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Prabowo Runs for President
Jimmy Hitipeuw | Selasa, 22 November 2011
BANJARMASIN, KOMPAS.com -
Retired army general-turned-politician Prabowo Subianto affirmed here on Monday he intends to run for president
in 2014.
"Yes, God willing, I will again join the presidential race," he said before dedicating the secretariat
of the
South Kalimantan regional chapter of the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party here on Monday evening.
He took part in the 2009 presidential election as Megawati Soekarnoputri’s running mate.
The former chief of the Army’s Special Force (Kopassus) said he had decided to run for president because he believed
there was growing support from Gerindra and other parties for him to do so.
"In the 2009 general elections, Gerindra emerged as one of the big nine political parties in Indonesia, yet
it was then
only a newcomer," he said.
Another reason for his decision, he said, was that people now increasingly craved prosperity and self-reliance
while
Gerindra had in the past 3.5 years always remained consistent with its commitment to improve the people’s welfare.
The retired three-star general said he was optimistic that endowed with enormous natural resources, Indonesia would
be
able to make rapid progress and raise its welfare standards without having to remain the servants of other nations.
Therefore, he said, he would call on the people to vote for candidates who would really fight for their welfare.
"So, beware of the so-called ’dawn attacks’, namely offers of Rp100,000 cash handouts ahead of voting day.
Do not allow yourselves to suffer over the next five years in exchange for a mere Rp100,000 cash handout,"
he warned.
Prabowo who is chief patron of Gerindra Party came to South Kalimantan along with Gerindra chairman Prof Dr. Ir
Suhardi Msc to install the executive board of the party’s provincial chapter led by H Abidin H.H.
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Jakarta (ANTARA News) - Prabowo Subianto, chairman of the Advisory Board of the Great Indonesia Movement Party
(Gerindra), is ranked the highest as a presidential candidate, according to survey results released here on Wednesday.
The results of the survey by the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate from October 3-8, 2011 in 33 provinces in the country
involving 1,318 respondents showed 28 percent of respondents chose Prabowo as presidential candidate while 10.6
percent chose Constitutional Court chairman Mahfud MD.
Other candidates included former economic minister Sri Mulyani (7.4 percent), Golkar Party chairman Aburizal Bakrie
(6.8 percent), Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic organization chief Said Akil Siradj (6.0 percent), Muhammadiyah Islamic
leader Din Syamsuddin (5.2 percent), army chief of staff General Pramono Edhie Wibowo (4.2 percent), former vice
president Jusuf Kalla (4.0 percent), chief security minister Djoko Suyanto (3.2 percent), chief economic minister
Hatta Rajasa (2.8 percent) and businessman Surya Paloh (2.5 percent).
Soegeng Saryadi Syndicate executive director Toto Sugiarto said most respondents had chosen a military figure to
be the country`s next president because they missed a strict leader and therefore 65 percent had chosen Prabwowo.
"33.8 percent of respondents still believe a military figure is fit to be elected president in 2014,"
he said.
Second in the ranking was an academic collecting 17.2 votes, followed by religious figure (12.1 percent), businessman
(9.7 percent) and political party figure (8.9 percent).
The results of the survey done based on a stratified random sampling indicated that the military-civilian dichotomy
has not yet completely vanished.
The choice of a military figure correlates with public desire for the government to focus on corruption eradication.
A total of 40.5 percent of respondents urged the government to immediately settle the corruption and bribery problems.
Other problems needing urgent settlements were poverty according to 29.8 percent of respondents, unemployment (16
percent), mafia operations in all sectors (10.4 percent) and sovereignty (3.1 percent).
About a vice president, most respondents choose an honest and smart person.
The two qualities were represented in Constitutional Court figure Mahfud MD who won 15.6 percent of votes.
Following him were Sri Mulyani Indrawati (8.0 percent), Pramono Edhie Wibowo (7.1 percent), Din Syamsuddin (6.8
percent), KH Said Aqil Siradj (6.3 percent), Djoko Suyanto (3.9 percent) and Puan Maharani, the daughter of former
president Megawati Soekarnoputri (3.0 percent).
Earlier, the Reform Institute issued survey results showing Aburizal Bakrie to be the most popular figure as a
candidate for the 2014 presidential elections. He obtained 13.58 percent votes of 2,010 respondents involved in
the survey.
In the survey Prabowo Subianto was ranked second with 8.46 percent of the votes.
Editor: Priyambodo RH
COPYRIGHT © 2011
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Prabowo Ranked Highest As Presidential Candidate
Antara News
Wednesday, October 26, 2011
(Prabowo Subianto, chairman of the Advisory Board of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), is ranked the
highest as a presidential candidate, according to survey results released here on Wednesday.)
The results of the survey by the Soegeng Sarjadi Syndicate from October 3-8, 2011 in 33 provinces in the country
involving 1,318 respondents showed 28 percent of respondents chose Prabowo as presidential candidate while 10.6
percent chose Constitutional Court chairman Mahfud MD.
Other candidates included former economic minister Sri Mulyani (7.4 percent), Golkar Party chairman Aburizal Bakrie
(6.8 percent), Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic organization chief Said Akil Siradj (6.0 percent), Muhammadiyah Islamic
leader Din Syamsuddin (5.2 percent), army chief of staff General Pramono Edhie Wibowo (4.2 percent), former vice
president Jusuf Kalla (4.0 percent), chief security minister Djoko Suyanto (3.2 percent), chief economic minister
Hatta Rajasa (2.8 percent) and businessman Surya Paloh (2.5 percent).
Soegeng Saryadi Syndicate executive director Toto Sugiarto said most respondents had chosen a military figure to
be the country`s next president because they missed a strict leader and therefore 65 percent had chosen Prabwowo.
"33.8 percent of respondents still believe a military figure is fit to be elected president in 2014,"
he said.
Second in the ranking was an academic collecting 17.2 votes, followed by religious figure (12.1 percent), businessman
(9.7 percent) and political party figure (8.9 percent).
The results of the survey done based on a stratified random sampling indicated that the military-civilian dichotomy
has not yet completely vanished.
The choice of a military figure correlates with public desire for the government to focus
on corruption eradication.
A total of 40.5 percent of respondents urged the government to immediately settle the corruption and bribery problems.
Other problems needing urgent settlements were poverty according to 29.8 percent of respondents, unemployment (16
percent), mafia operations in all sectors (10.4 percent) and sovereignty (3.1 percent).
About a vice president, most respondents choose an honest and smart person. The two qualities were represented
in Constitutional Court figure Mahfud MD who won 15.6 percent of votes.
Following him were Sri Mulyani Indrawati (8.0 percent), Pramono Edhie Wibowo (7.1 percent), Din Syamsuddin (6.8
percent), KH Said Aqil Siradj (6.3 percent), Djoko Suyanto (3.9 percent) and Puan Maharani, the daughter of former
president Megawati Soekarnoputri (3.0 percent).
