Army chief of staff Gen. Moeldoko, the sole candidate for the top post at the Indonesian Military (TNI), said
on Wednesday that Indonesia should revisit the concept of national defense with the emergence of new security threats
from non-state actors, including terrorism and communal conflicts.
Speaking to members of the House of Representatives (DPR) Commission I on defense, Moeldoko, who was required to
undergo a fit-and-proper test at the House, argued that a review was needed as there were possible security threats
in the “grey areas” that were subject to military operations other
“The TNI is concerned about the possible occurrence of asymmetric warfare due to the archipelagic nature of the
country — which makes it prone to infiltration —, democratization, the pluralistic nature of [our] society and
globalization, which has had a multi-dimensional impact on the country,” he said. “The TNI must be ready for asymmetric
wars which have unusual, unexpected or irregular characteristics.”
The country has faced social conflicts, ranging from religious to agrarian disputes in the years following the
downfall of Soeharto in 1998. With the 2014 elections approaching, many analysts have predicted that social conflicts
in the country could escalate.
The government has consequently proposed a number of items of security-related legislation, including the national
security bill, which allows for the deployment of the military to deal with riots. However, the legislation has
been strongly opposed by human rights activists, who claim that it could lead to rights abuses.
Under the 2012 Law on Social Conflict Management, the TNI can be involved in resolving social conflicts, but they
can only act under the command of the police.
When asked about his strategy to improve discipline among soldiers, Moeldoko said that the key was training.
“We have a program to humanize soldiers so that they will not easily lose their temper when dealing with incidents
that might provoke them. We will also strengthen subordinate commanders to ensure soldiers follow instructions
in the field,” he said.
The TNI was severely criticized recently following a series of incidents, including the shooting of four detainees
at a prison in Yogyakarta by members of the Army’s Special Forces.
Moeldoko proposed an increase in the budget allocation for soldiers’ remuneration, which he said was still far
from reasonable as only 37 percent of the annual state budget allocated to the TNI was used to pay around 438,000
soldiers nationwide. “Increasing the use of locally produced technology will help the efficacy of budget allocation
[...] I hope we can increase the allocation for our soldiers’ salaries to 57 percent, but it is of course up to
you,” he told the lawmakers.The government has annually increased the budget allocation for the TNI. This year,
the TNI received Rp 81.3 trillion (US$759 million) up from last year’s Rp 7.56 billion. If approved by lawmakers,
the TNI will receive Rp 83.4 trillion next year.
During the fit-and-proper test on Wednesday, Moeldoko affirmed the TNI’s non-affiliation to any political parties
law makers raised concerns over whether he would be neutral during the elections.
Tjahjo Kumolo from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) told Moeldoko that his predecessors had
vowed to be neutral approaching the 2004 and 2009 elections, but they failed to live up to their claims. “We don’t
want the TNI taking sides during the election,” said Tjahjo.
Moeldoko said, “My stance is firm and clear. I will not compromise in protecting the Unitary State of the Republic
of Indonesia [NKRI].”
Commission I chairman Mahfudz Siddiq told reporters that his commission would closely monitor the TNI to ensure
its impartiality in the elections. “He [Moeldoko] has promised to be neutral, thus we will keep an eye on the TNI
to make sure that he keeps his promise,” Mahfudz, a Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) politician, said.
Contacted separately, defense observer Iis Gindarsiah from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
said that if selected commander, Moeldoko should focus the TNI on its main job of protecting the country from external
“I think the TNI must not be involved in dealing with communal conflicts because that is the responsibility of
the police. However, as social conflicts will likely escalate in the near future, he must deploy soldiers to aid
our police without getting too much involved in the conflicts,” Iis said. All factions on Commission I agreed to
endorse Moeldoko. The commission will forward its assessment to the House plenary meeting on Aug. 27 for approval.
Vision and mission:
• To improve the welfare and professionalism of soldiers
• To improve soldiers’ discipline
• To minimize import of weaponry to promote the national defense industry
• To be neutral in upholding security approaching the 2014 elections
Moeldoko’s wealth amounts to Rp 36 billion (US$3,340,000), comprising:
• Land and property worth Rp 22.13 billion
• Cars worth Rp 1.7 billion
• Livestock worth Rp 1.2 billion
• Precious metals and stones worth Rp 4.6 billion
• Demand deposits worth Rp 2.8 billion and US$450,000
Abstract. This report describes the history and the issues involved in the longstanding differences between
Congress and the executive branch over U.S. policy toward the Indonesian military (ABRI). It describes
two past episodes when these differences broke out: the period of Indonesian radicalism under President
Sukarno in the early 1960s and the initial years of the Indonesian military occupation of East Timor in the
late 1970s. It outlines the different views of the Indonesian military between its congressional critics and
the executive branch officials who have promoted close U.S. relations with it. The issues between Congress
and the Bush and Clinton Administration in the 1990s are discussed within this framework, culminating
in American policy toward the ABRI in 1998 as Indonesia’s economic-political crisis led to the downfall of
President Suharto. Specific issues of the 1990s discussed in the report, including U.S. training of Indonesian
military personnel and U.S. arms sales to Indonesia, likely will come to new legislative attention in the near
The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (ADRI) historically has been the dominant service, with administrative control
of the armed forces resting with the army chief of staff, in 1992 a four-star general. His staff included a vice
chief of staff, an inspector general, and assistant chiefs of staff for logistics, operations, personnel, planning
and budget, security, and territorial affairs. Total army strength, which had not changed substantially during
the New Order era, as of 1992 was some 217,000, not including several thousand in nonmilitary positions throughout
The Indonesian National Defense Forces [Tentara Nasional Indonesia - TNI] were formerly Armed Forces of the
Republic of Indonesia [Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia - ABRI]. The literal translation of tentara is not
"military" but "army", although this confuses the roles of the three services within the TNI.
