarian cadre thoroughly trained in Marxist theory and revolutionary practice."
The duplicitous character of this "lesson" can be seen from the fact that it was oriented toward the
Stalinists. The references to a "hardened proletarian cadre" and "Marxist theory" were a sham.
In fact, the "United Secretariat" advised the survivors of the PKI leadership to take the road of rural
Its statement expressed the hope that "what remains of that leadership along with the surviving party cadres
especially the best educated, those steeled by the terrible experiences they went through in the past six months
will have taken the road of guerrilla war, if only out of self-defence.
They urged the Stalinists to turn to a peasant-based guerrilla war, aping the Maoists in China. Maoism is a variant
of Stalinism based on peasant hostility to the hegemony of the working class. Arising out the defeat of the 1926-27
Chinese revolution and the destruction of the Chinese Communist Party's working class membership, Mao's turn to
the peasantry led to the abortion of the 1949 Chinese revolution. It produced a highly deformed workers' state
based on Mao's "bloc of four classes" the national bourgeoisie, the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the peasantry
and the working class.
It was this very doctrine which guided the determination of the Aidit leadership of the PKI to prevent a proletarian
socialist revolution in Indonesia. In Aidit's words: "The working class, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie
and the national bourgeoisie must unite in one national front."
The Pabloites' pamphlet was a cynical bid to divert class conscious workers from the most essential lesson of
the Indonesian betrayal the necessity for a Trotskyist party to defeat the Stalinists and their Pabloite accomplices
who function as counter-revolutionary petty-bourgeois agencies within the mass movement. There was and is only
one revolutionary party which can avenge the betrayal of 1965 by leading the Indonesian workers to power an Indonesian
section of the International Committee of the Fourth International.
In 1951 the PKI leadership had set out clearly the path of betrayal it was to pursue. "In the struggle to
realise their political convictions, the communists will not use force while the ruling class still leaves the
peaceful, the parliamentary way open. If there is the use of force, the spilling of blood, a civil war, it will
not be the communists who start it but the ruling class itself."
This counter-revolutionary perspective was only able to be inflicted on the Indonesian masses because the Pabloites
tied the most class conscious sections of the working class to the banner and program of the PKI.
The Pabloite betrayals in Sri Lanka and Indonesia demonstrated the counter-revolutionary character of Pabloism.
As the International Committee of the Fourth International stated in its 1988 perspectives resolution, The World
Capitalist Crisis and the Tasks of the Fourth International,:
"In the assistance it rendered to Stalinism, social democracy and bourgeois nationalism, the opportunism
of the Pabloite centrists played a vital role in enabling imperialism to survive the crucial years between 1968
and 1975 when its world order was shaken by economic turmoil and an international upsurge of the working class
and the oppressed masses in the backward countries. It verified Trotsky's assessment of centrism as a secondary
agency of imperialism. The petty-bourgeois defeatists who pontificate on the doomed character of the proletariat
while discovering new vistas for the bourgeoisie never bother to concretely analyse how decrepit capitalism survived
into the 1980s. The Pabloites care least of all to examine the results of their own policies. Inasmuch as the entire
petty-bourgeois fraternity of centrists, radicals and declassed intellectuals dismiss a priori the revolutionary
capacities of the working class and accept its defeat as inevitable, they never even consider what the consequences
of a correct Marxist policy would have been in Sri Lanka in 1964, in France in 1968, in Chile in 1973, and in Greece
and Portugal in 1974.
"The International Committee, on the other hand, derives from the strategical experiences of the proletariat
during the postwar period the crucial lesson upon which it bases its preparation for the coming revolutionary upheavals:
that the building of the Fourth International as the World Party of Socialist Revolution to ensure the victory
of the international working class requires an uncompromising and unrelenting struggle against opportunism and
A new revolutionary leadership must be built to lead the Indonesian masses to smash the Suharto dictatorship, overthrow
the bourgeoisie and throw off the yoke of imperialist exploitation in the fight for the world socialist revolution.
Against the Stalinists and Pabloites who are preparing another bloody trap for the masses, an Indonesian section
of the ICFI must be forged to lead this struggle.
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