Earlier, the Reform Institute issued survey results showing Aburizal Bakrie to be the most popular figure as a
candidate for the 2014 presidential elections. He obtained 13.58 percent votes of 2,010 respondents involved in
the survey.
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LtGeneral Prabowo Subianto
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I Never Betrayed My Country
Prabowo Subianto is blamed for the violence
surrounding the fall of Indonesia’s Suharto.
Now the former general tells his story”
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By JOSE MANUEL TESORO.
Articles and Photos courtesy of Asiaweek Magazine
At night on May 21, 1998, the story goes, dozens of soldiers took up positions around Jakarta’s Merdeka palace
and the suburban home of B.J. Habibie, who less than 24 hours before had become the third president of Indonesia.
The commander of this force was the brutal Lt.-Gen. Prabowo Subianto. A week before, he had marshaled the dark
forces at his call – special forces operatives, inner-city gangsters, Muslim radicals – to murder, burn, rape,
loot and sow ethnic hatred in the heart of Jakarta. His aim: to undermine his rival, armed forces chief Gen. Wiranto,
and force his father-in-law, Suharto, to make him leader of the armed forces – a step closer, in a time of turmoil,
to Prabowo himself becoming president.
Suharto’s premature resignation as president frustrated Prabowo’s ambitions. So he turned his wrath on Habibie.
Disaster for Indonesia – and a nightmare for Southeast Asia – might have followed, if not for an order from Wiranto
relieving the dangerously out-of-control general of his command position. Enraged, Prabowo brought his troops to
the palace grounds and tried to burst, armed, into Habibie’s chambers. But he was eventually outmaneuvered. His
attempted coup d’etat was the climax to the 10-day drama surrounding the fall of Suharto, Indonesia’s leader for
three decades.
The problem is that not all of it is true. Maybe even none of it is.
The first to say that is Prabowo. “I never threatened Habibie,” he says. Did Prabowo plan the May unrest against
Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese to bring down Wiranto or Suharto? “I was not behind the riots. That is a great lie,”
he responds firmly. “I never betrayed Pak Harto. I never betrayed Habibie. I never betrayed my country.”
Prabowo, 48, is no saint. For 24 years, he belonged to the Indonesian military, which loyally followed the president’s
orders. He built up its elite special forces, Kopassus, to combat insurgency and internal terrorism. Prabowo was
also married to Suharto’s second daughter and enjoyed the wealth, power and freedom from accountability the First
Family afforded. He admits to abducting in early 1998 nine activists, some of whom underwent torture. About a dozen
others believed kidnapped in the same operation remain missing.
But is Prabowo a demon? In August 1998, a military honor court found him guilty of misinterpreting orders and recommended
sanctions or a court-martial. Prabowo was later discharged. In its October 1998 report, the government Joint Fact-Finding
Team (TGPF by its Indonesian initials) on the May riots asked that he be investigated for the unrest. Indonesian
and foreign media have since linked his name with words such as “scheming,” “ruthless and reckless,” “power-hungry
fanatic.” Wrote one Asian paper: “He is said to hate the Chinese.” The belief that he started the riots and failed
to contain them has already found its way into history books. “I’m the monster behind everything,” Prabowo says
with undisguised irony.
Yet nearly two years after Suharto’s resignation, no evidence has surfaced connecting him to the riots that triggered
it. The complete picture of those days remains obscured by conflicting accounts and unnamed sources. In September
1998, Marzuki Darusman, then TGPF chair and today attorney-general, mused to reporters: “I think there’s more to
it than just Prabowo. I say he’s a keeper of secrets. And he might be predisposed to reveal a few if forced to.”
Prabowo had been tried by public opinion and found guilty. But he had never had the chance to give his testimony.
He now spends all his time abroad, though local papers say he did make a brief, discreet trip home in January,
the first time in 15 months. (His wife remains in Indonesia, while their son is studying in the U.S.)
Now, many thinking Indonesians are acknowledging that Prabowo was perhaps the easy but not necessarily right target.
Says veteran journalist Aristedes Katoppo: “He was made the fall guy for a lot of mistakes not of his making. He
may have demanded things. But launching a coup? That is wrong. It’s disinformation.” Prabowo himself believes that
his persecution has a reason: “There was a certain group that wanted to make me a scapegoat, maybe to hide their
involvement.”
What emerges from Prabowo’s own account, coupled with this magazine’s independent inquiry, is a far different,
more nuanced tale than the accepted assessment that Suharto’s fall stemmed from a battle between good and evil
– and that Prabowo was the villain. This story is a report from and about the highest reaches of Indonesian politics,
a revelation of its treacherously shifting nature and the complexities of its actors. It challenges what many accept
about the country: its military, its former ruling family, its history. Whatever verdict you draw, it is impossible
to look at the fall of Suharto in the past – or the personalities and conflicts of the present – in the same way
again.
THE RUN-UP
Many tales circulate in Jakarta about Prabowo. In the popular narrative of Suharto’s fall, the former special forces
officer is often cast as its author: an evil genius who, if he cared to explain, could show how the entire arc
of events he designed made up one clever yet suicidally flawed conspiracy. But at the end of Suharto’s rule, he
was not the only figure. There were many actors, thus many motives and maneuvers. Amid social unrest and economic
collapse, it had become clear long before May 1998 to Jakarta’s elite that the question was not if the president
would step down, but when. Most important to them was to survive or even benefit. That meant playing a difficult
game: stay – or at least seem to stay – unwaveringly loyal to Suharto yet at the same time move into the best position
for a future without him.
The students and the popular oppositionists, despite their high profile, were the least powerful of the players.
The real decisions were made around the aging president. There were Suharto’s six children. There was his vice
president, Habibie. There were Suharto’s ministers and the chiefs of his parliament. And there were his armed forces,
and its two top generals, Wiranto and Prabowo.
In the run-up to May, Prabowo was snug in the center. In March 1998, he had been promoted from chief of the special
forces, Kopassus, to head the army’s key strategic reserve, Kostrad. The new job made him a three-star general.
His Kopassus classmate Maj.-Gen. Syafrie Syamsuddin had taken command of the Jakarta garrison in September 1997.
Prabowo’s former Kopassus superior, Gen. Subagyo Hadisiswoyo, was army chief of staff. Other allies included new
Kopassus boss Maj.-Gen. Muchdi Purwopranjono.
The one general Prabowo did not get along with was his superior, Wiranto. “There was not good chemistry between
us,” says Prabowo. “We never served in the same units. We came from different backgrounds.” Wiranto grew up in
traditional Central Java. Prabowo grew up abroad in European and Asian capitals. Where Prabowo’s postings were
field and combat assignments, Wiranto spent time in staff jobs and provincial commands. After four years as Suharto’s
adjutant, Wiranto rose quickly from Jakarta garrison commander to Kostrad chief. In 1997, he became army chief
of staff. In March 1998, Suharto made him both the armed forces chief and the defense minister. (Asiaweek sent
Wiranto Prabowo’s claims and comments as well as questions appearing in this story. Wiranto’s aide replied that
the general had chosen to respond to Asiaweek in a later issue.)