The Indonesian National Police were a branch of the armed forces for many years. The police were formally separated
from the military in April 1999 [at which point the ABRI was redesignated TNI], a process that was completed in
July 2000. With 250,000 personnel, the police represent a much smaller portion of the population than in most nations.
The TNI totals approximately 350,000 members, including the army, navy, marines, and air force. The army is the
largest branch with about 280,000 active-duty personnel. Defense spending in the national budget accounts for 1.8%
of GDP, but is supplemented by revenue from many military businesses and foundations.
Indonesia has peaceful relations with its neighbors. Without a credible external threat in the region, the military
historically viewed its prime mission as assuring internal security. Military leaders have said that they wish
to transform the military to a professional, external security force, providing domestic support to civilian security
forces as necessary.
Throughout Indonesian history, the military maintained a prominent role in the nation's political and social affairs.
A significant number of cabinet members have had military backgrounds, while active duty and retired military personnel
occupied a large number of seats in the parliament. Commanders of the various territorial commands played influential
roles in the affairs of their respective regions. With the inauguration of the newly-elected national parliament
in October 2004, the military no longer has a formal political role, although it retains important political influence.
A central element of the transformation of Indonesia into a stable and prosperous democracy is the continuing evolution
of the Indonesian military, or TNI, into a modern, professional, civilian-controlled force focused on external
security. The Indonesian public has rejected a formal role for the military in politics, and the TNI has remained
professional and out of politics during Indonesia's democratic transition. Major reforms of the security forces
* The establishment of a police force separate from the military.
* The end of the military ``dual function'' system that placed military officers in civilian government positions.
* The end of military and police appointed seats in Parliament in 2004.
* The passage of legislation in 2004 to ensure that the Parliament begins to exert control over the military's
President Yudhoyono and Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono were committed to implementing and consolidating these
reforms. Sudarsono was Indonesia's first civilian Defense Minister and worked to strengthen civilian control over
the budgetary and procurement process. The Indonesian legislature in 2004 passed an armed forces law that made
clear the importance of democratic values, civilian supremacy, and respect for human rights. The TNI has also supported
the Aceh peace process.
When President Yudhoyono visited Washington in May 2006, he and President Bush jointly stated that normal military
relations would be in the interest of both countries and undertook to continue working toward that objective. President
Yudhoyono also reaffirmed his commitment to further strengthen military reform, civilian control, and accountability.
President Bush pledged his full support in these efforts. Secretary Rice's February 2006 decision to resume International
Military Education and Training reestablished professional links between our militaries and result in increased
professionalism of Indonesian military officers with respect to transparency, human rights, and public accountability.
We also think that Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is in the interests of both countries. TNI reform is a long-term
project, and President Yudhoyono is committed to take the necessary steps for enhanced military-to-military relations.
We are committed to supporting Indonesia in that effort.
Indonesia's four armed services, collectively termed the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia [ABRI - Angkatan
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia], consisted of the three military services -- the army, navy, and air force-- and
the police. The effort to forge a united and coherent nation that could accommodate the natural diversity of peoples
in the Indonesian archipelago has always been a central theme in the country's history. ABRI played a role in national
society that was perhaps unique in the world. The military establishment in the early 1990s was involved in many
affairs of state that elsewhere were not normally associated with military forces and acknowledged as the dominant
political institution in the country. The armed forces establishment, led by the dominant branch, the army, has
been the country's premier institution since 1966 when, in its own view, it answered the summons of the people
and moved to the center stage of national life. Comprising the three military services and the police, the armed
forces operated according to dwifungsi, or dual function, a doctrine of their own evolution, under which they undertook
a double role as both defenders of the nation and as a social-political force in national development.
To fully understand the role of the armed forces in contemporary Indonesian society, one must understand the
absolute priority the government and the military leadership has placed, from the beginning of the New Order, on
the importance of internal security to the achievement of national stability. The New Order government, whose military
leaders played an important role in 1965 in crushing what was officially described as a communist coup attempt,
believed that threats to internal stability were the greatest threats to national security. Having experienced
two attempted coups, supposedly communist-inspired, a number of regional separatist struggles, and instability
created by radical religious movements, the government had little tolerance for public disorder.
Since the beginning of Suharto's rise to power in 1965, the armed forces accepted and supported the foundation
of his regime, namely, the belief that economic and social development was the nation's first priority and that
social and political stability was absolutely essential if that goal were to be achieved. The primary mission of
the armed forces has therefore been to maintain internal stability. The maintenance of internal security was considered
an integral part of national defense itself. Indonesian doctrine considers national defense within the broader
context of "national resilience," a concept that stresses the importance of the ideological, political,
economic, social, and military strength of the nation. Like dwifungsi, this concept has also legitimized activities
of the armed forces in areas not ordinarily considered belonging to the military sphere.