Wiranto and Prabowo were equally balanced. But in March, when the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) re-elected
Suharto and appointed Habibie vice president, Prabowo seemed to move a notch higher. He was a longtime friend of
Habibie. They shared Western temperaments and an optimistic idealism. “I liked his vision of high technology,”
Prabowo says. “That captured my heart. There was always this: We’ll show [that] Indonesia can be great.” They met
often. To fellow generals, Prabowo was Habibie’s most ardent defender.
Given the shaky state of Suharto’s health – he had had a mild stroke in December 1997 – Habibie’s chances of succeeding
him were better than those of any previous vice president. For Prabowo, Habibie’s ascension meant a shot at becoming
the military’s boss: “Several times he mentioned: If I become president, you’ll be armed forces chief, you’ll be
four-star.”
That is, if there were an orderly succession. The collapse of the rupiah, which began in October 1997, had sent
waves of social unrest throughout the archipelago. The following January, a bomb exploded in a Jakarta apartment
occupied by members of the banned leftist People’s Democratic Party (PRD). The military struggled to face strident
student demonstrations. Some activists mysteriously went missing. On April 27, Pius Lustrilanang testified to his
kidnapping and two-month imprisonment – the first of many accounts by abducted activists. During his interrogation,
Lustrilanang said, he had received electric shocks and been held under water. Despite Wiranto’s denials that kidnapping
was policy, popular suspicion fell on the military, and especially on Kopassus, still identified with Prabowo though
he was no longer with the unit.
While he had a reputation for absolute loyalty to Suharto, Prabowo also maintained friendships with critics of
the president’s “New Order” regime. These ranged from Suharto’s disenchanted contemporary Gen. Nasution to Adnan
Buyung Nasution, a lawyer who helped found the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, which defended and fostered anti-Suharto
activists. Prabowo built relations with Muslim figures, who perceived themselves as both victimized by a Christian-influenced
military and government as well as isolated in an ethnic Chinese-dominated economy. Among these: Amien Rais, a
Jogjakarta professor whose attacks on Christian power and Chinese capital were turning into open criticism of Suharto.
Prabowo’s unconventional contacts, and closeness to Habibie, set him apart from others around the president.
THE RIOTS
The drama began on Tuesday, May 12, when Prabowo received a phone call. Some students had been shot during a demonstration
at Trisakti University. Prabowo’s first instinct was to blame ill-disciplined security forces: “Sometimes our police
and soldiers are so unprofessional. You get some of these units – oh my God, this is stupid. That was my first
reaction.”
Sensing an impending emergency, he went to his headquarters on Merdeka Square, just beside the Jakarta garrison.
As chief of the strategic reserve, Prabowo’s job was to supply men and materiel. “I alerted my troops, to rush
them in,” he says. “These troops are always under operational control of the garrison commander. That’s our system.
I was basically in an advising capacity. I did not have command.”
He returned home well after midnight, but was back at Kostrad HQ early the next morning, May 13. As marauding mobs
began looting and burning buildings, Prabowo spent the day figuring out how to move in and barrack his battalions.
Another worry: Wiranto had been scheduled to preside over an army ceremony the next morning, in Malang, East Java
– over 650 km from the troubled capital. Throughout the 13th, Prabowo says he tried to persuade Wiranto to cancel
his appearance. “I suggested that we call off the ceremony in Malang,” he says. “The result: no, the ceremony was
on. [I] phoned back. It went back and forth . . . Eight times I phoned his office. Eight times I was told that
the show must go on.”
So at 6:00 a.m. on Thursday the 14th, Prabowo arrived at Halim air base in East Jakarta. He says he was surprised,
given the tense situation, to see most of the military’s senior command there. During the flight and the ceremony,
he says, Wiranto and he did not say much to each other. They arrived back in the capital after noon. Prabowo returned
to Kostrad HQ, where he bumped into Syafrie. The Jakarta garrison commander was heading off to survey the western
part of the city by helicopter. Prabowo accepted Syafrie’s invitation to join him. As they watched the second day
of rioting from the smoky sky, Prabowo remembers wondering to himself: “Why are there so few troops around?”
At around 3:30 p.m., Prabowo left Kostrad to see Habibie. The president had been away in Cairo since May 9 to attend
a summit. The vice president and Prabowo talked about the possibility of a succession. Under the Constitution,
Prabowo pointed out, Habibie was next in line. The subject of the future chief of the military came up. “I should
have noticed the shift,” says Prabowo. “He said: ‘If your name comes up, I will approve.’ There’s a big difference
there.”
On the way back to Kostrad HQ, Prabowo noticed that Jakarta’s main business artery seemed unguarded. He saw the
garrison commander: “I said: Syafrie, on Thamrin there are no troops. He was convinced there were enough. He asked
me to come along, and we saw!” Prabowo suggested taking half of the 16 armored personnel carriers guarding the
defense ministry and sending them instead to Thamrin. This did take place.
As night fell, Prabowo got a call from his secretary. Buyung Nasution and a motley collection of figures from various
groups wanted to see him. (This May 14 meeting would become central to the later investigation into the riots.)
“When I arrived at headquarters, they were there,” Prabowo says. “I did not call them. They were asking: What’s
happening?” Buyung Nasution demanded to know if there was any truth to the spreading rumors that Prabowo had planned
the riots, the Trisakti shootings, as well as the abductions. He also asked if there was rivalry between him and
Wiranto. Prabowo denied everything. “How can there be rivalry?” he explains now. “He’s a four-star. I’m a three-star.
I was trying to step in line. But after him I would be a good candidate, wouldn’t I?”
After a command briefing chaired by Wiranto which ended late, Prabowo arrived at his next appointment at nearly
1:00 a.m. Two close friends from Abdurrahman Wahid’s mass Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) had suggested
Prabowo see the cleric, who was already asleep when the general arrived. Wahid, a.k.a. Gus Dur, still received
Prabowo and asked about the chaotic situation. “I said, we can get it under control tomorrow,” says Prabowo.
After a change of clothes, he headed for Halim airbase, where Suharto was due to arrive before dawn on May 15,
Friday. Prabowo waited in his jeep while Wiranto met Suharto. Then the three, with most of the senior command,
drove to Suharto’s home on Cendana Street in central Jakarta. Prabowo says Suharto appeared cold toward him. By
now, Prabowo believes, Suharto thought his son-in-law was plotting against him. Says Prabowo: “It came out in the
papers that Gen. Nasution, who everyone knew was fond of me, said that Amien Rais should talk to Gen. Prabowo [about]
taking care of the situation. This must have been sent to Pak Harto.”