The role of the separate armed services has not changed since 1969, when the heads of the army, navy, and air force
were reduced to chiefs of staff. Operational control of almost all their military units was vested in the commander
in chief, reducing the headquarters of each military service to the status of administrative organs. Only the police
chief continued to exercise operational control over his own personnel.
Communist victories in South Vietnam and Cambodia prompted national authorities to reconsider both the external
threat the nation faced and how best to meet it. Consequently, the new minister of defense and security, General
Mohammad Jusuf, directed a major upgrading of armed forces military capabilities. This upgrade included increased
training and procurement of sufficient equipment and personnel to establish a core of some 100 fully ready combat
battalions. Under Jusuf, the armed forces initiated extensive retraining and reorganization programs that culminated
in a major reorganization of the armed forces in 1985.
Largely retained intact when split off from HANKAM in 1985, the ABRI staff and its functions remained directly
subordinate to the commander in chief, who remained, in turn, directly responsible to the president, also the supreme
commander of the armed forces. Under the commander in chief, there was a provision for a deputy, a position that
in 1992 was not filled. There were two ABRI chiefs of staff, one for the general staff and one for social-political
affairs. The inspector general and the assistant for plans and budget, as well as a number of agencies and institutes,
remained directly under the commander in chief. The ABRI chief of general staff directed assistants for communications/electronics,
intelligence, logistics, operations, personnel, public security affairs, and territorial affairs, the chief of
staff for social-political affairs directed the armed forces' dwifungsi operations in the civilian sector of the
government through assistants for nonmilitary workers' affairs and for social-political affairs. The ABRI joint
staff supported the headquarters of each of the four services. Staff personnel were drawn from all four services.
Police officers served only in positions related to internal security.
The 1985 reorganization also made significant changes in the armed forces chain of command. The four multiservice
Regional Defense Commands (Kowilhans) and the National Strategic Command (KOSTRANAS) were eliminated from the defense
structure, establishing the Military Regional Command (KODAM), or area command, as the key organization for strategic,
tactical, and territorial operations for all services. The chain of command flowed directly from the ABRI commander
in chief to the ten KODAM commanders, and then to subordinate army territorial commands. The commander in chief
exercises control over most of the combat elements of the army, navy, and air force through the ten army KODAMs,
the two air force KO-OPs, and the two navy Armadas.
ABRI's military operations relied on a well-developed doctrine of national defense called Total People's Defense,
based on experiences during the struggle for independence. This doctrine proclaimed that Indonesia could neither
afford to maintain a large military apparatus nor would it compromise its hard-won independence by sacrificing
its nonaligned status and depending on other nations to provide its defense. Instead, the nation would defend itself
through a strategy of territorial guerrilla warfare in which the armed forces, deployed throughout the nation,
would serve as a cadre force to rally and lead the entire population in a people's war of defense. Military planners
envisioned a three-stage war, comprising a short initial period in which an invader would defeat conventional Indonesian
resistance and establish its own control, a long period of unconventional, regionally based fighting, and a final
phase in which the invaders would eventually be repelled.
The success of this strategy, according to the doctrine, required that a close bond be maintained between citizen
and soldier to encourage the support of the entire population and enable the military to manage all war-related
resources. In this scenario, the people would provide logistical support, intelligence, and upkeep, and, as resources
permitted, some civilians would be organized, trained, and armed to join the guerrilla struggle. In trying to attain
these goals, ABRI maintained a territorial organization, run largely by the army, to support public order. This
group exercised considerable influence over local decisions regarding such matters as population redistribution,
the production of food and strategic materials, and the development of air and sea transportation. Armed forces
personnel also continued to engage in large-scale civic action projects involving community and rural development
in order to draw closer to the people, to ensure the continued support of the populace, and to develop among military
personnel a detailed knowledge of the region to which they were assigned. The largest of these programs, the Armed
Forces Enters the Village (AMD) began in 1983 and was to continue indefinitely. It consisted of nationwide civic
action campaigns held roughly three times a year to provide assistance in planning and constructing rural and urban
projects selected by local villagers.
The Total People's Defense strategy did not apply in some of the major actions Indonesia had engaged in since independence.
For example, during the Confrontation with Malaysia from 1963 to 1966, ABRI engaged Malaysian forces in guerrilla
warfare without the support of the border peoples of Sarawak and Sabah; in the dispute with the Dutch over West
New Guinea in the mid-1960s, ABRI fought against Dutch troops. These conflicts were fought in territory outside
the effective jurisdiction of the national government where the Indonesian armed forces lacked the support of the
civilian population and where the concept of Total People's Defense could not be implemented. However, because
the framers of the 1945 constitution had declared these areas as naturally belonging to Indonesia, national authorities
declared that these conflicts were anticolonial wars and in fact represented the completion of the war of independence
begun in 1945
Indonesia is unique among developing countries in the relatively low priority given to defense spending. Having
fully supported the basic concept of the Suharto regime, namely, that national defense and security depended on
the country's economic development, the armed forces endorsed the principle that scarce domestic resources and
foreign aid could not be diverted for military use without slowing the progress of national development.
Only about twenty-five to thirty percent of the budget of the Indonesian military actually comes from the government.