At the end of his rule, Suharto had become as dependent on the ministers, generals and children who surrounded
him as they were on him. He was their leader, but, in a sense, he was also their prisoner. “There’s a thousand-year-old
art of palace intrigue,” says Prabowo. “You whisper something very delicately, and poison someone’s mind. I tried
to give information, but I was considered as meddling. There were people poisoning his mind: that his son-in-law’s
there only to grab power.” This, Prabowo now believes, contributed to his downfall.
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Gerindra
‘rational’ over Prabowo 2014 bid
The Jakarta Post | Thu, 10/27/2011 7:19 AM
JAKARTA: The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) is focusing on gaining more support rather than prematurely
campaigning for party patron Prabowo Subianto as its presidential hopeful, despite Prabowo’s growing popularity,
a politician says.
“The party is facing a dilemma. While Pak Prabowo’s popularity is high, public support for the party is considered
relatively low,” Desmond Junaidi Mahesa, House of Representatives legal commission lawmaker from Gerindra, told
The Jakarta Post on Wednesday.
He said that the party would focus its efforts on reaching 20 percent of the population, the minimum percentage
a party must secure to nominate a presidential candidate for the upcoming 2014 general elections.
“But we want to be rational as well. Should the party fail to achieve the 20 percent target, then we must be ready
to name Pak Prabowo a vice presidential candidate,” he said.
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Prabowo Maneuvering
for 2014 Elections
JG Analysis | February 28, 2011
Controversial former general Prabowo Subianto
is luring smaller parties to side with his Gerindra party
as he prepares for a run on the presidency in 2014. (JG Photo)
With four more small parties set to join the Great Indonesia Movement Party and the ruling coalition warming
to it, party chairman Prabowo Subianto’s road to the presidency in 2014 is looking a lot smoother.
The party, also known as Gerindra, has worked over the past few months to create an alliance of 10 small political
parties to consolidate its power base ahead of the 2014 general elections.
Gerindra’s target is to win at least 13 percent of the 560 seats at the House of Representatives in 2014 — compared
to
the 4.5 percent the party now holds.
It has also been touted as a possible replacement for the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in the ruling coalition
after Gerindra backed the president’s Democrats in opposing a proposed inquiry into corruption at the tax office.
The PKS and the Golkar Party, both coalition members, broke ranks when they supported the inquiry, which ultimately
failed in a plenary session where Gerindra’s votes proved decisive.
Marzuki Alie, the House speaker and deputy chairman of the Democratic Party’s advisory board, said on Friday that
Gerindra could prove to be a valuable coalition partner.
Gerindra also hinted on Sunday that it was open to the possibility of joining the ruling coalition.
The party’s deputy chairman, Fadli, told the Jakarta Globe that “nothing is impossible in politics.”
But the party will also keep its eye on winning the presidency in 2014, when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
will not be eligible to run for a third term.
Political observers say that by voting in line with the Democrats on recent issues, Gerindra is sending a friendly
signal
and in return expects the ruling party — which has not named a candidate to replace Yudhoyono — not to block
Prabowo’s presidential bid.
One political insider says that while there is no shortage of ammunition against Prabowo, the Gerindra chairman
hopes
to avoid mudslinging from the ruling Democratic Party.
Prabowo, a retired Army general, was widely accused of controlling paramilitary squads used by the Kopassus special
forces to kidnap, torture and kill East Timorese dissidents while it was still an Indonesian province.
He is also accused of being behind the rioting in Jakarta in May 1998, leading up to the downfall of President
Suharto,
as well as the kidnapping, torture and murder of antigovernment activists.
He would later be found guilty by a military ethics tribunal of “exceeding orders” in the 1998 kidnappings, but
was not jailed.
But the political insider said the Democrats also want something in return for allowing Prabowo to run unimpeded.
Playing ball with Gerindra, according to the source, helps the Democratic Party by driving a wedge between Gerindra
and
the opposition Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), tacitly acknowledging Prabowo’s growing strength.
In other words, t he payoff for Yudhoyono’s Democrats is to keep Gerindra from getting too close to the PDI-P,
especially since the ticket of PDI-P chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri and Prabowo came second to Yudhoyono in 2009.
But Marzuki denied that ties between the Democrats and Gerindra were based on “pragmatic and transactional” politics.
“I know Gerindra is very critical of certain issues, but when it deals with any political move to counter government
policies, I’m sure they’ll never support it,” the House speaker said.
Fadli, Gerindra’s deputy chairman, said the party did not regard itself as a friend or enemy of the ruling coalition.
He also said Prabowo had never discussed any specific “possibilities” with the Democrats or other coalition members.
“Of course, we’re never going to beg [the Democratic Party to let us join the coalition], but if the offer comes,
we’ll certainly discuss it with the party’s leaders,” Fadli said. JG Analysis
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LtGen (ret) Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo
Former commander, Kopassus and Kostrad
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Retired LtGen Prabowo is not a suspect in the 1999 violence in East Timor. He is mentioned here only as background,
because so many of the suspects were connected with him earlier in their careers.
Although a major influence on Indonesian counter-insurgency tactics in East Timor beginning in 1989/90, he was
out of the country throughout 1999. Having been dismissed from his Kostrad command in May 1998, and from the military
entirely in August 1998, Prabowo had no TNI position in 1999. Instead he was in self-imposed exile in Jordan, doing
business with his wealthy brother. The many rumours, all of them unproven, that he was still in Indonesia anyway,
and directing clandestine operations in East Timor, indicate the power he once held.
Among the many 1999 militia leaders who were Prabowo's proteges were Eurico Guterres, Lafaek Saburai, Martinho
Fernandes, and Joni Marquez. Governor Abilio Soares owed his career largely to Prabowo's support. Many of the soldiers
(especially in Kopassus) who directed the militias in 1999 had been Prabowo's subordinates at some stage. Among
them were: MajGen Adam Damiri, MajGen Mahidin Simbolon, BrigGen Amirul Isnaeni, Col Gerhan Lentara, and LtCol Wioyotomo
Nugroho. Others had been his colleagues: Gen Subagyo H S, MajGen Zacky Anwar Makarim, MajGen Sjafrie Syamsuddin,
MajGen Kiki Syahnakri, LtGen Johny Lumintang, and Col Pramono Edhie Wibowo.
Background
Prabowo was born on 17 October 1951 in Jakarta, the son of noted economist (and dissident politician) Professor
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. While his father was on the run for supporting a failed regional revolt in 1957, Prabowo
grew up in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Switzerland and Britain. He graduated from the military academy
in 1974.