The exact figures are impossible because nobody is allowed to audit the military budget. Each of the services has
their own foundation, where they get their money from. These foundations operate all kinds of businesses -- legal
and illegal businesses -- some of them involve poaching, smuggling, oil smuggling, all kinds of different things.
This encourages business activities among the soldiers. And the soldiers are grossly underpaid. An Indonesian general
makes only about four hundred dollars a month, and an Indonesian enlisted man makes considerably less. They have
to earn a living somehow, and almost always ends up being some sort of activity, such as setting up a roadblock
and stopping drivers coming through and shaking them down for money or something.
Parliamentary mandate in 1978 encouraged the development of a domestic defense industry to lessen Indonesia's dependence
on foreign manufacturers and to reduce the use of scarce foreign currency reserves on weaponry. In keeping with
these guidelines, domestic capacity to maintain, repair, and produce military equipment was improved. Large naval
vessels and fighter aircraft still had to be purchased abroad, but the Indonesian aircraft and shipbuilding industries,
detached from the armed forces in the early 1980s, had been upgraded by the early 1990s. They produced helicopters,
light aircraft, transport aircraft, landing craft, patrol boats, small arms, and a variety of spare parts for these
systems, taking advantage of offset production and other licensing agreements with foreign firms. Defense industries
attended to a greater amount of routine as well as local-level maintenance, such as installing new engines in helicopters
and combat vehicles that had been retired from service because of a shortage of spare parts. Several electronics
firms were established to support defense matériel production. The government continued to seek defense-related
technology transfer from the United States, Japan, and several European nations. For example, certification of
the P.T. PAL shipyard, starting in 1992, to perform certain types of en route repairs for United States Navy warships
on a commercial basis brought a new level of sophistication to that facility.
Despite these efforts, Indonesia is far from self-sufficient in the production of weapons and defense-related matériel.
Domestic facilities remained inadequate for the repair of certain complex weapons systems, and equipment inventories
often represented considerable overstatements of what was in functioning order. Moreover, although defense guidelines
favored the standardization of weaponry and defense matériel, the armed forces still possessed and continued
to procure equipment from a number of other countries, presenting serious problems in obtaining and stocking spare
parts and training technical maintenance personnel. Progress on regional cooperation in defense maintenance began
to show results in the mid-1980s, with cooperative agreements for aircraft and maritime repairs and maintenance
established with both Singapore and Malaysia.
Civilian utilization of defense industry plants has benefited the national economic base. The major defense industries
were transferred from the armed forces in the 1980s and in 1992 were managed by the minister of state for research
and technology. Under a new policy these plants also produced matériel for the commercial and civilian sectors.
The aircraft industry produced parts and equipment for commercial aviation, for example, and the army's former
munitions plants manufactured commercial explosives for the mining and petroleum industries. The P.T. PAL shipyard
also manufactured commercial ships and maritime equipment.
Grade and rank structure is standard throughout the three military services and the police. It corresponded
to that common to most military systems, with minor deviations. No formal class of warrant officers existed between
the enlisted and commissioned hierarchies. Uniforms of the four services were distinguished by color and style,
with variations in headgear and other details distinguishing some elite troops, who wear various colors of berets.
Army working and ceremonial uniforms are olive drab and those of the police, dark brown. Air force and navy uniforms
are medium blue and navy blue, respectively. Rank insignia are standardized among the services. In ceremonial and
service dress, officers wear them on the shoulder epaulet. Field uniform insignia were moved in 1991 from the front
of the fatigue shirt to the collar tip. Rank insignia were worn on the sleeves for NCOs and enlisted personnel.
One title unique to Indonesia is panglima, a traditional heroic rank revived during the National Revolution. Although
panglima is often translated as commander, it carries a higher connotation of honor and power. Its bearers, usually
flag officers of various ranks, derive enhanced personal status from serving as panglima. In the 1980s, tradition
evolved to limit the title panglima to the ABRI commander in chief and the commanders of KOSTRAD and the ten KODAMs.
A major change in the status of security and intelligence appeared to have occurred as a result of the 1985 military
reorganization, which included the elimination of the OPSUS [Special Operations Service]. OPSUS compiled political
intelligence and was sometimes used by the president to conduct delicate foreign diplomatic assignments. Opsus
was originally a combat intelligence unit set up by Suharto during the Irian Barat campaign of 1963-66.
For many years, it was headed by the late Ali Murtopo, a close confidante of the president who also served as the
minister of information (see Political Parties , ch. 4). Ali Murtopo and Opsus were identified with the implementation
of the Act of Free Choice, through which the Irian Barat became a province of Indonesia in 1969. Opsus was also
involved in negotiations with Portugal regarding East Timor in the mid-1970s.
The Indonesian Army (Indonesian: Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, TNI–AD), the land component of the
Indonesian Armed Forces, has an estimated strength of 328,517 regular personnel. The force's history
began in 1945 when the Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR) "Civil Security Forces" served as paramilitary and
Since the nation's independence struggle, the Indonesian Army has been involved in many operations involving foreign
powers such as the incorporation of Western New Guinea, the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation, and the annexation
of East Timor, as well as with internal operations in Aceh and Maluku. Like the Indonesian military as a whole,
it has been involved in numerous human rights violations, especially in West Papua, East Timor and Aceh.
The Indonesia Army comprises the headquarters and associated units, the military area commands, a strategic reserve
command KOSTRAD, a special forces command Kopassus, and other formations and units. The force has grown over the
years; in July 1976 the army was estimated to consist of 180,000 personnel, one armoured cavalry brigade, part
of Kostrad (one tank battalion, plus support units), 14 infantry brigades (90 infantry, 1 para, 9 artillery, 11
anti-aircraft, and 9 engineer battalions) of which three of the brigades were in Kostrad, two airborne brigades
totalling six battalions, also part of Kostrad, one independent tank battalion, 7 independent armoured cavalry
battalions, and four independent para-commando battalions.
Military Area Commands
The Armed Forces' military districts were created by General Soedirman, following the model of the German Wehrkreise
system. The system was later ratified in Surat Perintah Siasat No.1, signed by General Soedirman in November 1948.
From 1946 to 1952, the Army had been organised into numerous divisions. These were consolidated in 1951, and then
eliminated in 1952. From 1952 to 1958-59, the Army was organised into seven Tentara & Teritoriums. In August
1958, the Indonesian Army reorganised its territorial commands. There were to be sixteen Kodams from that point
in time, which retained earlier divisional titles; the Siliwangi Division, for example, became Kodam VI/Siliwangi.
A reorganization in 1985 made significant changes in the army chain of command. The four multiservice Regional
Defense Commands (Kowilhans) and the National Strategic Command (Kostranas) were eliminated from the defense structure,
re-establishing the Military Area Command (Kodam), or regional command, as the key organization for strategic,
tactical, and territorial operations for all services. The chain of command flowed directly from the ABRI commander
in chief to the ten Kodam commanders, and then to subordinate army territorial commands.
The Kodams incorporate provincial and district commands each with a number of infantry battalions, sometimes a
cavalry battalion, artillery, or engineers. Some have Raider battalions attached. Currently there are 12 Military
Area Commands, and these are:
* Kodam Iskandar Muda, overseeing Aceh province as part of the Aceh special autonomy law. Previously under the
Kodam I/Bukit Barisan.
* Kodam I/Bukit Barisan, overseeing northern Sumatra provinces of North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau and Riau Islands.
o In 1997, before the split of Kodam I into Kodam I and Kodam Iskandar Muda, territorial military district commands
included Korem 011 (HQ Lhokseumawe), Korem 012 (HQ Banda Aceh), Korem 022 (HQ Pematang Siantar), Korem 023 (HQ
Sibolga), Korem 031 (HQ Pekanbaru), and Korem 032 (HQ Padang).
* Kodam II/Sriwijaya, overseeing southern provinces on Sumatra island of Jambi, Bengkulu, Bangka Belitung, South
Sumatra and Lampung.
o Korems in 1997 included Korem 041 (HQ Palembang), Korem 042 (HQ Jambi), Korem 043 (HQ Lampung), and Korem 044
* Kodam Jaya, overseeing Jakarta as the capital city of Indonesia. Kodam Jaya also oversees three regions outside
Jakarta of Bekasi and Depok which actually in West Java province and Tangerang which is in Banten province.
* Kodam III/Siliwangi, overseeing West Java and Banten provinces.
* Kodam IV/Diponegoro, overseeing Central Java and Yogyakarta provinces.
* Kodam V/Brawijaya, overseeing East Java province.
* Kodam VI/Tanjungpura, overseeing all provinces on Kalimantan island (Borneo) of Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan,
South Kalimantan and West Kalimantan.
* Kodam VII/Wirabuana, overseeing all provinces on Sulawesi island of Gorontalo, Central Sulawesi, North Sulawesi,
South Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi and West Sulawesi.
o Units include Batalyon Infanteri 714
* Kodam IX/Udayana, overseeing provinces of Bali, East Nusa Tenggara and West Nusa Tenggara. The former Indonesian
province of East Timor was also under the jurisdiction of Kodam IX/Udayana.
* Kodam XVI/Pattimura, overseeing Maluku and North Maluku provinces.
* Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, overseeing West Papua and Papua provinces.
* Previously Irian Jaya and the Maluku islands were under Kodam VIII/Trikora. Kodam VIII/Trikora had in 1997
six infantry battalions plus engineer detachments. The district commands in 1997 included Korem 171 (HQ Manokwari),
Korem 172 (HQ Abepura), Korem 173 (HQ Biak) and Korem 174 (HQ Ambon). The South Pacific Yearbook reported three
infantry battalions which were based at Manokwari, Jayapura, and Sorong, as well as mentioning a naval base at
 Operational Commands
Indonesian Army HQ in Jakarta. The statue is of Sudirman
* Special Forces Command (Kopassus), est 5,530 divided is composed of five groups, Grup 1/Parakomando (Para Commando),
Grup 2/Parakomando (Para Commando), Pusat Pendidikan Pasukan Khusus (Training), Grup 3/Sandhi Yudha (Combat Intelligence),
SAT 81/Penanggulangan Teror (Counter-terrorism); plus the Presidential Guard (Paspampres) and headquarters. Each
group is headed by a Colonel and all groups are para-commando qualified. Of note is the unusual nature of Group
IV, possibly also called "Sandhy Yudha," which consists of select members from Groups I, II, and III.