In 1976 he went to East Timor as part of Tim Nanggala X, a special forces unit that belonged to Kopassandha, later
called Kopassus. He undertook anti-terrorist training in the US (Fort Bragg, 1980; Fort Benning, 1985), and in
West Germany (GSG-9, about 1981), scoring 'top graduate' each time. In 1983 he married the daughter of President
Suharto, Siti Hediati Harijadi (Titiek). In 1983, sent to East Timor as a major in charge of Kopassus Detachment
81 (D81), he established the Tim Alfa militia in Lospalos. He was involved in the Kraras massacre of September
1983.[1] In 1988-89 he was in East Timor again, in command of the Kostrad combat Battalion 328. He turned it into
such a highly trained unit that it was chosen as the best battalion in East Timor.[2]
After eight years in Kostrad he returned to Kopassus in 1993 as commander of its Group 3, a special forces training
unit in Batujajar, West Java, that also played a role training militia leaders. He rose to Deputy Commander of
Kopassus in 1994-95, and to Kopassus Commander in 1995-98. In March 1998 he was moved back to Kostrad, becoming
Kostrad Commander.
However, with Suharto gone his fortunes quickly declined. He was exposed as having organised the kidnapping of
anti-Suharto activists early in 1998, and was finally dismissed from the armed forces in August 1998 after an internal
inquiry (DKP).
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Prabowo Subianto Speaks
Sep 29th, 2006
Conspiracy theories and paranoia from former military commander Prabowo Subianto.
Lieutenant General (retired) Prabowo Subianto, former head of Kopassus, the army special forces unit, from 1995
until the fall of Suharto in 1998, complains that Indonesia, its government and people, is constantly subject to
foreign attempts to weaken it.
There are certain world powers who openly say that Indonesia will split up, that there will be civil war, and so
on.
The fact that the Indonesian archipelago is located near several important sea lanes and that it has great amounts
of natural wealth and resources means that some countries will always seek to weaken it, he says. They fear that
if Indonesia has large deposits of uranium then the country will one day seek to build a nuclear industry.
The monetary crisis of 1997-98 had been planned by foreigners as one way of weakening Indonesia.
He named Michael Camdesus of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as one of the conspirators.
He added that both Camdesus and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher both wrote in their memoirs that
they had wished to see the reign of General Soeharto come to an end.
Therefore they schemed to create a monetary crisis in Indonesia to bring about their wishes.
He didn't make any mention of Jews however.
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Lieutenant General (ret.)
Prabowo Subianto
After Years of Solitude in Jordan
Former Commander of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command runs for President.
Rabu, 19 November 2008, 10:34 WIB
VIVAnews – He spoke in front of hundreds of administrators of Gerindra Party (Great Indonesia Movement Party).
In short, he stated that he is joining Gerindra's struggle in the next General Elections. In response, they cheered,
“Long live Prabowo! Long live Gerindra!!”
Their cheering was referred to Prabowo Subianto, formerly the Commander of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve
Command (Kostrad), who was attending a party held to celebrate Gerindra's success in entering the 2009 elections,
at Mount Putri, Bogor, 12 July 2008. At the same time, Prabowo declared his resignation from Golkar (the Functional
Group Party).
From then on, Prabowo no longer hesitated in reaffirming his stance on running for President in the 2009 elections.
Previously, he was considered to be a bit reluctant to go forward. He was still calculating, afraid that he would
not have significant support. “If there are responses and real support, then every citizen has a duty to go forward.
But if there are no support or response, then I would have to be realistic,” he said.
Together with Gerindra, Prabowo prioritizes the people's economic welfare. This is in accordance with his current
position as head of a nationwide farmers’ organization, the Indonesian Farmers Association (HKTI). Prabowo is also
the head of the Association of Indonesian Market Traders (APPSI). That is why in his television advertisements
Prabowo puts himself up as someone close to farmers, fishermen and laborers of the nation.
Prabowo's Journey
Born in Jakarta on 17 October 1951, Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo is the third child of Sumitro Djojohadikusuma
and Dora Sigar. Prabowo spent his childhood and part of his teenage years on the run. His father fled from Indonesia
due to a difference of opinion with then President Soekarno.
For a period of about ten years Prabowo spent his childhood in Singapore, Malaysia, Hongkong, Switzerland and England.
The experience molded his character to become independent, adaptive, and hardworking.
Since early on, his father, Sumitro, had planted the principles of the will to struggle in Prabowo. Sumitro deliberately
immortalize his brother's name, Subianto, who died fighting the Japanese, in his son's middle name. His hope was
that Prabowo would later become a fighter like his Banyumas-born uncle, who, according to him, inherited a tradition
of opposition.
At 16, in 1967, Prabowo completed high school in London. He was admitted to three universities in the United States:
Colorado, George Washington, and Rhode Island. But his father put a hold on Prabowo's college life, for fear of
possible psychological impact on going to college at too young of an age.
His father brought him back to Indonesia, so that he would get to know the country he was from. This is what made
Prabowo, an admirer of the Commander General Sudirman, choose to go to Magelang, Central Java, and enter the National
Military Academy. This is where important career episodes for Prabowo started.
Prabowo was the academy's valedictorian of 1974. Two years later, Prabowo became the platoon commander of the Para
Commando first group of the Sandy Yudha Command Force (Kopassandha) to be assigned to East Timor as part of the
Naggala team. In 1977, Prabowo was the Company Commander of the Para Commando first group Kopassandha, with the
rank of First Lieutenant.
After three years, he was assigned to participate in an anti-terrorist training in Fort Braggs, United States of
America. In 1981, Prabowo carved an outstanding achievement as the best graduate on the GSG-9 Anti Terrorist training
in West Germany. 1983, Prabowo was Vice Commander of the 81st Detachment of Indonesian Military Special Force (KOPASSUS).
In that same year, he married Siti Hediati Harijadi, the daughter of former President Soeharto. Not long after
the wedding, he was again sent on an operation to East Timor. There, Prabowo and his troops were missing in action
for 12 hours when they were ambushed by the enemy. Fortunately, he survived.
After that, he obtained various military achievements. In 1995, he was trusted to become the General of the Indonesian
Military Special Force (KOPASSUS). It was then that Prabowo was accused of being responsible for the kidnappings
and disappearance of several activists, which was done by a team called “Tim Mawar” (the “Rose Team”). To this
day, the victims are still nowhere to be found.
In 1998, Prabowo was appointed the Commander of the Indonesian Army Strategic Reserve Command. He didn't hold this
position for long because of the May 1998 incident. The May incident is believed to be a scenario of political
power, a controversy, involving an internal military dispute between Prabowo and the Indonesian Military Commander
Wiranto.
As a result, Prabowo was transferred. He became Commander of Indonesian General Staff and Command College. Through
the Honorary Board of Military Officers (DKP), Wiranto discharged Lieutenant General Prabowo from military service.
From the Market to the Palace
After being discharged from the military, Prabowo went to Jordan. He obtained citizenship status there and was
treated well by the King of Jordan, a friend of his during military training. In Jordan he entered the business
world. Three years later, he returned to Indonesia.
Upon his return, Prabowo founded the Nusantara Energy, together with Johan Teguh Sugianto and Widjono Hardjanto.
As stated in his personal website, www.prabowosubianto.net, Nusantara Energy consolidates many companies in the
pulp insdustry, forestry, agriculture, mining, commercial fishery and professional services. PT Kiani Kertas, PT
Kiani Lestari, PT Nusantara Berau Coal, are three of his many subsidiaries. The total number of workers in Nusantara
Energy amounts to 10,000 people, with total assets amounting to US$10 billion. Nusantara Energy is located in the
Bidakara Tower, South Jakarta.
In the political arena, the name Prabowo again emerged during the 2004 Golkar (Funcitonal Group Party) convention
for presidential candidate. Prabowo used a media consultant to improve his image. Alex Castinallos, the campaign
consultant of the Republican Party of the United States that put Geroge W. Bush in the Oval Office, and an advertisement
media consultant, David Axelrod, were signed by Prabowo's campaign team. Prabowo made it to the final round but
failed to win the election.
Prabowo's campaign team has devised a strategy for the 2009 elections. “Since 2004, the team has prepared a strategy,”
a Gerindra leader said to VIVAnews. The team conducted researches on the kind of presidential figure that people
are looking for, as well as the organizations that Prabowo would have to approach on his journey to the Presidential
Palace.
On the Fourth National Convention of the HKTI, and the fifth Farmers Congress on 5th December 2004, he was elected
as Chairman of HKTI for the 2004-2009 period. He replaced Siswono Yudho Husodo, with a vote of 309, defeating HKTI
Secretary General Agusdin Pulungan, who only received 15 votes, and one abstain, from a total of 325 votes. Recently,
in June, Prabowo was also voted as Chairman of Market Merchants Association of Indonesia (APPSI).
Before leading APPSI, Prabowo secretly assisted in the founding of Gerindra. The initiative for the founding of
this party came from some of the leaders of HKTI who are not satisfied with Golkar, as well as some of Prabowo's
close friends, including Fadli Zon. “Early 2007, I have proposed for a party of farmers and fishermen, but have
yet to receive a response,” said Gerindra chairman Suhandri, during an interview with VIVAnews, September 2008.
Nearing the administrative verification of political parties participating in the General Elections at the Department
of Justice and Human rights in mid 2007, Prabowo contacted Suhardi and asked about the proposal for the new party.
Prabowo agreed to help, but asked the party to be named Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement). Suhardi enthusiastically
mustered everything he had in order to be ready in two months for verification at the Department of Justice and
Human Rights. In the mean time, Prabowo had not officially resigned from Golkar.
Gerindra finally passed the verification process, both from the Department of Justice and Human Rights, and from
the General Elections Commission (KPU). Then on 12 July 2008, Prabowo delivered his resignation letter from Golkar
to its head chairman, Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Prabowo legally joined Gerindra, the party that he helped all
this time behind the scene. His path to the Palace is getting clearer.
Prabowo's seriousness in running for President can be seen in the amount of money he has spent for commercials.
Gerindra's vice secretary, Abdul Haris Bobihoe, disclosed that more than Rp 1 trillion (about US$100 million) has
been prepared for advertisements. No less than 10 television advertising concepts with 30-60 seconds duration have
been made with various approaches. It will be divided in 3 phases: first, introduction; second, a public figure
in a political party; and third, persuasion.
“All of this is being conceptualized by the same consultant team as it was in 2004,” Haris said. So it can be assured
that Prabowo's media consultant team is still Alex Castinallos and David Axelrod, the two people responsible for
getting George W. Bush back in the White House for the second time.
What has been the result of Prabowo's and Gerindra's campaign? In the 3 months of rigorous advertisements, Gerindra
has managed to become the most known new party, overcoming the popularity of even Hanura (The People's Conscience
Party) which is older. In a survey conducted by the National Survey Department in September 2008, 65.4% of 400
respondents knew Gerindra. While only 51.9% knew Hanura.
Now, Prabowo's name is more familiar in the ears of the people and he would perhaps have a chance as Indonesia’s
president, not just a president of farmers. That said, Prabowo's new saying is, “I am Prabowo Subianto, for the
new Indonesia!”
Translated by: Archie Ardian, Ramona Sofianne Dewi
• VIVAnews
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Prabowo Subianto
Prabowo Subianto (born October 17, 1951) was an Indonesian career soldier and currently a businessman and a
politician. Married to former President Suharto's daughter, Siti Hediati Hariyadi (Titiek Soeharto), he was influential
under the New Order administration.
The 1998 Revolution cut short his career, and he was accused of involvement in various "riots, plunderings,
rapes and murders".[1] Similar accusations were made by various NGOs of his efforts to preserve Indonesian
rule in East Timor. The controversial special forces unit Kopassus, which he commanded between 1995 and 1998, was
implicated in these alleged crimes.
The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) nominated Prabowo for the presidency in the run-up to the 2009 Indonesian
presidential election, however he eventually agreed to run for the vice-presidency alongside presidential candidate
Megawati Sukarnoputri.
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Pre-1998 career
Prabowo is the son of former finance minister, one of Indonesia's most respected economist, Sumitro
Djojohadikusumo. His brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, was the controller of one of Indonesia's larger conglomerates,
the Tirtamas Group, until it went bankrupt during the 1997-98 economic crisis.[citation needed] He graduated from
the Indonesian Military Academy in 1974 together with others who would gain senior positions such as Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, who would later become a prominent reform-minded general and be elected President of Indonesia in 2004.[citation
needed]
As a Lieutenant-General in command of the special forces unit, Kopassus, between December 1995 and March 1998,
Prabowo returned to East Timor, where according to Prof. Ronald Palmer of George Washington University, former
US Ambassador to Malaysia, "[Prabowo] turned East Timor into a personal fief and a training ground for Special
Forces black operations. He extended his protection to the notorious East Timor 'Ninja' criminals and used them
in extra-legal operations involving torture, extortion, murder, kidnapping, etc. in other regions of the nation,
before and after he become Special Forces commander in 1995"[2]
Outside Indonesia he was considered a likely heir presumptive, underlined by the fact that he was said to be "lionized
by his American counterparts as a future national leader".[3]
"Terror Squads" in East Timor
The Australia-based East Timor International Support Center demanded that Prabowo be prosecuted at the International
War Crimes Tribunal "for the atrocities committed in East Timor by Kopassus under his command". Specifically,
the human rights group charged that[4]
Prabowo has been implicated in the control of 'ninja squads', operated by the paramilitary groups in East Timor,
which have been used by Kopassus and other elements of the military to terrorise and torture East Timorese suspected
of supporting the pro-independence resistance.
According to the group, "leaked documents on actual ABRI troop numbers in East Timor indicate the existence
of 13 paramilitary squads and contradicts ABRI's long-time claims of having no links with paramilitary groups in
East Timor". Further, "the documents name groups like Team Alpha and Team Saka, which are known terror
squads in the Indonesian-occupied territory, and support claims that [these groups] were supported by Kopassus,
which was then under the command of Prabowo.