The duties of these specially trained personnel include attacking behind enemy lines (Infiltration tactics). Group
IV also, reportedly[who?], works with the Joint Intelligence Unit on interrogations, and carries out clandestine
operations around the country.
* Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), is the Indonesian Army's Strategic Reserve Command. Kostrad is a Corps
level command which has around 40,000 troops. It also supervises operational readiness among all commands and
conducts defense and security operations at the strategic level in accordance with policies of the TNI commander.
o Infantry Division 1 Kostrad, with 13th Infantry Brigade and the 17th Airborne Brigade, plus Field Artillery Regiment
o 2nd Division, with 6th and 9th Infantry, and the 18th Airborne Brigades, plus a field artillery regiment
o 3rd Airborne Infantry Brigade, Ujung Pandang (ex-Kopassus 3rd Group)
o KOSTRAD also commands several combat service support units such as combat engineers.
* Army Aviation Command The army had its own small air arm that performs liaison and limited transport duties.
It operates 100 aircraft in several helicopter and aircraft squadrons composed mostly of light aircraft and small
transports, such as the IPTN produced CN-235.
List of Army Chief of Staffs
Col. GPH Djatikusumo (1948–1949)
Col. AH Nasution (1949–1952)
Col. / Maj. Gen. Bambang Sugeng (1952–1955)
Maj. Gen. Bambang Utoyo (1955)
Maj. Gen. AH Nasution (1955–1962)
Let. Gen. Ahmad Yani (1962–1965)
Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudra (temporary) (1965)
Indonesia may be Southeast Asia’s biggest economy. But the nation’s status as a regional military power has dissipated.
The Indonesian Military’s (TNI)strength was at its peak in the 1960s, when the nation forced the Dutch to give
up their claim to the resource-rich region of West Irian, now the provinces of Papua and West Papua.
Then president Sukarno developed the TNI with foreign aid and equipment, principally from the former Soviet Union,
turning the TNI into Asia’s second most powerful military, behind the People’s Liberation Army in China.
“The Indonesian Military had an effective deterrent. Without such a powerful force, our history might have gone
in a different direction,” former Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal (ret.) Chappy Hakim said.
The TNI could boast of the air superiority and long-range strike capability of its many Soviet-made state-of-the-art
MiG-17 and MiG-21 fighter jets and TU-16 bombers, Chappy said, as well of its fleet of Soviet-made warships and
However, a reliance on Soviet-made equipment kept Indonesia’s defense industry in its infancy — despite a history
of domestic production dating to the 19th century, when the Dutch created companies such as NV de Broom, NV de
Vulcaan and NV de Industrie to arm its colonial forces.
Not long after gaining independence on Aug. 17, 1945, Indonesia, under the leadership of prime minister Djuanda
Kartawijaya, nationalized local Dutch arms companies.
The policy made way for the establishment of state-owned defense companies such as PN Boma, PN Bisma, PN Indra,
PN Barata and PN Sabang Merauke.
The companies were an embryo for the eventual development of 10 state defense companies, including aircraft maker
PT Dirgantara Indonesia, shipyard PT PAL Indonesia, arms maker PT Pindad and explosives maker PT Dahana.
Other non-weapon strategic companies include steel maker PT Krakatau Steel, heavy equipment company PT Barata Indonesia,
diesel and machinery company PT Boma Bisma Indra, train maker PT INKA, telecommunication company PT Telekomunikasi
Indonesia and electronic component maker PT LEN Industri.
However, it was not until the mid-1970s that Indonesia’s defense industries were professionally managed.
Then president Soeharto handpicked a genius — German-educated aeronautical scientist Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie
— to plan and develop the industrialization of the nation with full assistance from the West.
In 1974, at the age of 38, Habibie was named a presidential advisor for technology. Four years later, he was made
minister of research and technology, a position he held for 20 years before his appointment as vice president in
Under Habibie’s management, 10 strategic industries were consolidated under a single organization,
the Strategic Industry Regulatory Body (BPIS), in 1989 to “build and develop the country’s defense industry as
well as defense and security sovereignty”.
Habibie also had an ambitious goal to bolster the nation’s maritime and aviation industries by 2015.
With support from state budget, Habibie’s huge investments in Pindad, PAL and IPTN (Dirgantara’s previous name)
reaped benefits in the early 1990s, as local companies designed and produced the CN-235 cargo plane and the N-250
passenger aircraft, warships and various rifles and types of ammunition.
However, the TNI also went on a shopping spree, buying weapons systems from Western countries, including the US,
the UK, Germany and France.
The move was driven by the personal interests of TNI officers, who pocketed fees from arms brokers employed by
foreign arms companies.
Several weapon systems that might have been supplied by domestic producers were ordered from overseas vendors.
The TNI’s unwritten doctrine during the Soeharto era that placed the Army ahead of the Air Force and the Navy was
also hampering the development of shipyards and aviation companies that might have been more useful in protecting
an archipelago comprised of 17,000 islands and spanning more than 1.9 million square kilometers.
Budget constraints imposed by the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis and the absence of a grand design for defense
and industrialization after Soeharto’s fall have continued to plague the TNI and the nation’s defense industries.
Worse, the TNI currently relies heavily on foreign arms suppliers, leaving local companies with underdeveloped
core competencies due to limited orders.