The numerous kidnappings, disappearances, torture and killings by instruments of the state, to keep Suharto in
power and to consolidate ABRI's presence and control over East Timor, can be traced back to Prabowo.
Allegation of orchestrating May 1998 riot
A senior US official told The Sunday Times that a major reason for that decision - "taken after considerable
deliberations" - was "a reasonable belief that Prabowo was involved in the riots which devastated Jakarta
in 1998" and that "witnesses had testified to his involvement in torture and the organizing of rapes
during the May riots, both being crimes covered under the [UN] convention".[5]
In Indonesian political debate, attention centered more on the accusations linking Prabowo with acts committed
in the heart of Indonesia itself during the final year of the Suharto regime and especially in during the Jakarta
Riots of May 1998, and targeting groups - such as the followers of Megawati Sukarnoputri - which came to prominence
following 1998.
Prabowo was accused of involvement in "the kidnappings, tortures, abuses, and murders" of anti-Suharto
intellectuals and activists.[citation needed] In their testimonies, former detainees told of being tortured for
days in an unidentified location, allegedly a military camp where most of their time was spent blindfolded, while
being forced to answer repeated questions, mainly concerning their political activities. According to the testimonies,
they were kicked, punched, terrorised physically and mentally, and given electric shocks.[6]
Prabowo is believed to have used Kopassus - and the army in general - as the instrument to trigger chaos - during
1997
and 1998 mostly targeted the Indonesian-Chinese minority.[citation needed]
Allegation of attempted coup and Fall from grace
The fall of Suharto and his replacement by the Vice-President Habibie deprived
Prabowo of his most important power source, though for a short time he and his associates still retained their
positions in the army.[citation needed] In his published memoires, Habibie discloses that during his early days
in power, there were wild movements of Army units around the Presidential Palace, organized by Prabowo.[7]
As described by Palmer, the fall of Prabowo was essentially accomplished in the space of three days:[8] "On
May 21 Prabowo met Habibie and demanded that Wiranto be replaced by his own man Gen. Subagiyo; however, Habibie
decided instead to appoint Wiranto Minister of Defense and Security, as well as TNI commander. Wiranto then fired
Prabowo as commander of the Strategic Reserve in the night of May 22.[citation needed] He was summoned by Wiranto
on May 23
and reassigned to Bandung".[citation needed]
In August 1998, the Dewan Kehormatan Perwira (Officers Council of Honor) found Prabowo guilty of "exceeding
orders" in
the kidnapping of anti-Suharto activists in 1998 but imposed no term of imprisonment.{{Kompas[9]}} He then went
into a
kind of "voluntary exile" in Jordan, but was forced to leave and go to Germany and then Bangkok.[citation
needed]
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The eagle
has crash-landed
Monday, 15 June 2009 01:30
Dirk Tomsa
Edition 97: Jul-Sep 2009
Despite an unprecedented media campaign, Prabowo Subianto’s political comeback has fallen flat – for now
Ten years ago it seemed as if Prabowo Subianto’s political career was over before it had really begun. During the
twilight days of the New Order, the former commander of the notorious special forces unit Kopassus had lost a power
struggle against his arch-rival Wiranto and was subsequently dismissed from the military. Accused of involvement
in the abduction of student activists and the instigation of the anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta in May 1998, the
former son-in-law of ousted president Suharto considered it safer to leave the country and go into temporary hiding.
In self-imposed exile in Jordan he turned his attention to business, making a fortune on the international oil
and gas market and through a number of high-stake deals aided by his billionaire brother, business tycoon Hashim
Djojohadikusumo.
In the meantime, Prabowo’s arch-rival from his days in the army, Wiranto, enjoyed a brief moment in the sun. Having
outmaneuvered Prabowo during the turbulent days of the transition, the former adjutant of Suharto was instrumental
in helping Abdurrahman Wahid to an unexpected stint at the presidency in 1999. But to Wiranto’s disappointment,
his support for Wahid did not bring the desired recompense. Instead of being rewarded with the vice-presidency,
he had to make do with a ministerial post. Shortly afterwards, Wahid added insult to injury when he sacked Wiranto
from the cabinet. Thus, merely two years after the fall of Suharto it seemed, for a short time at least, as if
there was no place for either Wiranto or Prabowo in Indonesia’s new democracy.
Two years after the fall of Suharto it seemed there was no place for either Wiranto or Prabowo in Indonesia’s new
democracy
It did not take long for the two to attempt political comebacks. In 2004, Wiranto and Prabowo were both candidates
in Golkar’s national convention to select a presidential candidate. Wiranto in particular invested huge amounts
of money at the convention in order to secure a place in Indonesia’s first-ever direct presidential election. In
the end the former commander-in-chief of the armed forces did manage to win the convention, but he failed to make
it all the way to the palace, finishing third in the presidential poll. Undeterred by the defeat, Wiranto then
moved on to found his own party (Hanura) and soon began preparing for the next elections in 2009.
His old foe Prabowo, meanwhile, was not just sitting idly by. In fact, it seemed as if defeat at the Golkar convention
had only whetted his appetite for politics. Watching Wiranto’s activities carefully, Prabowo too began to get ready
for the next elections. In contrast to his half-hearted campaign in 2004, however, this time he meant business.
Assisted by a high-profile media consultancy firm from the United States, Prabowo crafted an elaborate strategy
which he hoped would eventually elevate him to the highest office. The strategy consisted of three main pillars:
first, mobilisation of support for his bid; second, enhancing name recognition for his organisational vehicle;
and third, finding a niche in the political spectrum that he could use to distinguish himself from other candidates.
Finding the right vehicle
Prabowo’s first step was to assume control over one of Indonesia’s biggest mass organisations, the national farmers’
association HKTI (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia). Created during the New Order as a corporatist tool for Suharto
to monitor Indonesia’s millions of peasants, this organisation had descended into political oblivion after 1998,
but its vague affiliation with the rural masses made it an ideal vehicle for Prabowo because it provided him with
an opportunity to begin his image-building campaign by presenting himself as a champion of the poor. In December
2004 he was elected HKTI chairman with 309 out of 325 votes – never mind that he was not even a member of the association
at that time.
The HKTI position provided Prabowo with valuable access to an organisational base, but with a view to the 2009
elections he needed more than the chairmanship of a mass organisation. Indonesia’s electoral rules dictate that
only candidates who are nominated by political parties are allowed to contest a presidential election, so in order
to avoid dependence on the goodwill of an already existing party, he decided to emulate what various other retired
generals had done before him: he created a new party of his own. And so Gerindra (Movement for a Great Indonesia)
was born, a party with a fierce-looking Garuda eagle on its logo (the Garuda is the centrepiece of Indonesia’s
national coat of arms). From the day of its formation in February 2008, Gerindra dedicated itself almost exclusively
to promoting the presidential ambitions of Prabowo Subianto.
At first sight, Gerindra appeared to be not much different from the various other parties that had been established
by retired generals in recent years. Just like Edi Sudradjat’s PKPI, Hartono’s PKPB and more recently Wiranto’s
Hanura, Gerindra too seemed to stand for little more than conservative nationalism imbued with a touch of New Order
nostalgia. And yet, many observers were much more concerned about Gerindra than the other parties formed by retired
officers. A closer look at the composition of its leadership board and its advisory council reveals why. Formally
led by a largely unknown forestry professor called Suhardi, Gerindra provides a political home for a number of
controversial former generals who continue to be dogged by persistent allegations of gross human rights violations.
Amongst the most prominent are Gleny Kairupan, a former intelligence officer with a dubious track record in East
Timor, Muchdi Purwopranyoto, who despite his exoneration by a Jakarta court is widely believed to have masterminded
the murder of human rights activist Munir in September 2004, and of course Prabowo himself, whose list of alleged
crimes includes abduction, torture, and instigation of large-scale anti-Chinese riots. For this reason, Gerindra
and Prabowo caused particular alarm among human rights advocates, many of whom protested openly against his presidential
campaign this year.
In order to dispel this image, Prabowo pursued an ingenious plan. To the disbelief of those human rights activists
who now opposed his candidature, Prabowo approached some of his former victims and persuaded them to join his party.
Why exactly former student activists like Desmond Mahesa or Pius Lustrilanang, and Haryanto Taslam, a former leader
of Megawati Soekarnoputri’s PDI-P, all three of whom were kidnapped by Prabowo’s troops in 1998, agreed to support
the presidential ambitions of their former tormentor has been the subject of much speculation. Some observers have
argued that they were simply bought off while others claim they may suffer from Stockholm syndrome (a psychological
condition in which victims of abductions become emotionally attached to their hostage-taker). The three men themselves
have rejected all such speculation and simply maintained that after Prabowo had apologised to them, it was time
to move on.
An unprecedented media campaign
For Prabowo, people like Haryano, Desmond and Pius represented important human capital that could be used in his
bid for the presidency. But the real weapon in Prabowo Subianto’s struggle to polish his image was an unprecedented
media offensive which in mid-2008 ushered in the second phase of his presidential campaign. While other parties
were still in the planning stage, Prabowo began to inundate the Indonesian public with an unparalleled bombardment
of political advertisements.
Buoyed by a self-confidence bordering on hubris, Prabowo used these advertisements to liken himself to statesmen
ranging from Napoleon and Sukarno to Barack Obama
Buoyed by a self-confidence bordering on hubris, Prabowo used these advertisements to liken himself to an array
of past and present statesmen, ranging from Napoleon and Sukarno to Barack Obama. All television advertisements
featured the majestic Garuda eagle and consistently highlighted the alleged failure of post-Suharto administrations
to realise Indonesia’s huge economic potential. To fund this media onslaught, the soldier-cum-businessman-cum-politician
had to dig deep into his pockets (and those of his brother Hashim). According to a Gerindra official, the media
campaign alone cost about US$100 million, leaving plenty of room for speculation about just how much more was spent
on other campaign activities.
Throughout his media offensive, Prabowo portrayed himself as the only presidential contender capable of liberating
Indonesia from the yoke of rural poverty, unemployment and foreign debt. So far, so predictable. What very few
observers had predicted, however, was the solution Prabowo proposed for the country’s alleged malaise. Driven by
the need to distinguish himself from his rivals, the man who owed his fortune largely to strategic maneuvers on
global financial markets and to his connections to some of Indonesia’s most powerful elite families campaigned
on a quasi-socialist platform, criticising the government’s privatisation agenda and proposing revisions of existing
contracts with foreign companies such as Freeport and Exxon. Given Prabowo’s background, this may sound cynical,
but the ‘anti-neoliberal’ label helped him to stand out from his rivals. And in view of the electoral success of
other big-spending leftist populists like Hugo Chavez or perhaps Thaksin Shinawatra the strategy made sense, especially
in times of a global financial crisis.
Was it all in vain?
So why did it not work? Even though Prabowo had implemented his campaign strategy meticulously from the start,
Gerindra got less than five per cent of the vote (Wiranto’s Hanura party fared even worse, achieving only about
three per cent). A number of reasons probably account for this poor result, including persistent discomfort amongst
many Indonesians about Prabowo’s hardline image and his human rights record, as well as widespread apprehension
about his links to the Suharto family. Taken together, these factors apparently provided a substantial deterrent
for many voters. Arguably the most important reason, however, is that despite the global financial crisis the overall
socio-economic conditions in Indonesia were simply not ripe for the emergence of a populist saviour.
The man who owed his fortune to strategic global financial markets and connections to some of Indonesia’s most
powerful elite families campaigned on a quasi-socialist platform
Thanks largely to the government’s three-phase ‘direct cash assistance’ (BLT) program, many poorer Indonesians
appear
to be quite satisfied with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s performance. Significantly, the third phase of
the BLT program was implemented in late March 2009, which meant that merely two weeks before the election more
than 18 million poor families received yet another government-sponsored cash injection of Rp 100,000 per month,
to be distributed over a period of two months. In view of these measures taken by the incumbent president, it is
hardly surprising that few of the millions of farmers and fisherfolk targeted by Prabowo saw a need for a radical
overhaul of the economic system.
Moreover, even those who may actually have seen this need were apparently reluctant to believe that the person
to implement it would be, of all people, Prabowo Subianto, who, to put it lightly, is hardly famous for his philanthropy.
Another important reason for Prabowo’s failure to push Gerindra to a better result was that his campaign was essentially
regressive. Despite the professional outlook of the advertisements, Gerindra appeared to be preoccupied primarily
with romanticising the past rather than outlining the future. This nostalgia was epitomised in a statement by Gerindra’s
deputy chairman Fadli Zon who maintained that Gerindra ‘would like to rebuild Indonesia just like how it was in
the past when
people gained prosperity from agriculture and fishing’. Clearly, the election result showed that very few Indonesians
share
this desire to go back in time. Thus, it could be argued that Prabowo may have revolutionised the style of political
advertising in Indonesia, but he failed to match his impressive style with a convincing message.
So Prabowo will not become Indonesia’s next president, and neither will Wiranto. Does that mean that at long last
there really is no place for these two in Indonesia’s democracy? Not quite. Despite the clear verdict at the ballot
box and poor approval ratings in most opinion polls, both Prabowo and Wiranto are running as vice-presidential
candidates for Megawati and Jusuf Kalla respectively. This may look like a consolation prize only, but it will
ensure that the two will continue to have
a place in the system for years to come. And don’t be surprised if they run for president again in 2014. ii
Dirk Tomsa (Dirk.Tomsa@utas.edu.au) is a lecturer in Asian Studies at the University of Tasmania.
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