“This unhealthy reliance has left our country prone to military embargoes, just as the US and European Union did
to us in 1999,” legislator T.B. Hasanuddin, deputy chairman of The House of Representatives’ Commission I overseeing
Hasanuddin referred to the western embargo of arms and spare parts sales to Indonesia following allegations of
human rights abuse committed by the TNI in the former province of East Timor, now Timor Leste.
The International Monetary Fund, which provided financial aid to Indonesia during the crisis, also instructed Indonesia
in 1998 to end its financial support of what it called inefficient local high-technology companies, leading to
the dissolution of the BPIS.
The government’s move to save the 10 strategic companies through establishing a holding company, PT Bahana Pakarya
Industri Strategis, in 1998, had no significant impact.
Following the company’s liquidation in 2002, the companies have operated independently under the State-Owned Enterprises
Most of the companies are currently in an unhealthy state due to mismanagement, bad loans and limited capital.
PAL and Dirgantara, for instance, are striving to get rid of loans that have haunted their businesses for more
than a decade, while Pindad, although having secured a small profit, is far from a prosperous company.
The government’s preference for importing arms, coupled with unscrupulous officials, has also contributed to the
fall of the nation’s defense industries and created disorientation in the defense system.
“Nowadays, our weapons system management is chaotic. We use a lot of different models for our defense systems:
local, US, Russian and Chinese systems,” Chappy said.
“Not only that it is more costly but also it requires more technicians to learn the different systems.”
The prioritization of the Army has also remained, meaning the TNI is focused on domestic security and not deterrence
or power projection.
The Army regularly absorbs almost half the TNI’s budget, receiving Rp 21.5 trillion (US$2.38 billion) of the military’s
Rp 44 trillion budget for 2010 alone.
This has affected funding for new warships and fighter jets, which Chappy said should be prioritized.
“Our defense industry is always tied to our defense policy. Since the Army is always a priority, we don’t expect
companies like PAL and Dirgantara to get a lot of orders. Our defense policy is basically saying let the enemies
come and we’ll beat them in our house, instead of preventing them stepping into our yard,” Chappy said.
This is the last report on the military’s (TNI) defense industry and arms procurement. Since the 1998 reform movement,
policymakers have made little headway in overhauling the arms procurement process, which has been plagued with
entrenched inefficiencies and a lack of transparency. The Jakarta Post’s Nani Afrida and Hasyim Widhiarto explore
Around 50 top military brass, arms vendors and officials from several ministries gathered at the Defense Ministry
in mid-September to hammer out decisions on the long-planned purchase of submarines, battle tanks and howitzer
The meeting was led by Defense Ministry secretary-general Air Marshal Eris Haryanto, who said in his opening speech
that the regular quarterly meeting was aimed at reducing the red tape and other obstacles in building the national
However, because the procurement problems are so entrenched, the six-hour meeting resulted in no substantial conclusions.
“[There is] still a long way to go. We’re forming a working group for selecting the overseas vendors who will cooperate
with us,” Eris said after the meeting.
The meeting highlighted just how lengthy and cumbersome the arms procurement process was — with deals often getting
lost in a labyrinth of bureaucracy.
An expensive arms procurement order could require 30 months-worth of paperwork simply to determine which country
would be the supplier, Eris said.
The process to purchase four submarines has been ongoing for more than five years, while the purchase of a Sukhoi
fighter jet squadron (approximately 12 jets) is now in its seventh year.
Aside from financial constraints and bureaucracy, other factors are also at play, including political interests
and deep-rooted brokerage practices involving business players and fee-seeking officials.
The latest political showdown revolved around several legislators’ opposition to the US’s recent offer to sell
two squadrons of second-hand F-16 fighter jets at a steep discount.
However, the Air Force was not able to process the purchase, as it had to wait for approval from the legislators,
which was not likely to come anytime soon.
“Our opposition to the F-16s deal comes from the past trauma of the US arms embargo,” said legislator T.B. Hasanuddin
of the House of Representatives Commission I overseeing defense, intelligence and foreign affairs. The US applied
an arms embargo from 1992 to 2005 following violence in the former Indonesian province of Timor Leste. The embargo
crippled the Air Force, which was largely comprised of US-made aircraft.
While settling the political side of things is a matter of negotiation, the Defense Ministry and the TNI are confronted
with a more challenging obstacle: rooting out the fee-seekers who impose staggering inefficiencies on the procurement
The defense budget is set at Rp 45 trillion (US$5.04 billion) this year, less than 1 percent of the gross domestic
product. On top of that, Rp 99 trillion is earmarked through 2014 to pay for a primary defense system and its maintenance.
Prior to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration, sales commissions for top TNI officials, dealers
and high-ranking civil officials could be as high as 40 percent of the total procurement budget, according to former
defense minister Juwono Sudarsono, who served between 2004 and 2009.
“We can only reduce procurement markups at the Defense Ministry, the TNI and the chiefs of staff headquarters,
but we cannot eliminate them entirely,” he said.
“I warned all chiefs of staff that I could tolerate “market price” fees for arms procurements — say between 8 and
10 percent commissions — but I would not tolerate 30 to 40 percent markups as in the past.”
The Defense Ministry issued a procurement regulation in 2006 that was aimed in part at squashing the fee-seeking
business. However, the regulation only increased the amount of red tape while failing to curb misconduct.
“We’re planning to revise the regulation so we can streamline the procurement process in just 18 months” Eris said.
The ministry has also set up a high-level joint committee involving the Finance Ministry and the National Development
Planning Agency to supervise the procurement process.
Since 2005, the ministry has explored ways of plugging loopholes vulnerable to graft and fee-seeking, but so far
the results have been minimal.
Deputy Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin insisted there were no such fee-seeking or brokerage practices
in arms procurement.
“I’ve never met any brokers. What do they look like? We have a tight supervision mechanism in place. We negotiate
directly with the arms vendors or with the host governments for the purchases,” he said.
“The final decision gets approved by the procurement evaluation team.”
However, senior arms dealer Soeryo Guritno said no changes had been made to the supervision system.
“Everything is still the same. Fee-seeking officials still roam around to take advantage of the arms purchases,”
Aside from the top TNI brass, legislators also allegedly pursued procurement fees through their duty of approving
budgets for projects in the field.
Juwono said he challenged all 10 party factions in the House in 2007 to be transparent and to identify who in each
party had been assigned to collect “mark-up fees” from suppliers.
“They [party representatives] came to the ministry to protest, asking me to provide proof of their misconduct.
In the end, each of the party representatives privately acknowledged that it was their job to garner markup fees
from each procurement project processed through the House.”
Legislator Effendi Choirie, who has been on Commission I since 1999, strongly denied that his fellow legislators
were involved in any fee-seeking or procurement markups.
But legislator Hasanuddin admitted that several legislators had found “business opportunities” from their knowledge
of the defense budget. Hasanuddin refused to comment on whether he was also involved in such practices.
“The legislators usually collect fees by mediating deals between companies and the TNI for providing spare parts,
maintenance or other supporting military services. But as long as it is done after the budget is finalized, I think
it is a normal practice,” said Hasanuddin, who was also former president Megawati Soekarnoputri’s military secretary.
REFORMING Indonesia’s army, once among the world’s most corrupt and abusive, has been a slow process since the
army-backed Suharto regime collapsed ten years ago. A big obstacle to this, and to the country’s democratic progress,
has been the forces’ deep involvement in all sorts of businesses, legal and illegal. The income from these sidelines—including
plantations, logging, hotels and property development—gave the army an unhealthy degree of independence from the
civilian government that supposedly oversees it. With much of the revenue being diverted into senior officers’
pockets, it also allowed them to keep meddling in politics, even after they were stripped of their guaranteed seats
in parliament in 2004.
A law passed that same year instructed the army to surrender its businesses to the government by October 2009.
Not much happened until earlier this year, when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (himself a liberal ex-general)
created a panel of experts to investigate the firms. The panel is due to report to the president this month. The
defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono, says it has identified about 1,500 military firms. But most have gone bust,
been bought by the private sector or are close to collapse. Only six viable firms with assets over $50,000 have
The businesses date back to the struggle for independence from the Netherlands in the 1940s. Each unit of the nascent
Indonesian forces had to finance itself and any method—even smuggling and drug-trafficking—was acceptable. Under
Suharto the businesses became huge money-spinners. Many were disguised as “foundations” for the welfare of lower
ranks but were really vehicles for the chiefs’ money-laundering and other capers. Recently they have crumbled,
as Indonesia’s economy has been progressively liberalised and they lost the monopolies they relied on.
In this section
The government panel’s findings concur with those of a recent study by Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani
for the Brookings Institution, an American think-tank. It found that by 2006 the combined revenues of Indonesia’s
military businesses had shrivelled to $185m at most, and put their profits at no more than $73m. These figures
are much smaller than military experts had hitherto assumed, and are a fraction of that year’s official defence
budget of $2.9 billion. Even so, the Brookings study reckons it will be tough to persuade senior officers to give
them up while most other arms of the state have their own sidelines.
The findings undermine one of the army chiefs’ main excuses for keeping their businesses: that they desperately
need the revenues to supplement the meagre official budget. Mr Sudarsono agrees that although the defence budget
has now been raised to $3.6 billion, it remains inadequate; he compares this sum, spent to defend a nation of 226m
people, with the $4.6 billion that tiny Singapore spends to defend 5m people. He believes he has, however, convinced
the top brass that spending on public works and anti-poverty schemes must take priority for the next five to ten
years, and that by thus building a stronger economy the government will eventually have more money to spend on
Polls show that the army’s reputation among the public has improved. Cases of corruption and abuse still continue
(such as in the troubled Papua region) but there is nothing like the top-down organised repression of the Suharto
years. A few military strongmen associated with those abuses, such as Prabowo Subianto (son-in-law of the late
dictator) and Wiranto, a former army chief, are campaigning for next year’s presidential election, perhaps financed
from their past business earnings. But their poll ratings are low. Various other ex-military men are running for
parliamentary seats but Pramono Anung, the general secretary of the main opposition Indonesian Democratic Party
of Struggle, says he sees no sign of a concerted attempt by the army to return to politics.
The problem, notes Tim Huxley of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank, is that, as the
army’s image has improved, that of the police has sunk. The police have taken on many of the bad characteristics
once associated with the army: corruption, abuses and running illegal sidelines. Mr Sudarsono says that, though
the army has officially given up its role in public security, some local authorities still call on it to deal with
unrest because they mistrust the police.